THE  NATURAL  HISTORY 
OF  THE  STATE 


HENRY  JONES  FORD 


UNIVERSITY  OF 
CALIFORNIA 

SAN  DIEGO 


r> 


THE  NATURAL  HISTORY 
OF  THE  STATE 


An  Introduction  to  Political  Science 


BY 

HENRY  JONES  FORD 

PROFESSOR   OF  POLITICS   IN   PRINCETON    UNIVERSITY 


PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

PRINCETON 

LONDON:  HUMPHREY  MILFORD 
OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1915 


Copyright,  1915,  by 
PRINCKTON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

Published  May,  1915 


PREFACE 

There  is  in  general  an  attitude  of  reserve  on 
the  part  of  political  science  with  regard  to  the 
social  and  political  implications  of  Darwinian 
doctrine  which  is  justified  by  the  present  state 
of  that  doctrine.  Although  Darwin's  theory 
of  the  origin  of  species  by  transformism  is 
generally  accepted,  his  account  of  the  factors 
of  the  process  does  not  meet  with  general 
acceptance  but  is  regarded  by  many  critics 
as  being  defective  on  some  points.  Meanwhile 
important  data  have  been  accumulating  in  va- 
rious fields  and  it  is  manifest  that  the  doctrine 
is  deeply  affecting  the  ideas  of  the  times.  It  is 
impossible  to  avoid  the  subject  altogether  in 
the  study  of  political  science,  but  it  has  been  a 
matter  of  practical  difficulty  to  provide  stu- 
dents with  a  succinct  account  of  the  way  in 


in 


PREFACE 

which  the  doctrine  now  bears  on  politics.  To 
meet  this  difficulty  the  present  work  has  been 
produced.  Although  the  treatment  is  concise, 
the  work  makes  a  detailed  survey  of  connec- 
tions between  biology  and  politics  inferable 
from  the  doctrine,  with  notes  and  references 
directing  the  reader  to  sources  of  information 
on  the  topics  discussed.  Hence  any  class  of 
readers  interested  in  scientific  opinion  as  to  so- 
cial and  political  origins  may  find  the  work 
useful. 

H.  J.  F. 

Princeton  University 
May,  1915 


IV 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

CHAPTER  I.     THE    IMPACT    OF    DAR- 
WINISM    1 

§  1.  POLITICAL,  IMPLICATIONS   1 

§  2.  THE  NATURALISTIC  CONCEPT 2 

§3.  EFFECT  ON  POLITICAL  SPECULATION.  6 

§  4.  CONTRARIETY  OF  OPINION 8 

CHAPTER  II.     EVOLUTIONARY 

PROCESS    10 

§  5.  Two  MODES  OF  OPERATION 10 

§  6.  THE  HUMAN  SPECIES 12 

§  7.  MENTAL  AND  MORAL  FACULTIES.  ...  14 

§  8.  THE  INDIVIDUAL  HYPOTHESIS 20 

§  9.  DARWIN'S  ALTERNATIVES 22 

CHAPTER  III.     BIOLOGICAL  DATA 26 

§  10.  THE  GENEALOGY  OF  MAN 26 

§  11.  NEW  THEORIES  ADVANCED 29 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

§  12.  THE  EVIDENCE  OF  EMBRYOLOGY.  ...  34 

§  13.  EFFECT  OF  BRAIN  DEVELOPMENT.  .  36 

§  14.  ANTIQUITY  OF  MAN 39 

§  15.  VARIETY  OF  ANIMAL  BEHAVIOR.  ...  41 

§  16.  MAN  A  SOCIAL  ANIMAL 44 

§  17.  INSTANCES  OF  SOCIAL  EVOLUTION.  .  47 

§  18.  BIOLOGICAL  SUMMARY    49 

CHAPTER  IV.     PSYCHOLOGICAL   DATA  52 

§  19.  DARWIN  ON  MENTAL  POWERS 52 

§  20.  ROMANES  ON  MENTAL  EVOLUTION  .  .  54 

§  21.  ANIMAL  PSYCHOLOGY 56 

§  22.  QUALITATIVE  DIFFERENCE  IN  INTEL- 
LIGENCE    63 

§  23.  ANT  INTELLIGENCE    65 

§  24.  REACTION        AGAINST       BIOLOGICAL 

THEORY 68 

§25.  DISCUSSION   OF   THE   PROBLEM 71 

§  26.  HUMAN  NATURE  A  SOCIAL  PRODUCT  77 

§  27.  PSYCHOLOGICAL  SUMMARY 81 

CHAPTER  V.     LINGUISTIC  DATA  82 

§  28.  THE  FUNCTION  OF  SPEECH 82 

§  29.  THE  ROMANES  BRIDGE 83 

vi 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

§  30.  GENESIS  OF  LANGUAGE 85 

§  31.  VIEWS  OF  PROFESSOR  SAYCE 88 

§  32.  THE  TESTIMONY  OF  AMERICANISTS  .  .  92 

§  33.  THE  ORGAN  OF  GROUP  PERSONALITY  96 

§  34.  INDIVIDUAL.  RIGHT  A  LATE  CONCEPT  100 

§  35.  LINGUISTIC  SUMMARY 103 

CHAPTER  VI.  ANTHROPOLOGICAL 

DATA  105 

§  36.  VESTIGIAL  STRUCTURE  IN  SAVAGE  SO- 
CIETY    105 

§  37.  ORIGIN  OF  THE  FAMILY 108 

§  38.  SYSTEMS  OF  KINSHIP Ill 

§  39.  THE  UNDIVIDED  COMMUNE 115 

§  40.  THE  ORIGIN  OF  TOTEMISM 119 

§  41.  ANTHROPOLOGICAL  SUMMARY    122 

CHAPTER  VII.     SURVEY    OF    GENETIC 

DATA 124 

§  42.  THE    HUXLEYAN   POSITION 124 

§  43.  SOCIALITY   AN   ESSENTIAL 127 

§  44.  SPECIFIC    IMPORTANCE    OF    DIFFER- 
ENCE      128 

§  45.  THE  EVIDENCE  OF  BEHAVIOR 131 

vii 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

§  46.  THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   CHASM 134 

§  47.  ALTRUISM  AND  THE  AESTHETIC  SENSE  140 

§  48.  COMBINED  WEIGHT  OF  THE  EVIDENCE  141 

§  49.  CONCLUSIONS 144 

CHAPTER  VIII.     THE  STATE   146 

§  50.  THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  TERM  .  .    146 

§  51.  THE  TESTIMONY  OF  HISTORY 149 

§  52.  THE  TESTIMONY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY  152 
§  53.  TERMINOLOGY  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  156 
§  54.  THE  STATE  AN  ORGANISM 158 

CHAPTER  IX.     METHODOLOGY 162 

§  55.  UTILITY  OF  THE  NATURALISTIC  CON- 
CEPT      162 

§  56.  THE  FORMS  OF  THE  STATE 165 

§  57.  THE  SCOPE  OF  CLASSIFICATION 168 

CHAPTER  X.     FIRST    PRINCIPLES    IN 

POLITICS    171 

§  58.  APPEARANCE  AND  REALITY 171 

§  59.  DEFINITIONS    173 


vni 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  IMPACT  OF  DARWINISM 

§  1.  Political  Implications 

The  purpose  of  this  treatise  is  to  examine 
the  foundations  of  political  science  from  the 
naturalistic  point  of  view  established  by  the 
publication  of  Darwin's  Origin  of  Species  in 
1859.  It  is  a  corollary  of  the  Darwinian 
theory  that  the  State  has  a  natural  history.  In 
this  regard  it  does  not  matter  what  content  of 
meaning  be  assigned  to  the  term.  Whether 
it  be  taken  as  a  general  designation  covering 
every  form  of  polity,  or  whether  it  has  refer- 
ence only  to  a  particular  type  of  polity,  the 
State,  according  to  this  theory,  is  a  phase  of 
development  from  associations  formed  among 
animals  of  a  species  included  in  the  subject- 
matter  of  natural  history.  Darwin  himself 
made  no  attempt  to  develop  this  corollary,  al- 

1 


2          NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

though  he  predicted  that  one  result  of  his 
theory  would  be  that  "much  light  will  be 
thrown  on  the  origin  of  man  and  his  history."1 
But  Haeckel,  who  was  the  first  to  make  a  sys- 
tematic exposition  of  the  theory  in  all  its  bear- 
ings, expressly  included  political  development. 
In  a  survey  of  the  scope  of  biogeny  he  noted 
the  following  category :  "Cormophyly :  Tribal 
history  of  races  or  of  social  aggregates  com- 
posed of  persons,  families,  communities, 
States,  etc."2 

§  2.  The  Naturalistic  Concept 

The  concept  thus  supplied  to  political  science 
gave  promise  of  fruitfulness.  Almost  sim- 
ultaneously with  the  publication  of  Darwin's 
own  speculations  as  to  the  origin  of  the  mental 
and  moral  characteristics  of  humanity,  Bage- 

1  Origin  of  Species.  Chapter  XV.,  Sec.  822.  The  references 
are  to  the  English  edition  with  numbered  sections. 

Darwin's  doctrine  of  the  origin  of  species  by  transformism 
is  generally  accepted,  but  the  same  can  not  now  be  said  of 
his  account  of  the  factors  involved  in  the  process.  For  the 
purpose  of  the  present  treatise  it  is  not  necessary  to  go  into 
this  branch  of  the  subject.  A  good  account  of  the  state  of 
scientific  opinion  will  be  found  in  Professor  Kellogg's  Dar- 
winism To-day. 

3  Evolution  of  Man.    Vol.  I.,  Chap.  I.,  Table  1. 


THE  IMPACT  OF  DARWINISM  3 

hot  made  a  brilliant  application  of  the  doctrine 
of  natural  selection  in  explaining  the  forma- 
tion of  political  structure  and  the  development 
of  polity.  The  first  edition  of  Darwin's  Des- 
cent of  Man  was  published  in  1871.  Bage- 
hot's  Physics  and  Politics  was  first  published 
in  1873.  Expectations  were  entertained  of 
steady  progress  in  the  scientific  elucidation  of 
social  and  political  phenomena.  Publication 
of  Spencer's  Principles  of  Sociology,  account- 
ing for  the  growth  and  development  of  institu- 
tions on  the  principles  of  evolution,  was  begun 
in  1876  and  his  survey  of  political  institutions 
was  completed  in  1882.  His  Descriptive  So- 
ciology, begun  in  1867,  was  planned  "to  supply 
the  student  of  social  science  with  data  standing 
towards  his  conclusions  in  a  relation  like  that 
in  which  accounts  of  the  structure  and  func- 
tions of  different  types  of  animals  stand  to  the 
conclusions  of  the  biologist."3  The  work  was 
carried  on  for  fourteen  years  and  eight  vol- 
umes containing  classified  data  were  published, 
but  the  laborious  achievement  has  had  no 
noticeable  effect  in  any  branch  of  social  science. 

*  Preface  to  Descriptive  Sociology.    Vol.  I. 


4          NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

In  1885  Professor  Seeley  of  Cambridge 
University  proposed  a  scheme  of  political 
science  that  coordinated  it  with  natural  history. 
The  lectures  in  which  he  described  the  scheme 
were  collected  after  his  death  by  Professor 
Sidgwick,  and  published  in  1896  under  the 
title  Introduction  to  Political  Science.  Seeley 
virtually  adopted  the  same  methodological  con- 
cept that  Haeckel  had  indicated.  He  based 
political  science  upon  the  concept  of  the  State 
as  an  organism,  the  development  of  institu- 
tions being  the  result  of  the  effort  which  an 
organism  makes  to  adapt  itself  to  its  environ- 
ment. Pointing  out  that  in  its  traditional  form 
political  science  concerns  itself  only  with  the 
civilized  State,  excluding  the  wild  and  con- 
fused associations  in  which  savages  and  bar- 
barians may  seem  to  live,  he  condemned  such 
exclusion  as  unscientific. 

"An  inductive  method  of  political 
science  must  begin  by  putting  aside  as  ir- 
relevant the  distinction  of  barbarous  and 
civilized,  and  by  admitting  to  impartial 
consideration  all  societies  held  together  by 
the  principle  of  government.  We  must 


THE  IMPACT  OF  DARWINISM  5 

distinguish  and  arrange  the  various  kinds 
of  the  State  in  the  same  purely  observant 
spirit  which  a  Linnaeus  brought  to  plants 
or  a  Cuvier  to  animals.  We  no  longer 
think  of  excluding  any  State  because  we 
do  not  like  it,  any  more  than  a  naturalist 
would  have  a  right  to  exclude  plants  un- 
der the  contemptuous  name  of  'weeds,'  or 
animals  under  the  name  of  'vermin'." 

Referring  to  the  fact  that  in  the  animal 
kingdom  the  majority  of  the  numerous  classi- 
fications are  assigned  to  strange  organisms  in 
which  the  vital  principle  is  developed  in  such 
a  manner  that  the  being  has  little  external  re- 
semblance to  what  is  popularly  called  an  ani- 
mal, Seeley  said  that  if  political  entities  were 
studied  by  the  same  method  "It  would  not  be 
surprising  if  all  the  States  described  by  Aris- 
totle, and  all  the  States  of  Europe  into  the 
bargain,  should  yield  but  a  small  proportion 
of  the  whole  number  of  varieties,  while  those 
States  less  familiar  to  us,  and  which  our  manu- 
als are  apt  to  pass  over  in  silence  as  barbarous, 
yielded  a  far  greater  number."4 

4  Opus  cited,  pp.  33,  34. 


6          NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

Notwithstanding  this  promising  start  the 
methodizing  of  political  science  upon  an  ob- 
jective basis  in  connection  with  natural  history 
has  halted,  and  little  work  has  been  done  in 
that  direction.  The  naturalistic  concept  has 
apparently  been  abandoned  by  political  science 
and  has  been  taken  over  by  sociology,  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  which  is  not  primarily  the  State 
but  the  associational  process  of  which  the  State 
is  but  one  among  many  manifestations.  The 
present  tendency  in  political  science  is  away 
from  the  naturalistic  standpoint.  The  sugges- 
tions of  Darwinism  instead  of  supplying  social 
and  political  criteria  appear  to  be  a  source  of 
distraction  and  perplexity.5 

§  3.  Effect  on  Political  Speculation 

Apart  from  its  transient  effect  upon  politi- 
cal science,  the  impact  of  Darwinism  has  had 
marked  effect  upon  the  general  tenor  of  po- 
.litical  speculation.  In  this  field  the  naturalis- 
jtic  concept  has  been  extremely  fertile.  The 
concept  of  society  as  an  organism  and  of  the 

•G.  Lowes  Dickinson's  brilliant  little  volume  A  Modern 
Symposium  portrays  the  situation  with  comprehensiveness  and 
appreciation. 


development  of  social  structure  through  strug- 
gle and  conflict  was  grasped  by  Marx  before 
Darwin's  theory  was  propounded.  In  1859, 
the  year  in  which  the  Origin  of  Species  was 
published,  Marx  issued  his  Contribution  to  the 
Critique  of  Political  Economy  in  which  he 
stated  his  theory  of  economic  determinism 
later  developed  in  his  treatise  on  Capital.  In 
the  preface  to  the  first  volume  of  that  work, 
published  in  1867,  he  said:  "The  present  so- 
ciety is  no  solid  crystal,  but  is  an  organism 
capable  of  change  and  is  constantly  changing," 
and  he  declared  that  the  purpose  of  his  treatise 
was  "to  lay  bare  the  economic  law  of  motion  in 
modern  society."  This  school  of  thought  ac- 
cepted Darwin's  theory  as  a  biological  confir- 
mation of  the  philosophical  basis  of  Socialism, 
and  it  has  been  vigorously  exploited  in  that 
respect  ever  since.  There  is  now  a  voluminous 
literature  in  all  the  principal  countries  of  Eu- 
rope expounding  Darwinism  in  accord  with 
schemes  of  social  and  political  reconstruction, 
and  its  influence  extends  wherever  the  touch 
of  civilization  is  felt.  The  naturalistic  concept 
of  human  origins  is  familiar  to  the  literati  of 


8          NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

India  and  Japan  and  in  those  countries  too 
social  ferments  are  at  work  from  this  cause. 

§  4.  Contrariety  of  Opinion 

Thus  it  appears  that  while  the  movement  to 
methodize  political  science  according  to  the 
naturalistic  concept  has  apparently  miscarried, 
yet  that  concept  has  obtained  wide  acceptance 
as  the  basis  of  political  speculation.  When  the 
character  of  this  political  speculation  is  con- 
sidered it  appears  that  incompatible  conclu- 
sions are  reached  by  trains  of  reasoning  all 
starting  from  naturalistic  premises.  Socialists 
reach  the  conclusion  that  the  State  should  be 
the  universal  capitalist  and  employer.  Anar- 
chists reach  the  conclusion  that  the  State 
should  be  abolished  altogether.  From  the 
writings  of  Spencer,  Huxley,  Taine,  Marx, 
Kropotkin,  Galton,  Nietzsche,  Kidd  and  Hob- 
house  one  might  draw  the  most  widely  diver- 
gent interpretations  of  the  ethical  and  political 
^significance  of  Darwinism.  Such  marked  dis- 
agreement in  conclusions  suggests  that  diver- 
gent notions  exist  as  to  premises.  If  some 
reasoners  make  one  assumption  while  others 


THE  IMPACT  OF  DARWINISM  9 

make  another  assumption,  failure  to  achieve 
scientific  order  and  precision  in  exhibiting  the 
social  and  political  implications  of  Darwinism 
would  follow  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  just 
such  failure  is  manifest.  Therefore  an  inquiry 
into  the  bearing  of  Darwinism  upon  political 
science  must  first  determine  exactly  what  Dar- 
winism affirms  as  to  the  origin  of  human 
species. 


CHAPTER  II 

EVOLUTIONARY  PROCESS 

§  5.  Two  Modes  of  Operation 

In  The  Origin  of  Species  Darwin  pointed 
out  that  modification  of  structure  or  instinct  in 
the  individual  through  natural  selection  may 
take  place  either  directly  or  indirectly.  The 
increment  of  advantage  that  preserves,  ex- 
tends and  perpetuates  some  variations,  and 
thus  gives  rise  to  the  multiplication  and  the 
succession  of  species,  may  take  place  on  lines 
of  individuality  or  on  lines  of  community.  In 
the  latter  case  the  selective  process  affects  in- 
dividual character  through  stresses  and  reac- 
tions in  the  community  to  which  the  individual 
belongs.  Darwin  was  led  to  make  this  distinc- 
tion by  consideration  of  the  case  of  the  social 
insects,  which  in  members  of  the  same  species 
present  differences  of  structure  that  cannot  be 

10 


EVOLUTIONARY  PROCESS  11 

accounted  for  on  the  principle  of  individual 
advantage.  He  remarks  that  this  difficulty  at 
first  appeared  "insuperable  and  actually  fatal 
to  the  whole  theory."1 

The  difficulty  disappeared  and  the  facts 
came  into  agreement  with  the  theory  when  he 
noted  that  in  such  cases  the  community  forms 
a  compound  individual  and  it  is  this  individual 
whose  advantage  is  promoted  by  the  process  of 
natural  selection,  the  unit  life  of  the  com- 
munity being  indirectly  affected.  Applying 
this  principle  of  communal  advantage  he  was 
able  to  explain  the  remarkable  diversities 
among  insects  of  the  same  species.  Differentia- 
tion of  form  and  function  took  place  because 
"it  had  been  profitable  to  the  community." 
"Selection  has  been  applied  to  the  family,  and 
not  to  the  individual,  for  the  sake  of  gaining  a 
serviceable  end."2  Darwin  gives  details  of  the 
operation  of  this  principle  in  the  case  of  ants, 
different  individuals  of  which  have  markedly 
different  organs,  adapted  to  their  particular 
functions  in  the  service  of  the  community.  He 

*  Origin  of  Species,  Chap.  VIII.,  Sec.  434. 
'Ibid.  Chap.  VIII.,  Sec.  437. 


12        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

remarks:  "We  can  see  how  useful  their  pro- 
duction may  have  been  to  a  social  community 
of  ants,  on  the  same  principle  that  division  of 
labor  is  useful  to  civilized  man."3 

§  6.  The  Human  Species 

Whether  or  not  in  the  formation  of  the  hu- 
man species  the  operation  of  natural  selection 
has  been  direct  or  indirect,  individual  or  social, 
is  a  point  of  fundamental  importance  in  scien- 
tific appreciation  of  human  nature,  but  the 
point  is  not  considered  in  The  Origin  of  Spe- 
cies. Darwin  took  up  this  subject  in  The 
Descent  of  Man,  published  in  1871.  Close  ex- 
jamination  of  that  work  shows  that  he  vacillates 
between  two  different  theories  of  the  .origin  of 
the  human  species,  at  times  imputing  it  to  that 
indirect  operation  of  the  process  of  natural 
selection  which  in  this  discussion  will  be  desig- 
nated as  social  evolution,  and  at  other  times  im- 
puting it  to  individual  evolution.  His  work 
presents  an  extensive  array  of  evidence  in  sup- 
port of  the  proposition  that  "Man  is  the  co- 
descendent  with  other  species  of  some  ancient 

1  Ibid.  Chap.  VIIL,  Sec.  443. 


EVOLUTIONARY  PROCESS  13 

lower  and  extinct  form"  but  he  does  not  ex- 
press himself  with  clearness  and  consistency  as 
to  the  particular  process  by  which  the  human 
species  was  formed.  Therefore  to  give  a  fair 
presentation  of  his  views  it  is  necessary  to  quote 
him  at  some  length.  In  discussing  the  "Man- 
ner of  Development  of  Man  from  Some  Lower 
Form"  he  observes : 

"With  strictly  social  animals,  natural 
selection  sometimes  acts  on  the  individual 
through  the  preservation  of  variations 
which  are  beneficial  to  the  community.  A 
community  which  includes  a  large  number 
of  well  endowed  individuals  increases  in 
number  and  is  victorious  over  less  favored 
ones ;  even  although  each  separate  member 
gains  no  advantage  over  the  others  in  the 
same  community.  Associated  insects  have 
thus  acquired  many  remarkable  struc- 
tures, which  are  of  little  or  no  service  to 
the  individual,  such  as  pollen  collecting 
apparatus,  or  the  sting  of  the  worker  bee, 
or  the  great  jaws  of  the  soldier  ants." 


14        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

Darwin  goes  on  to  say  that  "with  the  higher 
social  animals"  he  is  not  aware  that  "any  struc- 
ture has  been  modified  solely  for  the  good  of 
the  community,  although  some  are  of  secon- 
dary service  to  it."  But  the  context  indicates 
that  he  is  here  thinking  of  extensive  structure 
such  as  he  has  just  mentioned  in  the  case  of 
social  insects.  He  is  not  referring  to  intensive 
structure  as  in  the  development  of  the  brain 
and  the  nervous  system,  for  he  immediately 
adds:  "In  regard  to  certain  mental  powers 
the  case  is  wholly  different;  for  these  faculties 
have  been  chiefly,  or  even  exclusively,  gained 
for  the  benefit  of  the  community,  and  the  indi- 
viduals thereof  have  at  the  same  time  gained 
an  advantage  indirectly."4 

§  7.  Mental  and  Moral  Faculties 

Darwin  gives  a  number  of  details  as  to  the 
way  in  which  the  incidence  of  natural  selection 
upon  the  individual  may  be  modified  by  com- 
munal life.  He  holds  that  the  germs  of  the 
mental  and  moral  faculties  of  man  are  trace- 
able in  the  nature  of  the  lower  animals.  The 

•Chap.  II.,  Sec.  94. 


EVOLUTIONARY  PROCESS  15 

difference  although  immense,  as  he  expressly 
declares  it  to  be,  is  of  degree  and  not  of  kind. 
Brain,  the  organ  of  the  mind,  has  been  de- 
veloped from  the  corresponding  plexus  of 
nerve  tissue  in  the  series  of  animal  forms  ante- 
cedent to  the  human  species.  This  portion  of 
Darwin's  treatise  is  most  important  in  its  po- 
litical bearings,  as  he  points  out  that  the  origins 
of  government  are  distinctly  noticeable  among 
the  gregarious  animals.  "The  most  common 
mutual  service  in  the  higher  animals  is  to  warn 
one  another  of  danger  by  means  of  the  united 
senses  of  all."5  He  gives  various  instances  of 
cooperation,  government  and  control.  "Bull 
bisons  in  North  America,  when  there  is  danger, 
drive  the  cows  and  calves  into  the  middle  of 
the  herd,  while  they  defend  the  outside."  He 
mentions  the  case  of  a  troop  of  baboons  at- 
tacked by  dogs,  all  escaping  safely  to  the 
heights  save  a  young  one,  who  stood  on  a  block 
of  rock,  loudly  calling  for  aid.  One  of  the 
largest  males,  "a  true  hero,"  Darwin  observes, 
"ran  to  the  young  one's  aid  and  led  him  out  of 
danger."6  "All  animals  living  in  a  body, 

"Chap.  IV.,  Sec.  160. 
"Chap.  IV.,  Sec.  161. 


16        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

which  defend  themselves  or  attack  their  ene- 
mies in  concert,  must  indeed  be  in  some  degree 
faithful  to  one  another,  and  those  that  follow 
a  leader  must  be  in  some  degree  obedient."7 
Darwin  points  out  that  it  is  impossible  to  ac- 
count for  the  spirit  of  self-sacrifice  on  grounds 
of  individual  advantage. 

"Man  seems  often  to  act  impulsively, 
that  is,  from  instinct  or  long  habit,  with- 
out any  consciousness  of  pleasure,  in  the 
same  manner  as  does  probably  a  bee  or 
ant,  when  it  blindly  follows  its  instincts. 
Under  circumstances  of  extreme  peril,  as 
during  a  fire,  when  a  man  endeavors  to 
save  a  fellow  creature  without  a  moment's 
hesitation,  he  can  hardly  feel  pleasure; 
and  still  less  has  he  time  to  reflect  on  the 
dissatisfaction  which  he  might  subse- 
quently experience  if  he  did  not  make  the 
attempt.  Should  he  afterward  reflect 
over  his  own  conduct,  he  would  feel  that 
there  lies  within  him  an  impulsive  power 
widely  different  from  a  search  after  plea- 

7  Chap.  IV.,  Sec.  167. 


EVOLUTIONARY  PROCESS  17 

sure  or  happiness,  and  this  seems  to  be  the 
deeply  planted  social  instinct/'8 

In  summing  up  the  evidence  in  the  closing 
portion  of  the  chapter  Darwin  holds  that  "the 
social  instincts,  which  no  doubt  were  acquired 
by  man  as  by  the  lower  animals  for  the  good 
of  the  community,"9  have  operated  to  develop 
Man's  moral  and  intellectual  faculties.  He 
devotes  the  fifth  chapter  to  an  examination  of 
the  steps  and  means  by  which  the  mental  and 
moral  faculties  of  man  have  been  gradually 
evolved.  In  this  chapter,  likewise,  his  princi- 
ple of  interpretation  is  social  evolution.  He 
observes : 

"It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  although 
a  high  standard  of  morality  gives  but  a 
slight  or  no  advantage  to  each  individual 
man  and  his  children  over  the  other  men 
of  the  same  tribe,  yet  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  well  endowed  men  and  an  ad- 
vancement in  the  standard  of  ^morality 
will  certainly  give  an  immense  advantage 

•Chap.  IV7.,  Sec.  194. 
•Chap.  IV.,  Sec.  203. 


18        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

to  one  tribe  over  another.  A  tribe  includ- 
ing many  members,  who,  from  possessing 
in  a  high  degree  the  spirit  of  patriotism, 
fidelity,  obedience,  courage  and  sym- 
pathy, were  always  ready  to  aid  one  an- 
other and  to  sacrifice  themselves  for  the 
common  good,  would  be  victorious  over 
most  other  tribes,  and  this  would  be 
natural  selection."10 

Man  is  differentiated  from  his  animal  cog- 
nates chiefly  by  interior  structure;  the  mass 
and  complexity  of  the  brain.  This  implies 
that  the  mode  of  evolutionary  process  in  the 
case  of  Man  would  be  such  as  to  develop  the 
brain  instead  of  transforming  corporeal  struc- 
ture. Darwin  cites  with  approval  Wallace's 
opinion  that  "Man,  after  he  had  partially  ac- 
quired those  intellectual  and  moral  faculties 
which  distinguish  him  from  the  lower  animals, 
would  have  been  but  little  liable  to  bodily 
modifications  through  natural  selection  or  any 
other  means."11  Therefore  the  fundamental 
biological  distinction  between  Man  and  other 

"Chap.  V.,  Sec.  220. 
"Chap.  V.,  Sec.  208. 


EVOLUTIONARY  PROCESS  19 

Anthropoidea  is  that  in  the  case  of  the  human  \ 
species  the  stress  of  evolution  has  been  exerted 
upon  internal  structure,  particularly  the  brain 
and  nervous  system.  Darwin  recurs  to  this 
point  in  discussing  "the  great  variability  of  all 
the  external  differences  between  the  races  of 
Man."  He  thinks  that  this  is  "owing,  it  seems, 
to  such  variations  being  of  an  indifferent  na- 
ture, and  to  their  having  thus  escaped  the 

7  Cj  n    in  -"^^^Tr     i          i       ~ 

action  of  natural  selection.12 

Darwin's  speculations  on  the  origin  of  the 
mental  and  moral  faculties,  set  forth  in  the 
third,  fourth  and  fifth  chapters  of  The  Descent 
of  Man  attribute  them  to  natural  selection  act-A  \ 
ing  primarily  upon  the  community.  In  this 
portion  of  his  work  his  reasoning  comes  to  this, 
that  the  being  for  whose  direct  advantage 
modification  took  place  under  the  stress  of 
natural  selection  was  the  community,  so  that 
human  nature  has  been  formed  by  life  in 
community  just  as  the  nature  of  the  social 
bees  has  been  formed  by  the  life  of  the  hive% 
Man  is  thus  designated  as  a  product  of  social 
evolution. 

"Chap.  VII.,  Sec.  340. 


20        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

§  8.  The  Individual  Hypothesis 

Along  with  the  expressions  of  opinion  that 
have  been  cited  propounding  the  doctrine  that 
Man  is  a  product  of  social  evolution,  Darwin 
at  times  used  expressions  inconsistent  with  that 
doctrine  and  rather  implying  that  Man  is  a 
product  of  individual  evolution.  The  latter 
hypothesis  makes  its  appearance  chiefly  in  con- 
nection with  his  consideration  of  the  influence 
of  sexual  selection,  a  factor  to  which  he  de- 
votes the  greater  part  of  The  Descent  of  Man. 
The  operation  of  that  process  implies  individ- 
ual competition  and  struggle,  and  when  his 
thoughts  are  running  on  sexual  selection  he  is 
apt  to  adopt  the  hypothesis  of  individual  evo- 
lution in  the  case  of  Man.  He  describes  the 
mating  habits  of  various  apes,  with  the  idea  of 
finding  in  them  a  picture  of  the  primeval  con- 
dition of  Man.  He  remarks: 

"Judging  from  the  analogy  of  the  lower 
animals  he  would  then  either  live  with  a 
single  female  or  be  a  polygamist.  The 
most  powerful  and  able  males  would  suc- 
ceed best  in  obtaining  attractive  females. 


EVOLUTIONARY  PROCESS  21 

They  would  also  succeed  best  in  the  gen- 
eral struggle  for  life,  and  in  defending 
their  females,  as  well  as  their  offspring, 
from  enemies  of  all  kinds."13 

In  considering  the  effects  of  civilization, 
Darwin  speaks  as  if  medical  science  in  pre- 
serving the  lives  of  the  weak  and  ailing  ex- 
ercised a  detrimental  influence  on  the  species. 
He  presses  the  point  by  analogies  drawn  from 
the  breeding  of  domestic  animals,  thus  by  im- 
plication assuming  that  individual  evolution  is 
the  law  of  human  improvement.  He  refers  to 
the  influence  of  the  Church  in  encouraging  a 
celibate  life  on  the  part  of  "men  of  gentle  na- 
ture, those  given  to  meditation  or  culture  of 
the  mind" ;  and  he  says  that  "this  could  hardly 
fail  to  have  a  deteriorating  influence  on  each 
successive  generation."14  But  elsewhere  in  the 
same  chapter  he  remarks  that  "great  law- 
givers, the  founders  of  beneficent  religions, 
great  philosophers  and  discoverers  in  science, 
aid  the  progress  of  mankind  in  a  far  higher 
degree  by  their  works  than  by  leaving  a  numer- 

"Chap.  XX.,  Sec.  983. 
"Chap.  V.,  Sec.  237. 


22        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

ous  progeny."15  After  mentioning  various 
characteristics  of  civilized  life,  which  would  be 
detrimental  to  the  species  on  the  hypothesis  of 
individual  evolution,  he  remarks : 

"Although  civilization  thus  checks  in 
many  ways  the  action  of  natural  selection, 
it  apparently  favors  the  better  develop- 
ment of  the  body,  by  means  of  good  food 
and  the  freedom  from  occasional  hard- 
ship. This  may  be  inferred  from  civilized 
men  having  been  found,  whenever  com- 
pared, to  be  physically  stronger  than 
savages."16 

§  9.  Darwin's  Alternatives 

The  divergence  of  the  conclusions  reached 
by  Darwin  as  to  the  genesis  of  the  human 
species  appears  distinctly  when  opinions  ex- 
pressed in  various  portions  of  The  Descent  of 
Man  are  brought  together  as  in  the  following 
parallel  columns: 

"Chap.  V.,  Sec.  229. 
"Chap.  V.,  Sec.  927. 


EVOLUTIONARY  PROCESS 


SOCIAL  HYPOTHESIS 
Man  originated  as  a  so- 
cial animal,  belonging  to 
the  Simian  stock.  "But 
we  must  not  fall  into  the 
error  of  supposing  that 
the  early  progenitor  of 
the  whole  Simian  stock, 
including  Man,  was  iden- 
tified with  or  even  closely 
resembled  any  existing 
form  of  ape  or  monkey."17 
While  it  is  not  known 
that  Man  is  descended 
from  some  small  species 
"we  should,  however,  bear 
in  mind  that  an  animal 
possessing  great  size, 
strength,  and  ferocity, 
and  which  like  the  goril- 
la, woiuld  defend  itself 
from  all  enemies  would 
not  perhaps  have  become 
social,  and  this  would 
most  effectually  have 
checked  the  acquirement 
of  the  higher  mental  qual- 
ities, such  as  sympathy 
and  love  for  his  fel- 
lows."18 


INDIVIDUAL  HYPOTHESIS 
Man  is  descended  from 
some  ape-like  creature, 
so  that  his  aboriginal 
habits  were  probably  like 
those  of  existing  Quadru- 
mana,  "more  particularly 
of  those  which  come 
nearest  to  man."1 

"The  most  probable 
view  is  that  he  aboriginal- 
ly lived  in  small  communi- 
ties, each  with  a  single 
wife,  or  if  powerful  with 
several,  whom  he  jeal- 
ously guarded  against 
other  men.  Or  he  may 
not  have  been  a  social 
animal  and  yet  have  lived 
with  several  wives,  like 
the  gorilla."20 


"Chap.  VI.,  Sec.  262. 
"Chap.  II.,  Sec.  96. 


"Chap.  XX.,  Sec.  975. 
-Chap.  XX.,  Sec.  976. 


24        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

In  each  hypothesis  Darwin  incidentally  re- 
fers to  the  gorilla,  and  the  varying  estimate 
made  of  its  relationship  to  the  human  species 
is  a  mark  of  the  incompatibility  of  the  two  hy- 
potheses. In  one  the  gorilla  is  rejected  as  a  ' 
possible  prototype  of  the  ancestor  of  the  hu- 
man species;  in  the  other  a  gorilla-like  animal 
is  accepted  as  a  possible  prototype. 

It  may  excite  surprise  that  a  reasoner  so 
learned  and  so  candid  as  Darwin  should  have 
involved  himself  in  such  inconsistency,  but  this 
surprise  will  disappear  when  the  nature  of  his 
task  is  considered.  When  Darwin  wrote  The 
Origin  of  Species,  the  traditional  opinion  was 
that  species  was  created  as  such.  Classifica- 
tion adhered  to  the  system  introduced  by  Lin- 
naeus, who  laid  down  the  principle:  "We 
reckon  just  as  many  species  as  there  were 
forms  created  in  the  beginning."  Darwin 
proposed  the  theory  of  the  formation  of  species 
by  modification  of  antecedent  forms  of  life 
through  selective  process.  In  dealing  with 
particular  cases  his  concern  was  to  show  that 
in  one  way  or  another  they  could  be  accounted 
for  in  agreement  with  his  theory.  In  dealing 


EVOLUTIONARY  PROCESS  25 

with  the  case  of  the  human  species  this  con- 
sideration presided  over  his  treatment  of  the 
subject  and  bounded  his  efforts.  In  consider- 
ing different  aspects  of  the  problem  of  human 
origins  he  at  times  resorted  to  one  hypothesis 
and  at  other  times  to  a  different  hypothesis. 
His  mode  of  treatment  did  not  raise  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  one  hypothesis  did  not  ex- 
clude the  other.  Thus  it  appears  that  Darwin 
at  times  shifted  his  premises  and  fell  into  in- 
consistency. He  left  unsettled  the  precise  na- 
ture of  the  process  of  evolution  that  went  on 
in  the  case  of  the  human  species,  and  in  so 
doing  failed  to  state  just  what  concept  natural 
history  may  supply  to  political  science.  That 
matter  must  be  determined  before  it  can  be 
affirmed  that  natural  history  can  supply  any 
principle  to  political  science  to  systematize  its 
theory  and  to  guide  its  practice.  Therefore  it 
becomes  necessary  to  inquire  what  light  has 
been  thrown  upon  the  problem  by  research 
and  speculation  since  Darwin  propounded  his 
theory. 


CHAPTER  III 

BIOLOGICAL  DATA 

§  10.  The  Genealogy  of  Man 

Darwin  traced  the  ancestral  form  of  Man 
back  through  "some  ancient  member  of  the 
anthropomorphous  sub-group"  now  repre- 
sented by  the  gorilla,  chimpanzee,  orang  and 
gibbon ;  thence  to  the  Catarrhine  or  Old  World 
division  of  the  monkey,  and  thence  back  to  the 
lemurs,  "and  these  in  their  turn  from  forms 
standing  very  low  in  the  mammalian  series." 
Darwin  admitted  the  existence  of  a  "great 
break  in  the  organic  chain  between  Man  and 
his  nearest  allies,  which  cannot  be  bridged  over 
by  any  extinct  or  living  species,"  but  he  pointed 
out  that  "in  all  the  vertebrate  classes  the  dis- 
covery of  fossil  remains  has  been  a  slow  and 
fortuitous  process"  and  he  remarked  that 
"those  regions  which  are  the  most  likely  to  af- 

26 


BIOLOGICAL  DATA  27 

ford  remains  connecting  Man  with  some  ex- 
tinct apelike  creature  have  not  as  yet  been 
searched  by  geologists."1 

These  observations  gave  support  to  the  no- 
tion of  the  existence  in  the  past  of  some  form 
intermediate  between  Man  and  the  anthropoid 
apes  that  became  popularly  known  as  "the 
missing  link."  Expectation  of  the  discovery 
of  this  missing  link  was  generally  entertained 
by  the  adherents  of  Darwinism.  In  Haeckel's 
Evolution  of  Man,  first  published  in  1874,  a 
graphic  representation  of  the  pedigree  of  Man 
is  given  in  which  the  various  genera  of  the  ani- 
mal kingdom  are  portrayed  as  ramifications 
from  a  biological  stem  typifying  the  general- 
ized type.  The  apex  is  assigned  to  Man,  rep- 
resented as  one  of  a  group  of  twigs  sprouting 
from  the  ape  stem,  the  cluster  including  the 
gorilla,  chimpanzee,  orang  and  gibbon.2  This 
concept  long  presided  over  research,  with  re- 
spect not  only  to  Man  but  also  to  species  in 
general.  But  as  paleontological  evidence  ac- 
cumulated it  did  not  bear  out  Darwin's  antici- 

1  Chap.  VI.,  Sees.  260,  267,  265,  266. 
'Opus  cited,  Vol.  II.,  p.  188,  Plate  XV. 


28        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

pation  of  generalized  types  to  which  existing 
species  converge  in  their  ancestry.  < 

In  assigning  to  the  Catarrhine  group  of 
monkeys  the  ancestral  form  from  which  Man 
was  derived,  Darwin  remarked  that  "every 
naturalist  who  believes  in  the  principle  of  evo- 
lution" will  grant  that  "the  Catarrhine  and 
Platyrrhine  monkeys,  with  their  sub-groups, 
have  all  proceeded  from  some  one  extremely 
ancient  progenitor."  He  predicted  that  "the 
early  descendents  of  this  progenitor,  before 
they  had  diverged  to  any  considerable  extent 
from  each  other,  would  still  have  formed  a 
single  natural  group;  but  some  of  the  species 
or  incipient  genera  would  have  already  begun 
to  indicate  by  their  diverging  characters  the 
future  distinctive  marks  of  the  Catarrhine  and 
Platyrrhine  divisions."3  No  confirmation  of 
this  anticipation  has  been  obtained.  The  vol- 
ume Mammalia,  in  the  Cambridge  Natural 
History  series,  remarks  that  "not  only  are 
these  two  groups  absolutely  distinct  at  the 
present  day  but  they  have  been,  so  far  as  we 
know,  for  a  very  long  time,  since  no  fossil  re- 

•Opus  cited,  Sec.  261. 


BIOLOGICAL  DATA  29 

mains  of  monkeys  at  all  intermediate  have 
been  so  far  discovered.  This  has  led  to  the 
suggestion  that  the  monkeys  are  what  is 
termed  diphyletic,  i.e.,  that  they  have  origi- 
nated from  two  separate  stocks  of  ancestors."4 
The  case  of  the  monkeys  is  not  peculiar  in  dis- 
appointing expectation  of  generalized  types 
from  which  existing  forms  have  ramified.  Pro- 
fessor H.  F.  Osborn  remarks:  "By  far  the 
most  striking  generalization  of  recent  mam- 
malian paleontology  is  the  early  separation, 
absolute  distinctness  and  great  age  of  numer- 
ous phyla  leading  up  to  modern  types."5  In- 
stead of  such  a  picture  as  was  given  by 
Haeckel,  a  graphic  representation  of  the  pres- 
ent concept  of  biogenic  process  would  resemble 
a  pollard  rather  than  a  branching  tree,  many 
parallel  stems  arising  from  the  primitive  mam- 
malian stock. 

§  11.  New  Theories  Advanced 

Evidence    of    this    character    has    modified 
opinions  as  to  the  genealogy  of  the  human 

*  Opus  cited,  p.  555. 

"Bulletin,  American  Museum  of  Natural  History,  Vol.  XIII., 
Art.  19,  Dec.   11,  1900. 


SO        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

species,  and  theories  have  been  advanced  to 
the  effect  that  Man  has  developed  parallel  to 
the  monkeys  but  without  connection  in  descent. 
A  summary  of  the  state  of  scientific  opinion  on 
this  subject  was  prepared  by  Professor  G. 
Schwalbe  of  the  University  of  Strassburg  for 
the  Cambridge  University  memorial  volume 
Darwin  and  Modern  Science,  published  in 
1909.  Prof.  Schwalbe  says: 

"The  hypotheses  as  to  descent  current 
at  the  present  day  may  be  divided  into 
two  main  groups.  The  first  group  seeks 
for  the  roots  of  the  human  race  not  among 
any  of  the  families  of  the  apes  .  .  .  but 
lower  down  among  the  fossil  Eocene 
Pseudo-lemuridae  or  Lemuridae,  or  even 
among  the  primitive  pentadactylous 
Eocene  forms,  which  may  either  have  led 
directly  to  the  evolution  of  Man,  or  have 
given  rise  to  an  ancestral  form  common 
to  apes  and  men."6 

The  other  main  group,  to  which  Professor 
Schwalbe  himself  adheres,  regards  the  genetic 

•Opus  cited,  p.  133. 


BIOLOGICAL  DATA  31 

order  set  forth  in  The  Descent  of  Man  as  still 
valid  today,  but  there  are  marked  differences  of 
opinion  upon  points  of  classification  within  the 
bounds  of  this  scheme.  The  fossil  anthropoid 
discovered  in  Java  and  designated  Pithecan- 
thropes "is  regarded  by  some  authorities  as  the 
direct  ancestor  of  Man,  by  others  as  a  side 
track  failure  in  the  attempt  at  the  evolution  of 
Man."7 

A  comprehensive  survey  is  made  in  Man 
and  His  Forerunners  by  Professor  H.  v.  But- 
tel-Reepen,  originally  published  in  1911.  It 
was  translated  from  the  German  in  1913  by 
Professor  A.  G.  Thacker,  in  a  revised  edition 
which  incorporated  an  account  of  relics  of  pre- 
historic man  discovered  in  December,  1912. 
This  work,  which  is  expository  in  character  and 
does  not  advocate  a  theory,  shows  that  as  the 
paleontological  evidence  is  enlarged  the  diffi- 
culty of  arranging  the  known  forms  in  serial 
order  is  increased.  Professor  Thacker  sums 
up  the  case  by  remarking  that  recent  researches 
have  brought  out  in  a  striking  manner  the  im- 
portant fact  that  in  the  remote  past  there  ex- 

7  Ibid.  p.   135. 


82        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

i 

isted  not  one  kind  of  Man  but  several  very 
distinct  kinds,  just  as  there  are  half  a  dozen 
diverse  sorts  of  apes  living  at  the  present  day. 
That  is  to  say,  no  generalized  type  of  ape-man 
has  been  discovered,  but  on  the  contrary  several 
distinct  phyla.  It  has  become  a  moot  point 
whether  the  term  "Man"  is  really  applicable  to 
the  remains  designated  as  proto-human. 
Thacker  says:  "It  now  seems  almost  certain 
that  the  oldest  stone  implements  antedate  by 
long  ages  the  appearance  of  any  being  we 
should  have  greeted  as  human  if  we  had  met 
him  in  the  flesh,"  and  he  remarks  that  it  may 
become  necessary  eventually  to  revise  our 
terminology  and  restrict  the  term  "Man"  to 
the  living  species.8 

The  tendency  noted  by  Schwalbe  in  1909,  to 
seek  the  roots  of  the  human  species  quite  apart 
from  any  of  the  existing  apes  but  lower  down 
in  forms  from  which  both  Man  and  the  apes 
were  separately  evolved,  has  been  enhanced  as 
more  evidence  becomes  available.  Upon  the 
basis  of  this  supposition  Professor  Klaatsch 
has  put  forth  an  elaborate  theory  of  separate 

•  Opus  cited,  p.  vii. 


BIOLOGICAL  DATA  33 

derivation  in  the  case  of  the  divergent  types 
found  in  fossil  remains,  the  existing  anthropoid 
apes  and  the  races  of  mankind,  from  a  stock  of 
common  progenitors  of  apes  and  men;  and 
this  stock  he  designates  Propithecanthropi. 
The  animals  of  this  hypothetical  genus  in  "the 
proportions  of  the  different  parts  of  their 
bodies  and  in  the  character  of  their  teeth  re- 
sembled human  beings;  not  the  anthropoid 
apes.9  This  genus  sent  out  offshoots  in  va- 
rious directions  and  into  different  environ- 
ments, giving  rise  to  the  existing  species  of 
men  and  apes,  and  also  the  extinct  species 
known  to  paleontology.  According  to  this 
theory  the  anthropoid  apes  are  to  be  regarded 
as  aberrant  or  degenerative  branches  of  the 
prehuman  stock.  Meanwhile  a  more  favored 
branch  of  the  primeval  stem  was  quietly 
evolving  upward  into  mankind,  retaining  in  the 
process  many  of  the  primitive  characters."1 
Klaatsch's  theory  has  been  severely  criticized.11 
That  part  of  his  theory  which  regards  the  an- 

•  Man  and  His  Forerunners,  p.  72. 
10  Man  and  His  Forerunners,  p.  75. 

u  A  survey  of  the  discussion  aroused  by  it  is  contained  in 
W.  L.  H.  Duckworth's  Prehistoric  Man,  pp.  135-139. 


34        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

thropoid  apes  as  belonging  to  parallel  phyla 
and  not  to  the  same  genetic  series  as  Man  is 
admitted  to  have  some  weighty  evidence  in  its 
favor.  Although  Duckworth  characterizes 
the  theory  in  its  present  form  as  "crude"  he 
admits  the  possibility  that  "the  diphyletic 
scheme  of  Professor  Klaatsch  may  yet  be 
modified  to  such  an  extent  as  to  receive  sup- 
port denied  to  it  in  its  present  form."12 

§  12.  The  Evidence  of  Embryology 

Data  of  marked  evidential  value  in  this  re- 
gard are  supplied  by  comparative  embryology. 
Buttel-Reepen  remarks:  "If  it  be  true  that 
the  apes  are  descended  in  the  manner  explained 
from  creatures  which  were  nearly  human,  we 
shall  expect  to  find  that  the  young  apes  are 
more  manlike  than  the  adult  individuals,  since 
it  is  well  known  to  geologists  that  the  individ- 
ual in  its  development  always  tends  to  recapi- 
tulate the  evolution  of  the  race  to  which 
it  belongs  thus  passing  through  ancestral 
phases."13  It  is  a  demonstrated  fact  that  the 

"Prehittoric  Man,  1912,  p.  138-9. 

u  Man  and  Hit  Forerunners,  pp.  76-7. 


BIOLOGICAL  DATA  35 

young  gorilla's  skull  is  far  more  humanlike  in 
its  contour  than  the  adult  type.  At  the  time 
Darwin  wrote  little  was  known  of  the  embryo- 
logical  history  of  the  anthropoid  apes.  Since 
then  embryos  belonging  to  different  simian 
groups  have  been  obtained  and  studied.  A 
convenient  summary  of  the  results  is  given  in 
the  third  chapter  of  Metchnikoff's  Nature  of 
Man.  At  an  early  stage  of  development  there 
is  a  general  resemblance  between  the  embryo 
of  the  anthropoid  ape  and  the  human  embryo. 
"Later  on  the  characters  that  distinguish  Man 
from  even  the  highest  of  the  apes  become  more 
and  more  pronounced.  In  the  anthropoids  the 
facial  portion  becomes  more  and  more  promi- 
nent and  betrays  a  bestiality  absent  from  the 
human  form."  Metchnikoff  holds  that  while 
the  evidence  is  in  favor  of  a  common  origin, 
"the  data  derived  from  embryology  do  not 
point  to  any  one  of  the  existing  genera  of 
monkeys  as  the  ancestor  of  Man.  They  lead 
us  to  infer,  rather,  that  Man  and  the  anthro- 
poid apes  had  a  common  origin."14 

The  notion  was  once  extant  that  it  was  nec- 

"  The  Nature  of  Man,  p.  48. 


36        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

essary  to  account  for  the  disappearance  in  man 
of  the  protruding  muzzle,  the  elongated  fore 
limbs  and  other  characteristics  of  the  anthro- 
poid ape.  But  the  evidence  just  considered 
suggests  that  men  never  possessed  such  char- 
acteristics. Hartmann,  in  his  Anthropoid 
Apes,  although  adhering  to  the  theory  of  close 
genetic  affinity,  remarks  that  "the  points  of  re- 
semblance to  the  human  type  are  fewer"  in  the 
case  of  an  old  than  of  a  young  animal.  He 
says  that  "this  is  an  important  fact,  since  in 
the  case  of  Man  we  almost  without  exception 
regard  the  fully  developed  male  adult  as  the 
typical  form."16 

§  13.  Effect  of  Brain  Development 

The  conclusion  to  which  those  observations 
point  is  that  the  resemblance  between  Man  and 
the  apes  is  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  both 
have  preserved  the  primitive  type  of  mammal- 
ian organization,  an  animal  with  five  digits  on 
each  limb.  That  pattern  was  retained  by  the 
entire  order  of  Primates  and  in  the  case  of  the 
anthropoid  apes  has  been  carried  to  stages  of 

MOpus  cited,  pp.  11,  293. 


BIOLOGICAL  DATA  37 

physical  development  which  from  the  stand- 
point of  animal  competency  are  beyond  those 
attained  by  Man.  In  the  case  of  Man  the 
development  of  bodily  structure  was  subordi- 
nated to  mental  development,  the  effect  of 
which,  according  to  both  Darwin  and  Wallace, 
is  to  make  Man  but  little  liable  to  bodily  modi- 
fications through  natural  selection  or  other 
means.  It  follows  that  the  parallelism  that  re- 
mains does  not  indicate  corresponding  resem- 
blance between  Man  and  the  apes  in  character. 
They  have  really  widely  diverged,  chiefly  by 
an  extensive  divergence  from  the  ancestral 
type  on  the  part  of  the  apes,  chiefly  by  an  in- 
tensive divergence  on  the  part  of  Man.16 

Wallace,  co-propounder  with  Darwin  of  the 
theory  of  natural  selection,  goes  over  the  whole 
ground  in  his  essay  on  Monkeys:  Their  Af- 
finities and  Distribution.  He  points  out  that 
"monkeys  as  a  whole  form  a  very  isolated 

14  Although  the  resemblance  between  Man  and  the  apes  ex- 
tends throughout  the  entire  structural  plan  it  is  constantly 
attended  by  difference  in  detail.  A  minute  comparison  of  all 
bodily  organs  is  made  in  The  Human  Species  by  Ludwig  Hopf. 
He  remarks  (p.  95)  that  "the  experienced  anatomist  can  im- 
mediately distinguish  any  anthropoid  muscle  from  its  corre- 
sponding human  muscle." 


38        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

group,  having  no  near  relations  to  any  other 
mammalia.  This  is  undoubtedly  an  evidence 
of  great  antiquity."  They  must  have 
"branched  off  the  great  mammalian  stock  at  a 
very  remote  epoch,  certainly  as  far  back  as  the 
Secondary  period."  At  this  period  they  were 
perhaps  not  separable  from  the  ancestral  mar- 
supials. "It  is  only  among  marsupials  that  we 
again  find  handlike  feet  with  opposable 
thumbs,  which  are  such  a  curious  and  constant 
feature  of  the  monkey  tribe." 

Wallace  remarks  that  "this  relationship  to 
the  lowest  of  the  mammalian  tribes  seems  in- 
consistent with  the  place  usually  accorded  to 
these  animals  at  the  head  of  the  entire  mam- 
malian series,"  and  he  suggests  that  it  is  due 
merely  to  the  fact  that  this  lowly  mammalian 
pattern  was  that  which  was  utilized  in  the  for- 
mation of  the  human  species.  A  scientific  ob- 
server not  predisposed  in  favor  of  the  human 
form  as  a  standard  would  hardly  place  the 
monkeys  so  high  as  we  do. 

"Neither  in  size,  strength  nor  beauty 
would   they   compare   with   many   other 


BIOLOGICAL  DATA  ! 

forms,  while  in  intelligence  they  would  not 
surpass  even  if  they  equalled  the  horse, 
the  elephant  or  the  beaver.  .  .  .  Man  is 
undoubtedly  the  most  perfect  of  all  ani- 
mals, but  he  is  solely  in  respect  of  char- 
acters in  which  he  differs  from  all  the 
monkey  tribe — the  easily  erect  posture, 
the  perfect  freedom  of  the  hands  from  all 
part  in  locomotion,  the  large  size  and  com- 
plete opposability  of  the  thumb,  and  the 
well  developed  brain,  which  enables  him 
fully  to  utilize  these  combined  physical 
advantages."17 


§  14.  Antiquity  of  Man 

There  now  seems  to  be  substantial  agree- 
ment between  specialists  as  to  the  extreme  an- 
tiquity of  the  human  race.  Haeckel,  in  his 
Wonders  of  Life,  published  in  1905,  held  that 
the  development  of  the  brain  which  chiefly 
differentiates  Man  from  the  apes  took  place 
during  the  Tertiary  period,  the  duration  of 
which  is  estimated  by  many  recent  geologists 

"Studies  Scientific  and  Social,  Vol.  I.,  p.  146. 


40        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

at  from  twelve  to  fifteen  (at  least  three  to  five) 
million  years.18    Wallace  points  out: 

"Man  is  related  not  to  any  one,  but  al- 
most equally  to  many  of  the  existing 
apes — Jo  the  orang,  the  chimpanzee,  the 
gorilla  and  even  to  the  gibbon,  in  a  va- 
riety of  ways ;  and  these  relations  and  dif- 
ferences are  so  numerous  and  diverse  that, 
on  the  theory  of  evolution,  the  ancestral 
form  which  ultimately  developed  into  Man 
must  have  diverged  from  the  common 
stock  whence  all  these  various  forms  and 
their  extinct  allies  originated.  But  so  far 
back  as  the  Miocene  deposits  of  Europe, 
we  find  the  remains  of  apes  allied  to  these 
various  forms,  and  especially  to  the  gib- 
bons; so  that  in  all  probability  the  special 
line  of  variation  that  led  up  to  man 
branched  off  at  a  still  earlier  period."19 

Wallace  holds  that  on  this  theory  of  his 
origin  Man  must  have  existed  in  something  ap- 
proaching his  present  form  during  the  Tertiary 
period.  We  must  then  go  back  many  millions 

18  Opus  cited,  p.  22. 

"Natural  Selection  and  Tropical  Nature,  p.  432. 


BIOLOGICAL  DATA  41 

of  years  for  the  hypothetical  ancestral  form 
from  which  Man  and  apes  were  derived.  This 
extremely  remote  relationship  is  all  that  is  left 
to  warrant  the  suggestion  made  by  Darwin  in 
the  Individual  Hypothesis  that  the  habits  of 
the  anthropoid  apes  represents  the  aboriginal 
habits  of  the  human  species. 

§  15.  Variety  of  Animal  Behavior 

Behavior  varies  greatly  even  among  ani- 
mals of  closely  applied  species,  such  as  the 
chimpanzee  and  the  gorilla.  "In  mental  char- 
acteristics there  is  the  widest  difference.  The 
chimpanzee  is  described  as  lively,  teachable 
and  tamable;  the  gorilla  is  gloomy,  ferocious 
and  quite  untamable."20  According  to  Hart- 
mann  the  chimpanzee  either  lives  in  separate 
families  or  in  small  groups  of  families.  The 
gorilla  goes  about  in  families  with  but  one 
adult  male,  who  fights  for  his  position  as  leader 
of  the  band.  If  a  young  male  reaches  ma- 
turity "a  conflict  for  the  mastery  takes  place, 
and  after  his  rival  is  killed  or  driven  away  the 
stronger  animal  becomes  head  of  the  com- 

30  Mammalia,  pp.  573,  575. 


42        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

munity."21  The  gibbons,  which  have  some 
physical  characteristics  in  which  they  approxi- 
mate human  structure  more  closely  than  the 
other  anthropoids,  include  species  which  are 
markedly  gregarious.  The  siamang  go  in 
troops  led  by  a  powerful  old  male.  The  hulock 
has  been  seen  in  troops  of  from  100  to  150 
together,  and  their  combined  onset  makes  them 
formidable.  The  family  Cercopithecidae, 
which  include  the  Gibraltar  apes  and  the 
baboons,  is  gregarious.  In  1893  the  governor 
of  Gibraltar  counted  as  many  as  thirty  apes  in 
one  herd.  There  are  eleven  species  of  baboons, 
all  of  which  go  in  large  herds.  Among  the 
lemurs  some  species  are  very  sociable,  "travel- 
ing in  large  companies,"  while  others  "lead  a 
solitary  life  or  go  about  in  pairs."22 

Sociability  is  highly  developed  in  many 
branches  of  the  mammalia.  Kropotkin,  in  his 
Mutual  Aid — A  Factor  of  Evolution,  presents 
an  impressive  array  of  evidence  on  this  point. 
He  holds  that  sociability  is  the  dominant  factor 
of  mammalian  life.  The  extent  to  which  sys- 

"  Anthropoid  Apet,  pp.  237,  232. 
"  Mammalia,  pp.  564,  539. 


BIOLOGICAL  DATA  43 

tematic  cooperation  among  mammals  may  be 
carried  is  illustrated  by  the  beaver  colonies. 
This  species  forms  communal  dwellings  of 
large  size,  the  construction  of  which  is  accom- 
panied by  notable  engineering  feats.  The 
Smithsonian  Institution  report  for  1900  men- 
tions the  case  of  a  beaver  colony  which  built  a 
dam  containing  probably  more  than  thirty  tons 
of  material.  The  social  habits  of  the  prairie 
dog  are  well  known,  from  the  abundance  of 
its  burrows  in  our  Western  prairies.  The  vi- 
zacha,  a  South  American  .rodent,  has  an  in- 
tensely sociable  nature.  This  animal  is 
described  as  living  in  societies  of  twenty  to 
thirty  members  in  a  village  of  a  dozen  or  so 
of  burrows  which  intercommunicate.  It  has  a 
most  varied  voice,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether 
there  is  "any  other  four  footed  beast  so  loqua- 
cious or  with  a  dialect  so  extensive."  These 
animals  "are  very  friendly  and  pay  visits  from 
village  to  village;  they  will  attempt  to  rescue 
their  friends  if  attacked  by  a  weasel  or  peccary, 
and  to  disinter  those  covered  up  in  their  bur- 
rows by  man."23 

"  Ibid.  p.  497. 


44        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

It  therefore  appears  that  unless  the  ances- 
tral form  of  the  human  species  was  gregarious 
in  habit  it  lacked  what  in  general  is  a  mam- 
malian characteristic.  From  the  fact  that  the 
gorilla  is  unsocial  Kropotkin  regards  it  as  a 
decadent  type.  He  remarks  that  "sociability, 
action  in  common,  mutual  protection,  and  a 
high  development  of  these  feelings  which  are 
the  necessary  outcome  of  social  life  are  char- 
acteristic of  most  monkeys  and  apes."  "And 
if  we  find  among  the  highest  apes  two  species, 
the  orang-outang  and  the  gorilla,  which  are  not 
sociable,  we  must  remember  that  both,  limited 
as  they  are  to  very  small  areas,  the  one  in  the 
heat  of  Africa,  and  the  other  in  the  islands  of 
Borneo  and  Sumatra,  have  all  the  appearance 
of  being  the  last  remnants  of  formerly  much 
more  numerous  species."24 

§  16.  Man  A  Social  Animal 

Thompson  and  Geddess  remark  that  "the 
anthropoid  apes  are  not  social,  but  many  mon- 
keys are,  and  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
Man  was  from  the  first  distinctively  social. 

*  Mutual  Aid,  pp.  50-52. 


BIOLOGICAL  DATA  45 

'Man   did   not   make    society;    society   made 
Man'."25 

It  is  an  undisputed  fact  that  although 
marked  physiological  variation  has  taken  place 
in  human  species,  everywhere  and  always  Man 
is  found  to  be  a  social  animal.  At  a  remote 
period  in  geologic  time  Man  had  spread  to 
every  part  of  the  earth,  and  was  settled  in  all 
the  continents  when  land  areas  were  very  dif- 
ferent from  what  they  are  now.  The  accepted 
theory  is  that  America  was  peopled  from  Asia 
at  a  time  when  the  northern  extremities  of 
those  continents  were  connected  by  what 
American  geologists  have  designated  as  the 
"Miocene  Bridge."  Behring's  Strait  has  been 
formed  since  the  Tertiary  period.  Man  was 
settled  in  the  New  World  before  the  Glacial 
Epoch,  carrying  with  him  organic  proclivities 
implanted  before  that  epoch.  He  spread 
throughout  the  American  continents,  under- 
going physiological  variation  during  the  proc- 
ess in  adaptation  to  extremely  diverse 
conditions,  but  in  all  places  and  in  all  circum- 
stances life  in  community  appears  as  a  charac- 

30  Evolution,  in  Home  University  series,  p.  100. 


46         NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

teristic.  A  like  order  of  evidence  is  afforded 
by  Australia,  the  aborigines  of  which  are  re- 
garded as  an  archaic  species  sequestered  by 
geologic  changes  that  detached  the  land  from 
connection  with  the  continental  areas  of  the 
Eastern  Hemisphere.  To  this  circumstance  is 
attributed  the  preservation  in  Australia  of 
archaic  fauna  and  flora  superseded  elsewhere 
by  more  advanced  forms.  The  Australian 
aborigines  are  regarded  by  the  specialists  as 
survivals  of  the  type  once  represented  in  Eu- 
rope by  races  designated  by  anthropologists  as 
paleolithic.26  In  this  region,  which  from  the 
biological  point  of  view  may  be  regarded  as  a 
section  of  geologic  antiquity  accidentally  pre- 
served to  modern  times,  life  in  community  is  a 
universal  characteristic. 

Without  attaching  to  this  circumstance  any 
more  significance  than  would  be  attached  to 
any  other  anatomical  or  physiological  charac- 
teristic, the  evidence  points  to  deeply  im- 
planted sociality  as  a  primeval  characteristic 
of  Man.  However  anciently  separated  and 

*Cf.  E.  B.  Tylor,  The  Paleolithic  Period  in  Australia  and 
Tasmania,  Journal  of  the  Anthropological  Institute,  Vol.  28, 
1899;  p.  275. 


BIOLOGICAL  DATA  47 

widely  distributed  are  different  races  and  va- 
rieties of  the  human  species,  yet  they  possess 
life  in  community  as  a  common  characteristic; 
so  by  parity  of  reasoning  with  that  accepted  as 
valid  by  Darwinists  in  generalizing  from  mor- 
phological data,  the  parent  stock  possessed 
that  characteristic. 

§  17.  Instances  of  Social  Evolution 

The  hypothesis  that  the  line  of  variation 
upon  which  the  human  species  was  formed  was 
through  the  introduction  of  life  in  community 
as  a  characteristic  of  an  early  mammalian 
species  does  not  involve  the  assumption  of  a 
mode  of  evolution  peculiar  to  Man.  Commun- 
ity ranging  from  loose  association  to  closely 
articulated  polity  is  displayed  by  numerous 
species.  Darwin  gave  an  impressive  array  of 
evidence  on  this  subject  in  the  fourth  chapter 
of  The  Descent  of  Man.  There  is  no  ante- 
cedent improbability  in  the  supposition  that 
community  may  become  so  regular,  constant 
and  habitual  as  to  form  the  associate  life  into 
an  aggregate  on  which  the  evolutionary  process 
acts  primarily,  and  only  indirectly  on  the  indi- 


48        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

vidual  units  as  parts  of  the  composite  entity. 
The  classifications  of  zoology  supply  numerous 
cases  of  this  mode  of  evolution,  familiar  in- 
stances of  which  are  the  corals  and  the  sponges. 
Attention  has  already  been  called  to  the  social 
insects  instanced  by  Darwin.  It  is  known  that 
in  their  case  the  very  thing  happened  which 
the  data  now  under  consideration  suggest  in 
the  case  of  the  human  species,  namely,  the 
early  differentiation  of  social  and  non-social 
species.  The  physiological  differentiation  of 
the  Anthropomorpha,  taken  into  consideration 
with  their  present  geographical  distribution, 
suggests  that  a  similar  divergence  in  evolution- 
ary process  took  place  in  this  order  also.  The 
Tertiary  period  was  one  of  abounding  energy 
in  the  development  of  forms  of  mammalian 
life.27  A  point  of  marked  agreement  among 
the  specialists  is  that  Man,  gorillas,  chimpan- 
zees, orangs  and  gibbons  are  relics  of  a  Ter- 
tiary order  of  wide  distribution  and  numerous 
species.  The  few  species  that  survived  through 
individual  adaptation  to  the  environment  are 
now  restricted  to  narrow  habitats  in  the 

*  Mammalia,  p.  4. 


BIOLOGICAL  DATA  49 

tropics.  The  sole  species  that  has  meanwhile 
increased  and  multiplied  and  has  spread  to 
every  part  of  the  world,  surmounting  difficul- 
ties before  which  all  cognate  forms  declined  or 
retreated,  has  life  in  community  as  a  universal 
characteristic,  indicating  that  the  species  has 
been  formed  by  development  along  that  line; 
that  is  to  say,  by  social  evolution. 

§  18.  Biological  Summary 

Summing  up  the  results  of  this  examination 
of  biological  data,  it  must  be  said  that  they  do 
not  cast  much  light  upon  the  problem  under 
consideration.  In  general  the  Individual  Hy- 
pothesis seems  to  occupy  the  background  of 
thought  in  the  minds  of  biologists,  suggesting 
research  and  influencing  conclusions.  The 
views  of  the  late  Dr.  Ameghino,  a  paleontol- 
ogist of  Argentina,  form  a  striking  exception. 
In  1891  he  reported  the  discovery  in  Patagonia 
of  fossil  remains  of  monkeys  exhibiting  proto- 
hunmn  characteristics.  From  his  investiga- 
tions he  inferred  the  existence  in  the  Eocene 
period  of  a  species  that  he  named  Homuncul- 
idae,  which  he  held  to  have  closer  genetic  affin- 


50        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

ity  to  Man  than  to  the  apes.  The  animals 
were  small  creatures,  not  more  than  twenty 
inches  high.  Ameghino's  theory  seems  to  have 
been  regarded  as  rather  a  freak  of  opinion  not 
entitled  to  much  consideration.  But  upon  the 
Social  Hypothesis,  Darwin  himself  held  that 
Man  is  probably  descended  from  some  small 
species.28  The  mere  fact  that  Ameghino's 
Homunculus  was  such  a  small  animal  does  not 
rule  it  out  of  consideration.  As  Professor 
Kellogg  points  out  in  explaining  Ameghino's 
views,  "the  horse  began  likewise  in  lower  Ter- 
tiary as  a  little  four-and-three-toed  animal  no 
larger  than  a  cat."29  Indeed,  small  size  is  a 
characteristic  of  mammalian  beginnings. 
"The  earliest  undoubted  mammals  were  small 
creatures,  comparable  to  a  rat  or  a  mouse  in 
size.30  There  is  satisfactory  evidence  of  the  ex- 
istence of  Man  toward  the  close  of  the  Glacial 
Epoch.  Relics  of  his  arts  and  crafts  abound  in 

™  Descent  of  Man,  Sec.  96. 

"Beyond  War,  by  Vernon  L.  Kellogg,  1912,  p.  38.  This 
handy  little  book  gives  an  account  in  clear,  untechnical  lan- 
guage of  the  present  state  of  scientific  knowledge  as  to  the 
genesis  of  the  human  species. 

80  Mammalia,  p.  91. 


BIOLOGICAL  DATA  51 

our  museums.  But  beyond  that  the  data 
are  scanty,  the  interpretation  of  them  is  du- 
bious, and  the  specialists  disagree  sharply 
among  themselves.  The  evidence  is  not 
broad  and  solid  enough  to  warrant  any  deci- 
sion in  favor  of  either  the  Social  or  the 
Individual  Hypothesis. 


CHAPTER  IV 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA 

§  19.  Darwin  On  Mental  Powers 

Darwin  makes  a  comparison  of  the  mental 
powers  of  Man  and  the  lower  animals  leading 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  difference,  great  as  it 
is,  is  only  a  matter  of  degree.  He  says  that  we 
must  admit  that  "there  is  a  much  wider  interval 
in  mental  power  between  one  of  the  lowest 
fishes,  as  a  lamprey  or  lancelet,  and  one  of  the 
higher  apes,  than  between  an  ape  and  Man."1 
He  contends  that  "there  is  no  fundamental  dif- 
ference between  Man  and  the  higher  mammals 
in  their  mental  faculties."2  He  attributes  to 
animals  curiosity,  imitation,  attention,  memory 
and  even  reason.  "Only  a  few  persons  now 
dispute  that  animals  possess  such  power  of 

aChap.  III.,  Sec.  98. 
»Chap.  III.,  Sec.  100. 

52 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  53 

reasoning."3  He  remarks  that  "the  wonder- 
fully diversified  instincts,  mental  powers  and 
affections  of  ants  are  notorious,"  and  that 
"under  this  point  of  view  the  brain  of  an  ant 
is  one  of  the  most  marvelous  atoms  of  matter 
in  the  world,  perhaps  more  so  than  the  brain 
of  Man."4 

Darwin  gives  a  collection  of  instances  to 
show  that  the  higher  animals  are  able  to  reason 
in  some  degree,  but  he  adds  that  "the  mental 
powers  in  some  early  progenitor  of  Man  must 
have  been  more  highly  developed  than  in  any 
existing  ape,  before  even  the  most  imperfect 
form  of  speech  could  have  come  into  use."5 
He  frankly  admits  that  he  cannot  tell  how  this 
higher  development  was  effected  that  was 
necessary  to  bring  the  proto-human  stock  up 
to  the  possibility  of  speech,  save  that  it  must 
have  been  due  to  conditions  under  which  "the 
power  of  communication  had  to  be  improved."6 

3  Chap.  III.,  Sec.  119. 

4  Chap.  II.,  Sec.  83. 

8  Chap.  III.,  Sec.  141. 
•Chap.  III.,  Sec.  143. 


54        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

§  20.  Romanes  on  Mental  Evolution 

Darwin's  views  of  psychological  origins 
were  developed  by  his  friend  Romanes  in  two 
works  entitled  Mental  Evolution  in  Animals 
and  Mental  Evolution  in  Man,  published  re- 
spectively in  1885  and  1888.  In  1909,  they 
were  mentioned  by  Haeckel  as  still  constitut- 
ing the  most  complete  exposition  of  this  branch 
of  Darwin's  theory.7  But  Romanes  adopts 
the  Social  Hypothesis.  He  remarks: 

"The  existing  species  of  anthropoid 
apes  are  very  few  in  number,  and  appear 
to  be  all  on  the  high  road  to  extinction. 
...  It  is  certain  that  none  of  these  exist- 
ing species  could  have  been  the  progeni- 
tor of  Man;  and  lastly,  it  is  equally  cer- 
tain that  the  extinct  species  (or  genus) 
which  did  give  origin  to  Man  must  have 
differed  in  several  important  respects 
from  any  of  its  existing  allies.  In  the 
first  place,  it  must  have  been  more  social 
in  habits  ...  or,  to  state  these  prelimi- 

T  Article  in  Cambridge  Memorial  Volume,  Darwin  and  Mod- 
ern Science. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  55 

nary  considerations  in  a  converse  form, 
when  it  is  assumed  that  because  the  few 
existing  and  expiring  species  of  anthro- 
poid apes  are  unsocial  and  comparatively 
silent,  therefore  the  simian  ancestors  of 
Man  must  have  been  so,  it  is  enough  to 
point  to  the  variability  of  both  these  habits 
among  certain  allied  genera  of  monkeys 
and  baboons,  in  order  at  the  same  time  to 
dispose  of  the  assumption,  and  to  indicate 
the  probable  reasons  why  one  genus  of 
ape  gradually  became  evolved  into  Homo, 
while  all  allied  genera  became,  or  are  still 
becoming,  extinct."8 

Romanes  builds  a  bridge  of  hypothesis  over 
the  chasm  between  animal  and  human  intelli- 
gence, "starting  from  the  highly  intelligent  and 
social  species  of  anthropoid  ape  as  pictured  by 
Darwin."s  The  chasm  is,  narrowed  as  much 
as  possible  by  argument  to  the  effect  that  ani- 
mal intelligence  in  its  highest  range  approaches 
the  conceptual  thinking  admitted  to  be  pecul- 
iar to  human  intelligence.  Romanes,  like  Dar- 

8  Mental  Evolution  in  Man,  p.  365. 
•  Ibid.,  p.  377. 


56        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

win,  lays  stress  upon  ant  intelligence.  He 
remarks  that  "the  known  facts  of  human  psy- 
chology furnish  the  best  available  pattern  of 
the  probable  facts  of  insect  psychology."1 
He  pictures  the  pre-human  species  living  in 
communities,  tending  to  intellectual  advance 
"as  natural  selection  laid  a  greater  and  greater 
premium  on  intelligent  cooperation,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  social  insects."11 

§  21.  Animal  Psychology 

Romanes's  views  as  to  the  scope  of  animal 
intelligence  have  been  controverted  by  psychol- 
ogists who  have  applied  scientific  tests  to  ani- 
mal behavior.  Professor  Watson  of  Johns 
Hopkins  University  remarks  that  "the  older 
investigators  of  animal  intelligence  (Romanes 
and  a  host  of  others)  sat  in  their  offices  and 
received  letters  from  all  parts  of  the  country 
telling  of  some  brilliant  trick  of  a  pet  animal 
that  could  be  explained  upon  no  other  ground 
than  reason."12  But  when  exact  and  syste- 

10  Mental  Evolution  in  Animals,  p.  341. 

11  Mental  Evolution  in  Man,  p.  371. 

13  Animal  Education,  the  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1903. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  57 

matic  investigation  was  applied  to  animal  be- 
havior such  evidence  broke  down. 

The  marked  change  that  has  taken  place  in 
scientific  opinion  on  such  matters  since  Dar- 
win's time  is  impressively  exhibited  by  the 
monographs  of  Professor  Thorndike  of  Co- 
lumbia University,  issue  of  which  began  in 
1898.  Professor  Thorndike  made  a  series  of 
experiments  on  cats,  dogs  and  chicks,  chiefly 
by  putting  them  in  enclosures  from  which  they 
could  get  out  by  some  simple  act.  In  addition 
he  collected  information  as  to  the  methods  of 
animal  trainers.  Professor  Thorndike  found 
that  so-called  feats  of  animal  intelligence  "can 
all  be  explained  by  the  ordinary  associative 
processes  without  aid  from  abstract,  concep- 
tual, inferential  thinking."13 

"The  unit  of  their  consciousness,  apart 
from  impulse  and  emotions,  is  a  whole  as- 
sociation series.  Such  a  soil  cannot  grow 
general  ideas,  for  the  ideas,  so  long  as  they 
never  show  themselves  except  for  a  par- 
ticular practical  business,  will  not  be 

"  Animal  Intelligence,  p.  20. 


58        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

thought  about  or  realized  in  their  nature 
or  connections.  .  .  .  Language  will  be  a 
factor  in  the  isolation  of  ideas  and  a  help 
to  their  realization.  But  when  any  one 
says  that  language  has  been  the  cause  of 
the  change  from  brute  to  Man,  when  one 
talks  as  if  nothing  but  it  were  needed  to 
turn  animal  consciousness  into  human,  he 
is  speaking  as  foolishly  as  one  who  should 
say  that  a  proboscis  added  to  a  cow  would 
make  it  an  elephant."14 

In  conclusion  Professor  Thorndike  declares : 
"Man  is  not  an  animal  plus  reason.  Even 
after  leaving  reason  out  of  account  there  are 
tremendous  differences  between  man  and  the 
higher  animals.  The  problem  of  comparative 
psychology  is  not  only  to  get  human  reason 
from  some  lower  faculties,  but  to  get  human 
association  from  animal  association."15 

Thorndike  reached  a  similar  conclusion 
from  experiments  on  monkeys.  He  found 
that  "in  their  method  of  learning  monkeys  do 
not  advance  far  beyond  a  generalized  mam- 

11  Opus  cited,  p.  122. 
"Opus  cited,  p.  127. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  59 

malian  type,  but  in  their  proficiency  of  method 
they  do.  They  seem  at  least  to  form  associa- 
tions very  much  faster  and  they  form  very 
many  more."16  The  power  of  imitation  tra- 
ditionally ascribed  to  monkeys  was  not  ex- 
hibited under  scientific  tests,  but  the  activity 
of  monkeys  is  such  that  in  the  many  things 
done  in  quick  succession  an  example  may  be 
paralleled  in  a  way  that  looks  like  imitation. 

Professor  Watson  tested  Thorndike's  con- 
clusions by  an  independent  system  of  experi- 
ments so  contrived  as  to  make  a  powerful 
appeal  to  any  power  of  imitation  possessed  by 
monkeys.  He  reached  conclusions  which  "ex- 
actly harmonize  with  those  of  Thorndike"  as 
to  the  lack  of  power  of  imitation  in  monkeys.17 

Watson  has  an  interesting  chapter  on 
trained  animals,  in  which  he  describes  feats, 
performed  by  famous  educated  horses,  dogs 
and  a  chimpanzee,  that  looked  like  the  opera- 
tions of  reason.  The  evidence  thereof  does  not 
suffice  to  prove  this,  but  Watson  holds  that  the 
results  show  that  "the  sympathetic  upbringing 

"Opus  cited,  p.  239. 
"Behavior,  p.  284. 


60        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

of  animals  in  the  home  where  they  are  thrown 
into  constant  contact  with  human  beings  pro- 
duces in  them  a  certain  complex  of  behavior 
for  which  the  laboratory  concepts,  as  they  now 
exist,  are  inadequate  to  supply  explanation."1 
This  class  of  data  therefore  affords  impressive 
evidence  of  the  effect  of  social  stimuli  upon  in- 
dividual faculty  in  animals.  But  Watson  goes 
on  to  say  that  "the  search  for  reasoning, 
imagery,  etc.,  in  animals  must  forever  remain 
futile,  since  such  processes  are  dependent  upon 
language  or  upon  a  set  of  similarly  function- 
ing bodily  habits  put  on  after  language 
habits."19  Watson  holds  that  this  matter  of 
language  habits  accounts  for  the  popular  and 
the  scientific  feeling  that  a  break  exists  between 
man  and  animal.  "The  lack  of  language  habits 
forever  differentiates  brute  from  man."20 

The  profound  difference  found  actually  to 
exist  between  animal  intelligence  and  human 
intelligence  is  the  more  impressive  because  of 
the  expectation  that  evidence  of  genetic  affinity 


"Opus  cited,  p.  316. 
'•Opus  cited,  p.  334. 
"  Opus  cited,  p.  321. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  61 

would  be  forthcoming.  Washburn's  Animal 
Mind,  a  textbook  of  comparative  psychology 
published  in  1908,  reviews  the  evidence  for  and 
against  ideas  in  animals,  and  concludes  that 
"it  is  not  easy  to  prove  the  possession  by  any 
animal  of  memory  in  the  sense  of  having  ideas 
of  distant  objects."  But  after  showing  that 
what  looks  like  feats  of  memory  may  be  re- 
solved into  trains  of  association  not  involving 
ideation,  the  author  remarks  that  "it  is  not 
likely  that  any  such  gulf  separates  the  human 
mind  from  that  of  the  higher  animals  as  would 
be  involved  in  the  absence  from  the  latter  of 
all  images  of  past  experiences."21  And  yet 
with  this  assumption  to  preside  over  research 
scientific  evidence  in  support  of  it  has  not  been 
obtained. 

The  work  of  American  psychologists  seems 
to  mark  the  extreme  reach  of  opinion  adverse 
to  Romanes's  estimates  of  animal  intelligence. 
Less  remote  opinion  seems  to  be  held  by  Eng- 
lish psychologists,  but  they  too  greatly  reduce 
his  valuation.  C.  Lloyd  Morgan,  in  his  Ani- 
mal Life  and  Intelligence,  rather  inclined  to 

"Opus  cited,  pp.  270-273. 


62        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

the  views  of  Romanes  to  whom  he  says  he  owes 
much.  He  subsequently  modified  his  opinions, 
and  in  his  Introduction  to  Comparative  Psy- 
chology he  reached  the  conclusion  that  "the 
evidence  now  before  us  is  not,  in  my  opinion, 
sufficient  to  justify  the  hypothesis  that  any 
animals  have  reached  that  stage  of  mental 
evolution  at  which  they  are  even  incipiently 
rational."22 

L.  T.  Hobhouse  in  his  Mind  in  Evolution 
criticized  Thorndike's  conclusions,  contrasting 
them  with  experimental  results  obtained  by 
himself.  Hobhouse  concluded  that  "animal  in- 
telligence at  its  highest  point  of  development 
effects  a  correlation  between  perceptual  and 
practical  relations."  He  remarks:  "As  ap- 
plied to  apes,  this  conclusion  appears  very 
probable  indeed;  and  as  applied  to  some  other 
mammals,  it  is,  I  think,  better  provisional  hy- 
pothesis than  any  other  I  know."23  Hobhouse 
agrees  with  Romanes  in  holding  that  the  road 
to  intellectual  advancement  was  by  way  of  so- 
cial life,  and  upon  this  point  there  seems  to  be 
substantial  agreement  among  psychologists. 

"  Opus  cited,  p.  377. 
"Opus  cited,  p.  269. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  63 

§  22.  Qualitative  Difference  in  Intelligence 

Along  with  the  increasing  emphasis  upon 
the  quantitative  difference  between  animal  and 
human  intelligence  there  is  increasing  recog- 
nition of  qualitative  difference,  and  in  some 
cases  at  least  this  is  not  on  the  side  of  human 
superiority.  Professor  Watson  informs  me 
that  his  own  experiments  with  animals  sustain 
the  conclusions  reached  by  Professor  Thorn- 
dike  in  his  memorable  monograph  of  1898  on 
Animal  Intelligence,  with  the  further  conclu- 
sion that  animals  may  have  a  range  of  sense 
perceptions  different  from  that  of  Man,  or 
may  have  sense  perceptions  of  an  order  differ- 
ent from  any  possessed  by  Man.  His  experi- 
ments with  terns  and  homing  pigeons  indicate 
that  these  birds  have  a  direction  sense  not  de- 
pendent upon  either  hearing,  smell  or  vision, 
and  hardly  to  be  accounted  for  by  any  sense 
recognized  as  such  in  our  own  consciousness.24 

34  Publication  No.  103,  Carnegie  Institution  of  Washington, 
pp.  187-225,  contains  an  account  of  Professor  Watson's  ob- 
servations on  terns.  An  account  of  his  experiments  with 
homing  pigeons  is  given  in  Harper's  Magazine  for  October, 
1909,  and  February,  1910. 


64        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

This  possibility  was  pointed  out  by  a  pioneer 
investigator  in  this  field,  Sir  John  Lubbock, 
now  Lord  Avebury.  He  remarked : 

"We  have  five  senses,  and  sometimes 
fancy  that  no  others  are  possible.  But  it 
is  obvious  that  we  cannot  measure  the  in- 
finite by  our  own  narrow  limitations. 
Moreover,  looking  at  the  question  from 
the  other  side  we  find  in  animals  complex 
organs  of  sense,  richly  supplied  with 
nerves,  but  the  function  of  which  we  are 
as  yet  powerless  to  explain.  There  may 
be  fifty  other  senses  as  different  from  ours 
as  sound  is  from  sight;  and  even  within 
the  boundaries  of  our  own  senses  there 
may  be  endless  sounds  which  we  cannot 
hear,  and  colors,  as  different  as  red  from 
green,  of  which  we  have  no  conception. 
These  and  a  thousand  other  questions  re- 
main for  solution.  The  familiar  world, 
which  surrounds  us  may  be  a  totally  dif- 
ferent place  to  other  animals."25 

Comparative  psychologists  are  now  intro- 
ducing terms  to  designate  sense  organs  pecul- 

*  Sense* ,  Inatincti  and  Intelligence  of  Animals,  p.  193. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  65 

iar  to  animals.  In  contributions  to  periodical 
literature  in  this  field  such  expressions  appear 
as  "chemotactic,"  "photo-reception,"  "chemo- 
reception,"  the  "topochemical  or  contact-odor 
sense,"  etc.  Thus  animals  may  be  far  richer  in 
sensations  than  the  human  species,  although 
lacking  in  ideas.  They  may  have  ample  satis- 
factions while  destitute  of  self-consciousness. 
The  state  of  the  animal  mind  is  likened  by 
Professor  Thorndike  to  the  diffused  aware- 
ness which  we  sometimes  experience  without 
thought,  as  when  swimming.  "One  feels  the 
water,  the  sky,  the  birds  above,  but  with  no 
thoughts  about  them  or  memories  how  they 
looked  at  other  times,  or  aesthetic  judgments 
about  their  beauty;  one  feels  no  ideas  about 
what  movements  he  will  make,  but  feels  him- 
self make  them,  feels  his  body  throughout."26 

§  23.  Ant  Intelligence 

The  mental  powers  of  ants  which  Darwin 
referred  to  as  perhaps  more  marvelous  than 
those  of  Man  have  been  the  subject  of  close 
study  by  numerous  observers.  A  comprehen- 

"*  Animal  Intelligence,  p.  123. 


66        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

sive  monograph  on  these  interesting  insects 
has  been  issued  by  Professor  W.  M.  Wheeler 
of  Harvard.  The  wonderful  social  and  eco- 
nomic development  of  ant  life  is  impressively 
set  forth,  and  the  evidence  in  regard  to  ant 
psychology  is  examined  in  detail,  but  Profes- 
sor Wheeler  is  unable  to  find  any  satisfactory 
indication  of  the  existence  of  reasoning  power 
in  ants.27  It  is  not  doubted  that  ants  have 
means  of  communicating  with  one  another. 
Professor  Wheeler  says  that  "one  is  in  very 
imminent  danger  of  falling  into  gross  an- 
thropomorphisms in  interpreting  these  various 
movements,  but  they  are  so  clearly  associated 
with  certain  needs  in  the  lives  of  ants  and, 
moreover,  meet  with  such  uniform  response 
from  other  members  of  the  colony,  that  they 
come  to  have  the  same  significance  to  the  ob- 
server as  the  characteristic  attitudes  and  cries, 
or  what  have  been  called  'the  expressions  of 
the  emotions'  in  our  domestic  animals."  The 
signs  or  signals  by  which  ants  convey  impres- 
sions from  one  to  another  are  not  "rational 

"Ants:    Their  Structure,  Development,  and  Behavior,  p.  540. 
et  seq. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  67 

signs    like    those    of    language    and    mathe- 
matics."28 

The  case  of  the  ants  was  adduced  by  Dar- 
win as  a  typical  instance  of  the  indirect  stress 
of  natural  selection  which  in  this  discussion  has 
been  designated  as  social  evolution.  Professor 
Wheeler  remarks  that  "ants  and  mammals 
seem  to  make  their  appearance  simultaneously 
in  Mesozoic  times."  The  formation  of  social 
species  was  an  early  and  not  a  late  phase  of 
evolution  in  this  animal  order.  Among  the 
ants  of  the  Tertiary  period  "the  male,  female 
and  worker  phases  were  as  sharply  differenti- 
ated as  today."  "All  writers  agree  in  ascribing 
polymorphism  to  a  physiological  division  of 
labor  among  originally  similar  organisms." 
The  formation  of  the  community  was  a  con- 
dition precedent  to  the  differentiation  of  its 
units.  Professor  Wheeler  compares  the  dif- 
ferent castes  in  the  ant  community  to  the  dif- 
ferent tissues  of  a  living  body,  implying  that 
the  ant  community  is  an  organism.29 

"Opus  cited,  p.  536. 

"Opus  cited,  pp.  4,  161,  118,  7. 


68        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

§  24.  Reaction  against  Biological  Theory 

Thus  on  the  whole  it  appears  that  the  result 
of  research  since  Darwin's  time  has  not  pro- 
vided material  to  bridge  the  gap  between  the 
apes  and  Man,  but  rather  tends  to  show  that 
that  gap  is  wider  than  was  originally  supposed. 
Hence  some  evolutionists  think  it  desirable  to 
provide  a  special  category  for  the  process  in  the 
case  of  Man.  In  1906  Hobhouse  made  use 
of  the  term  "orthogenic  evolution"  to  dis- 
tinguish "the  processes  which  make  for  the  evo- 
lution of  a  higher  type  from  those  which  tend 
only  to  differentiation."30  A  reaction  has  set 
in  against  biological  interpretation  of  human 
nature.  Vigorous  expression  was  given  to  this 
tendency  by  Professor  C.  H.  Judd,  in  his 
presidential  address  before  the  American  Psy- 
chological Association,  December  30,  1909.31 
He  said: 

"The  social  sciences  have  sought  in  vain 
to  base  themselves  on  the  general  doctrine 
of  organic  evolution.  The  processes  of 

"Morals  in  Evolution,  p.  240. 

"  Payc hological  Review,   March,   1910. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  69 

human  adaptation  are  different  from  those 
of  animal  adaptation  just  because  human 
adaptation  is  determined  in  character  by 
consciousness." 

"I  know  of  no  more  vivid  way  of  put- 
ting the  matter  than  to  say  that  man  lives 
primarily  in  the  world  of  words.  .  .  . 
This  special  world  is  the  most  unique  pro- 
duct of  evolution  and  it  is  also  the  most 
effective  device  which  has  ever  been  pro- 
duced for  subjecting  the  physical  environ- 
ment to  human  needs.  How  any  student 
of  the  world  of  human  life  could  be  con- 
tent to  study  this  life  by  means  of  a  for- 
mula borrowed  from  the  realm  of  animal 
evolution,  passes  my  understanding." 

"I  believe  that  we  have  suffered  in  our 
later  studies  of  man  through  a  shortsight- 
edness born  of  the  biological  discovery 
that  our  antecedents  are  those  in  which 
consciousness  played  but  a  small  part.  I 
believe  we  need  to  work  further  on  this 
problem  of  evolution  until  we  see  that  in 
its  consummation  organic  evolution  passes 


70        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

into  a  form  of  adjustment  in  which  the 
inner  world  with  its  conscious  pattern  for 
changes  in  the  outer  world  is  more  import- 
ant than  any  form  of  objective  selection 
which  can  be  discovered." 

The  present  state  of  opinion  in  this  field  is 
thus  summed  up  by  C.  Lloyd  Morgan: 

"Now  that  the  general  evolutionary 
thesis  is  fully  and  freely  accepted  by  those 
who  carry  on  such  researches,  more  stress 
is  laid  on  the  differentiation  of  the  stages 
of  evolutionary  advance  than  on  the  fact 
of  their  underlying  community  of  nature. 
The  conceptual  intelligence  which  is  es- 
pecially characteristic  of  the  higher  mental 
procedure  of  man  is  more  firmly  distin- 
guished from  the  perceptual  intelligence 
which  he  shares  with  the  lower  animals, 
distinguished  now  as  a  higher  product  of 
evolution,  no  longer  as  differing  in  origin 
or  different  in  kind."32 

"Mental  Factors  in  Evolution,  article  in  Cambridge  memo- 
rial volume  Darwin  and  Modern  Science. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  71 

§  25.  Discussion  of  the  Problem 

It  is  worth  considering  whether  the  Social 
Hypothesis  suggested  by  Darwin  as  an  alter- 
native will  not  account  for  the  quantitative  and 
qualitative  difference  between  human  and  ani- 
mal intelligence  noted  by  comparative  psy- 
chology, and  also  furnish  just  such  a  difference 
between  Man  and  other  animals  in  mode  of 
evolution  as  Mr.  Hobhouse  and  Professor 
Judd  insist  upon  to  square  the  theory  with  the 
empirical  data.  The  matter  can  be  dealt  with 
most  effectively  by  regarding  the  problem  as 
being  simply  one  of  brain  development.  The 
cardinal  difference  between  man  and  brute  is 
there  and  nowhere  else.  Darwin  expressly 
correlates  mental  development  with  the  evo- 
lution of  the  brain.  He  remarks : 

"As  the  various  mental  faculties  grad- 
ually developed  themselves,  the  brain 
would  almost  certainly  become  larger. 
No  one,  I  presume,  doubts  that  the  large 
proportion  which  the  size  of  Man's  brain 
bears  to  his  body  compared  with  the  same 
proportion  in  the  gorilla  or  orang,  is  close- 


72        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

ly    connected    with    his    higher    mental 
powers."33 

The  problem  is  thus  resolved  into  finding  a 
satisfactory  answer  to  the  question:  What 
turned  the  stress  of  evolution  in  the  direction 
of  brain  development  to  the  comparative 
neglect  of  corporeal  structure?  Darwin  gave 
the  answer  in  the  Social  Hypothesis.  It  was 
the  institution  of  communal  life  that  promoted 
the  development  of  brain  rather  than  of 
greater  massiveness  of  jaw,  length  of  limb  and 
increased  muscular  power.  Man  is  conspicu- 
ously deficient  in  natural  weapons.  Instead  of 
fangs,  he  has  teeth;  instead  of  claws,  a  flat 
nail;  and  his  whole  body  is  weak  and  soft  as 
compared  with  other  large  mammals.  Thus 
his  physical  characteristics  indicate  that  he  has 
not  developed  on  lines  of  individual  compe- 
tency. He  seems  like  the  zooid,  modified  in 
nature  by  developing  as  part  of  a  collective  life. 

It  is  not  in  question  that  the  exceptional  de- 
velopment of  the  brain  in  the  human  species  is 
an  increment  of  advantageous  variation:  the 
point  at  issue  is  whose  advantage?  Upon  the 

M  Detcent  of  Man,  Sec.  83. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  73 

Individual  Hypothesis,  the  problem  baffles 
elucidation.  Wallace  found  this  such  a  stumb- 
ling block  that  he  held  that  some  factor,  other 
than  natural  selection,  must  have  come  into| 
play.  He  pointed  out  that  "all  changes  of 
form  or  structure,  all  increase  in  the  size  of  an 
organ  or  its  complexity,  all  greater  specializa- 
tion or  physiological  division  of  labor,  can  only 
be  brought  about  inasmuch  as  it  is  for  the  good 
of  the  being  so  modified."  But  it  is  impossible 
to  see  how  brain  development,  rather  than 
bodily  development,  could  have  been  initiated 
as  individual  advantage.  Wallace  goes  so  far 
as  to  say  that  even  now  savages  have  a  larger 
brain  than  they  have  use  for  as  individual 
animals.34 

The  opinion  that  human  evolution  manifests 
the  operation  of  some  distinctive  force  or 
power  demarcating  it  from  organic  evolution 
has  received  extensive  expression  in  current 
literature.  A  recent  instance  is  Professor 
Conn's  treatise  written  "to  show  that  the  laws 


34  Wallace's  views  are  presented  in  Chapters  VIII.  and  IX. 
of  Natural  Selection  and  Tropical  Nature;  also  Chapter  XV. 
of  his  Darwinism. 


74        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

of  the  evolution  of  animals  and  plants  apply 
to  human  evolution  only  up  to  a  certain  point, 
beyond  which  Man  has  been  under  the  influ- 
ence of  distinct  laws  of  his  own."35 

But  while  this  assumption  avoids  the  diffi- 
culty of  explaining  how  the  human  species 
was  extracted  from  animal  species  it  raises  new 
difficulties.  Whence  came  the  distinct  laws? 
What  fixed  the  turning  point  at  which  they 
superseded  the  laws  previously  applying  to 
human  evolution?  In  its  logical  character  the 
proposed  explanation  seems  to  revive  in  a  way 
the  doctrine  of  special  creation. 

The  Social  Hypothesis  disposes  of  this  mat- 
ter by  exhibiting  the  community  as  the  being 
for  whose  advantage  brain  development  pri- 
marily took  place.  The  individual  advantage 
therefrom  is  incidental.  The  case  is  an  instance 
of  the  modification  of  the  units  of  a  community 
through  stress  of  evolutionary  process  upon 
the  community  as  a  whole,  analogous  to  the 
case  of  the  social  insects.  Indeed  the  compara- 
tive growth  of  brain  structure  in  Man  is  not 
really  so  striking  an  exhibition  of  the  power  of 

"Social  Heredity  and  Social  Evolution,  p.  v. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  75 

social  evolution  in  moulding  individual  struc- 
ture, as  is  presented  by  ants.  Speaking  of  the 
driver  ants  of  West  Africa  Darwin  says: 

"The  reader  will  perhaps  best  appre- 
ciate the  amount  of  difference  in  these 
workers,  by  my  giving  not  the  actual 
measurements  but  a  strictly  accurate  il- 
lustration: the  difference  was  the  same  as 
if  we  were  to  see  a  set  of  workmen  build- 
ing a  house,  of  whom  many  were  five  feet 
four  inches  high;  and  many  sixteen  feet 
high;  but  we  must  in  addition  suppose 
that  the  larger  workmen  had  heads  four 
instead  of  three  times  as  big  as  those  of 
the  smaller  men,  and  jaws  nearly  five 
times  as  big.36 

The  difference  between  the  brain  of  Man 
and  Ape,  vast  as  are  the  consequences,  is  small 
compared  to  this  divergence  of  structure 
among  insects  due  to  social  evolution.  With 
them  too  the  brain  is  one  of  the  organs  en- 
larged through  the  stress  of  social  evolution. 
Darwin  observes  that  "in  ants  the  cerebral 

*  Origin  of  Species,  Sec.  440. 


76        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

ganglia  are  of  extraordinary  dimensions,  and 
in  all  the  Hymenoptera  these  ganglia  are  many 
times  larger  than  in  the  less  intelligent  orders, 
such  as  beetles."37 

If  social  evolution  should  have  such  an  ef- 
fect in  differentiating  the  organs  of  certain 
insect  species  from  those  of  other  insect  species, 
is  it  at  all  improbable  that  the  same  order  of 
influence  should  have  a  corresponding  effect 
among  the  Primates?  The  facts  of  individual 
development  indicate  that  just  such  a  differ- 
entiating influence  was  actually  exerted.  Pro- 
fessor Keith  remarks : 

"The  rapid  increase  of  the  cranial  ca- 
pacity is  a  character  of  the  human  infant. 
The  brain  of  the  newly  born  gorilla,  which 
is  only  slightly  smaller  than  that  of  a  child 
at  birth,  is  already  65  per  cent,  of  its  adult 
size;  the  remainder  of  its  growth  is  prob- 
ably due  to  the  addition  of  the  'corporeal 
concomitant.'  From  birth  onward  the 
anthropoid  brain  continues  to  increase  at 
almost  a  uniform  rate  until  adult  years 
are  reached;  there  is  no  spurt  in  growth 

17  Ibid.,  Sec.  83. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  77 

such  as  we  see  in  the  brain  of  the  human 
infant.  .  .  .  Man  then  is  peculiar  in  that 
his  brain  continues  to  grow  rapidly  after 
birth,  and  in  the  great  expansion  of  the 
head  in  infancy  and  childhood  we  see  one 
of  the  latest  phases  in  human  evolution."38 

Would  it  not  be  more  correct  to  say  that  in 
this  we  see  that  which  is  the  characteristic 
phase  of  human  evolution?  The  anthropoid 
brain  may  be  regarded  as  exhibiting  the  type 
of  brain  possessed  by  the  pre-human  stock  be- 
fore sociality  became  so  complete  that  the  pri- 
mary incidence  of  natural  selection  shifted 
from  the  individual  to  the  community.  The 
existing  peculiarity  of  the  human  brain  regis- 
ters the  distinctive  effect  of  social  evolution. 

§  26.  Human  Nature  a  Social  Product 

It  is  a  fair  inference  from  the  foregoing  con- 
siderations that  the  fundamental  difference 
between  Man  and  other  mammalia  is  that  he 
is  distinctly  a  product  of  social  evolution. 
This  conclusion  is  supported  by  another  class 
of  psychological  data,  those  obtained  by  study 

m  Man,  in  Home  University  Library,  p.  136. 


78        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

of  the  human  mind  and  the  phases  of  its  de- 
velopment. In  a  series  of  remarkable  essays 
on  the  ethical  implications  of  Darwinism  be- 
ginning so  early  as  1868  the  late  Professor 
William  Kingdon  Clifford  advanced  the  prop- 
osition that  human  nature  is  not  explicable 
save  as  a  social  product.  In  his  essay  on  The 
Scientific  Basis  of  Morals  he  gave  an  account 
of  the  way  in  which  the  individual  self  emerges 
from  the  tribal  self.  In  his  essay  on  Cosmic 
Emotion  he  described  the  human  mind  as  "an 
apparatus  for  connecting  sensation  and  action, 
by  means  of  a  symbolic  representation  of  the 
external  world,  framed  in  common  and  for 
common  purposes  by  the  social  intercourse  of 
men."  In  his  essay  on  Seeing  and  Thinking 
he  argued  that  the  life  of  Man  in  community 
has  generated  the  power  of  forming  general 
concepts.  "What  has  guided  the  process?"  he 
asked.  "Why,  clearly  the  use  of  them  to  so- 
ciety, and  not  the  use  of  them  to  individuals. 
.  .  .  As  soon  as  men  had  to  live  together  and 
found  that  they  could,  by  making  signs,  direct 
each  other's  actions,  immediately  there  was  an 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  79 

immense  step  made  forward  in  this  arrange- 
ment of  propositions  within  our  brain." 

Professor  Clifford  obscured  the  biological 
significance  of  the  process  he  describes  by 
speaking  of  it  merely  as  acting  upon  Man, 
whereas  his  reasoning  implies  that  it  was  the 
decisive  factor  in  the  making  of  Man,  virtually 
the  formation  of  the  human  species  from  an 
antecedent  mammalian  stock.  In  his  Scientific 
Basis  of  Morals  he  came  close  to  the  positive 
affirmation  that  the  process  he  describes  was 
the  species-forming  process.  He  remarked: 
"But  the  process  is  not  a  conscious  one;  the 
social  craft  or  art  of  living  together  is  learned 
by  the  tribe  and  not  by  the  individual,  and  the 
purpose  of  improving  men's  characters  is  pro- 
vided for  by  complex  social  arrangements  long 
before  it  has  been  conceived  by  any  conscious 
mind."  In  view  of  such  statements,  the  bio- 
logical implication  becomes  almost  obvious, 
and  it  appears  that  we  are  here  confronted 
with  an  instance  wherein  natural  selection,  in 
Darwin's  phrase  "acts  on  the  individual, 
through  the  preservation  of  variations  which 
are  beneficial  to  the  community." 


80        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

Professor  Clifford's  proposition  that  the 
human  mind  is  a  social  product,  is  now  settled 
doctrine,  so  that  citations  on  this  point  from 
the  writings  of  specialists  are  hardly  necessary. 
A  convenient  summary  of  conclusions  reached 
in  genetic  psychology  will  be  found  in  Profes- 
sor James  Mark  Baldwin's  work  on  Darwin 
and  the  Humanities  prepared  in  1909  on  the 
occasion  of  the  double  anniversary  of  Darwin's 
birth  and  the  publication  of  The  Origin  of 
Species.  Professor  Baldwin  says:  "The  'self 
of  the  individual's  self -consciousness  is,  in  its 
materials  and  processes  of  formation,  thor- 
oughly social  in  its  origin."  "Society  produces 
the  individual."  "The  individual  is  found  to 
be  a  social  product,  a  complex  result,  having 
its  genetic  conditions  in  actual  social  life." 
"The  individual  is  the  result  of  refined  proc- 
esses of  social  differentiation."  "Conscious- 
ness is  a  thing  of  functional  evolution  in  the 
race,  and  of  personal  development  in  the 
individual."39 

•Opus  cited,  pp.  48,  66,  74,  75,  81. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  DATA  81 

§  27.  Psychological  Summary 

Summing  up  the  results  of  this  examination, 
it  may  be  said  that  here  is  a  class  of  evidence 
that  does  cast  much  light  upon  the  problem 
under  consideration.  The  facts  unite  in  es- 
tablishing the  Social  Hypothesis  and  in  ex- 
cluding the  Individual  Hypothesis.  In  this 
field  one  does  not  note  such  disagreement 
among  specialists  as  was  found  in  the  field  of 
biology.  As  a  fact  of  ontogeny,  or  individual 
development,  the  psychologists  are  now  gen- 
erally agreed  that  the  "I"  does  not  develop 
save  in  the  presence  of  a  "you."  But  the  phy- 
logenetic  significance  of  the  fact  does  not  ap- 
pear to  be  sufficiently  observed.  It  is  logically 
part  of  the  same  statement  that  the  community 
is  prior  to  the  human  individual.  The  laws  of 
mental  development  thus  indicate  life  in  com- 
munity as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  genesis 
of  the  human  species. 


CHAPTER  V 

LINGUISTIC  DATA 

§  28.  The  Function  of  Speech 

The  same  kind  of  difficulties  that  are  en- 
countered when  the  attempt  is  made  to  account 
for  brain  development,  as  a  characteristic  ac- 
quired by  variation  in  the  line  of  individual 
advantage,  present  themselves  when  the  gen- 
esis of  speech  is  considered,  a  function  cor- 
related with  brain  development.  Professor 
Judd  states  the  case  as  follows: 

"There  are  certain  human  functions 
which  grow  up  as  supports  to  conscious- 
ness. These  functions  are  not  directly 
related  to  the  physical  environment  and 
would  never  have  been  perfected  at  a  level 
of  life  where  mere  preservation  of  indi- 
vidual existence  is  the  chief  end  of  ani- 
mal endeavor.  These  supporting  or  sec- 


LINGUISTIC  DATA  83 

ondary  functions  serve  the  purpose  of  self 
preservation  only  indirectly  through 
consciousness.  Chief  among  such  func- 
tions is  language.  .  .  .  Language  never 
was  a  useful  function  in  the  direct  strug- 
gle with  the  physical  world."1 

The  conclusion  is  justified  when  Man  is 
viewed  as  a  product  of  individual  evolution  like 
other  Primates;  but  it  is  not  warranted  when 
Man  is  viewed  as  a  product  of  social  evolution. 
If  language  is  an  innervation  of  the  com- 
munity, converting  it  into  a  compound  being 
of  many  heads  and  hands,  it  is  manifestly  a 
variation  advantageous  to  that  being  "in  the 
direct  struggle  with  the  physical  world."  So 
here  again  we  are  confronted  by  an  instance 
wherein  natural  selection,  in  Darwin's  phrase, 
"acts  on  the  individual,  through  the  preserva- 
tion of  variations  which  are  beneficial  to  the 
community."2 

§  29.  The  Romanes  Bridge 

The  object  proposed  by  Romanes  in  his 
studies  of  mental  evolution  was  that  of  "bridg- 

1  Psychological  Review,  March,  1910. 

2  See  ante,  Sec.  6. 


84        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

ing  the  psychological  distance  which  separates 
the  gorilla  from  the  gentleman."  But  in  set- 
ting about  this  bridge  building  he  begins  by 
discarding  the  unsocial  gorilla  as  a  pier.  He 
makes  the  assumption  that  the  pre-human  an- 
thropoid "was  presumably  not  only  more  in- 
telligent than  any  of  the  few  surviving  species, 
but  also  much  more  social."  He  adds:  "And 
this  is  an  important  point  to  insist  upon,  be- 
cause it  is  obvious  that  the  conditions  of  social 
life  are  also  the  prime  conditions  to  any  con- 
siderable advance  upon  the  signmaking  fac- 
ulty as  this  occurs  in  existing  apes." 

"Let  us  try  to  imagine  a  community  of 
Homo  alalus  considerably  more  intelli- 
gent than  the  existing  anthropoid  apes, 
although  still  considerably  below  the  in- 
tellectual level  of  existing  savages.  It  is 
certain  that  in  such  a  community  natural 
signs  of  voice,  gesture  and  grimace  would 
be  in  vogue  to  a  greater  or  less  extent. 
As  their  numbers  increased  (and  conse- 
quently, as  natural  selection  laid  a  greater 
and  greater  premium  on  intelligent  co- 


LINGUISTIC  DATA  85 

operation,  as  in  the  case  of  the  social  in- 
sects),  such  signs  would  require  to  become 
more  and  more  conventional,  or  acquire 
more  and  more  the  character  of  sentence 
words  and  denotative  signs."3 

Romanes  enters  into  a  detailed  examination 
of  philological  evidence  in  support  of  the  con- 
nection of  this  anthropoid  signmaking  faculty 
with  the  human  faculty  of  speech,  and  he  holds 
that  we  have  "a  proved  continuity  of  develop- 
ment between  all  stages  of  the  signmaking 
faculty,"  ranging  from  aboriginal  gesture  and 
pantomine  with  auxiliary  oralization,  up  to  the 
point  when  the  oral  element  of  communication 
predominates,  and  the  conceptual  ideation  be- 
comes possible  that  now  distinguishes  Man 
from  brute.  His  reasoning  is  quite  dependent 
upon  the  assumption  that  the  pre-human 
species  had  life  in  community  as  an  established 
characteristic. 

§  30.  Genesis  of  Language 

It  is  generally  agreed  among  specialists  in 
comparative  philology  that  the  formation 

'Mental  Evolution  in  Man,  pp.  439,  375,  371. 


86        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

of  society  was  a  condition  precedent  to  acquir- 
ing the  faculty  of  speech.  For  the  purposes 
of  this  discussion  it  is  not  necessary  to  enter 
into  the  controversy  between  those  who  hold 
that  language  began  with  the  formation  of 
monosyllabic  roots,  and  those  who  hold  that  it 
began  with  sound  groups  which  have  been 
designated  as  sentence  words,  or  the  holophase. 
Upon  either  theory,  the  existence  of  society  is 
admitted  to  be  prerequisite.  Professor  Whit- 
ney, who  adheres  to  the  radicarian  theory,  in 
his  dissertation  on  Philology  contributed  to  the 
Encyclopedia  Britannica  remarked : 

"As  a  solitary  man  now  would  never 
form  even  the  beginnings  of  speech,  as 
one  separated  from  society  unlearns  his 
speech  by  disuse  and  becomes  virtually 
dumb,  so  early  man,  with  all  his  powers, 
would  never  have  acquired  speech,  save  as 
to  those  powers  was  added  sociality  and 
the  needs  it  brought." 

The  radicarian  theory  was  derived  princi- 
pally from  analysis  of  the  Indo-European 
family  of  languages.  The  opposing  theory, 


LINGUISTIC  DATA  87 

which  accords  with  Wundt's  theory  of  the 
psycho-genesis  of  language,4  does  not  deny  the 
radicarian  characteristics  of  that  family  of  lan- 
guages but  regards  them  as  the  mark  of  an 
advanced  stage  of  linguistic  development, 
prior  to  which  there  were  stages,  vestiges  of 
which  remain  in  low  languages  classed  as  poly- 
synthetic,  thus  characterized  because  of  the 
fusion  of  the  several  parts  of  sentence  into  a 
single  word.  This  theory,  which  is  favored  by 
archaeologists  and  anthropologists,  throws  a 
light  upon  human  origins  that  deserves  special 
consideration,  since  in  illuminating  the  origin 
of  language  it  also  illuminates  the  beginnings 
of  personality. 

*  Wundt  holds  that  language  began  as  a  form  of  expressive 
movements  in  which  originally  gesture  predominated,  but  with 
sounds  as  a  habitual  accompaniment,  "which  sounds  would 
form  an  incomplete  language.  .  .  .  The  development  of  articu- 
late language  is  accordingly  in  all  probability  to  be  thought 
of  as  a  process  of  differentiation  in  which  the  articulatory 
movements  gradually  gained  the  permanent  ascendancy  over 
a  number  of  different  variable  expressive  movements  which 
originally  attended  them.  .  .  .  The  movements  of  the  vocal 
organs  gain  the  ascendancy  over  the  others  in  the  effort  of  the 
individual  to  communicate  with  his  fellows."  Outlines  of  Psy- 
chology, p.  341. 


88        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

§  31.  Views  of  Professor  Sayce 

Professor  Sayce  in  his  Introduction  to  the 
Science  of  Language  declares :  "Language  is 
the  creation  of  society.  .  .  .  Like  the  song  of 
birds,  the  language  of  man,  too,  is  instinctive 
and  necessary,  called  forth  by  a  sense  of  life 
and  energy,  by  a  common  participation  in  a 
common  work.  .  .  .  Grammar  has  grown  out 
of  gesture  and  gesticulation,  words  out  of  the 
imitation  of  natural  sounds  and  the  inarticu- 
late cries  uttered  by  man  engaged  in  a  com- 
mon work,  or  else  moved  by  common  emotions 
of  pleasure  and  pain."5 

Languages  which  historically  we  reckon  as 
ancient  are  in  fact  recent  in  the  order  of  hu- 
man life.  "The  parent  Aryan  itself  was  as 
developed  and  highly  inflectional  a  language 
as  Sanskrit  or  Greek;  its  first  stage  of  growth 
had  been  left  far  behind;  much  more  that 
primeval  era  when  it  was  first  being  elabora- 
ted out  of  the  rude  cries  and  grammarless  ut- 
terances of  a  barbarous  community.  .  .  .  The 
Accadian  of  Chaldea  is  an  old  and  decaying 

•Opus  cited,  Vol.  I.,  pp.  75,  83;  Vol.  II.,  391. 


LINGUISTIC  DATA  89 


speech  when  we  first  discover  it  in  inscriptions 
of  3000  B.C."6  Professor  Sayce  emphasizes 
the  fact  that  there  is  no  parent  form  of  lan- 
guage but  that  independent  linguistic  forms 
were  evolved  in  various  centres.  "The  num- 
ber of  separate  families  of  speech  now  existing 
in  the  world  which  cannot  be  connected  with 
one  another  is  at  least  seventy-five;  and  the 
number  will  doubtless  be  increased  when  we 
have  grammars  and  dictionaries  of  the  numer- 
ous languages  and  dialects  which  are  still  un- 
known, and  better  information  as  regards  those 
with  which  we  are  partially  acquainted."7 
Professor  Sayce  sums  up  the  philological  data 
as  follows: 

"Comparative  philology  thus  agrees 
with  geology,  prehistoric  archaeology  and 
ethnology  in  showing  that  man  as  a 
speaker  has  existed  for  an  enormous 
period,  and  this  enormous  period  is  of  it- 
self sufficient  to  explain  the  mixture  and 
interchanges  that  have  taken  place  in  lan- 
guages, as  well  as  the  disappearance  of 

•Opus  cited,  Vol.  II.,  pp.  320,  32L 
7  Opus  cited,  Vol.  II.,  p.  323. 


90        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

numberless  groups  of  speech  throughout 
the  globe.  The  languages  of  the  present 
world  are  but  the  selected  residuum,  the 
the  miserable  relics,  of  the  infinite  variety 
of  tongues  that  have  grown  up  and  de- 
cayed among  the  races  of  mankind.  Since 
language  is  a  social  relation,  the  first  lan- 
guages will  have  been  as  numerous  as  the 
first  communities."8 

The  polysynthetic  languages  are  regarded  as 
a  survival  of  primitive  forms  of  speech  which 
have  elsewhere  perished.  In  them  the  sentence 
and  not  the  word  is  the  unit  of  speech,  and  the 
sentence  is  a  sound  group  which  according  to 
Wundt's  theory  of  psychogenesis  was  origi- 
nally outcry  accompanying  pantomime,  the 
formation  of  language  being  a  process  of  de- 
tachment of  sound  from  gesticulation,  a  pro- 
cess still  not  complete.  In  fact  sign  language 
carried  on  by  gesture,  has  had  an  extensive 
development  alongside  of  spoken  language, 
Professor  Sayce  remarks:  "Had  the  hands 
not  been  wanted  for  other  purposes,  it  is  pos- 

•  Ibid.,  p.  329. 


LINGUISTIC  DATA  91 

sible  that  the  mouth  might  never  have  been 
used  to  communicate  ideas." 

The  long  sentence  words  of  polysynthetic 
languages  are  relics  of  primitive  oralization 
auxiliary  to  gesture.  Professor  Sayce  says: 
"Like  the  beehive  community  to  which  modern 
research  refers  the  first  beginnings  of  society, 
the  first  essays  at  language  were  undifferen- 
tiated  units,  out  of  which  the  various  parts  of 
the  sentence  were  eventually  to  come."9  Thus 
the  beginnings  of  speech  were  not  conceptual 
utterance,  but  the  expression  of  trains  of  as- 
sociation. Poverty  in  abstract  terms  is  still  a 
marked  characteristic  of  polysynthetic  lan- 
guages. Professor  Sayce  observes: 

"The  Mohicans  have  words  for  cutting 
various  objects,  but  none  to  convey  cut- 
ting simply ;  and  the  Society  Islanders  can 
talk  of  a  boy's  tail,  a  sheep's  tail,  or  a 
man's  tail,  but  not  of  tail  itself.  .  .  .  Che- 
roki  possesses  thirteen  different  verbs  to 
denote  particular  kinds  of  washing  but 
none  to  denote  washing  itself ;  and  accord- 

•Opus  cited,  Vol.  II.,  pp.  308,  302. 


92        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

ing  to  Milligan  the  aborigines  of  Tas- 
mania had  no  words  representing  abstract 
ideas;  for  each  variety  of  gum  and  wattle 
tree  they  had  a  name,  but  they  had  no 
equivalent  for  the  expression  'a  tree'; 
neither  could  they  express  abstract  quali- 
ties, such  as  hard,  soft,  warm,  cold,  long, 
short,  round.  The  lower  races  of  mankind 
have  excellent  memories,  but  very  poor 
reasoning  powers."10 

§  32.  The  Testimony  of  Americanists 

Edward  John  Payne  of  University  College, 
Oxford,  made  a  systematic  investigation  of 
clues  to  the  origin  of  speech  furnished  by 
American  tribal  languages.  He  remarks : 

"The  languages  of  the  American  tribes, 
who  left  the  Old  World  in  an  age  when 
speech  was  as  yet  imperfectly  developed, 
still  retain  the  impress  of  its  earliest 
elaboration.  .  .  .  The  investigator  of  the 
American  languages  has  not  proceeded 
far  in  his  task  before  discovering  that  he 
is  unwittingly  excavating  the  rude  foun- 

» Ibid.,  p.  6. 


LINGUISTIC  DATA  93 

dations  of  speech,  foundations  deeply  laid 
in  the  nature  of  thought,  animal  life  and 
human  society.  In  the  languages  of  civi- 
lization these  foundations  are  hidden  in 
the  structure  reared  around  and  above 
them  by  the  action  of  analytic  thought. 
In  the  American  languages,  though  anal- 
ysis is  universally  at  work,  the  founda- 
tions are  plainly  visible.  The  beginnings 
of  speech  appear,  simple  and  archaic,  as 
it  grew  out  of  the  imperfectly  significant 
cry  of  primitive  man.  From  a  nearer 
point  of  view  than  is  afforded  by  the  lan- 
guages of  the  Old  World,  we  see  the  hu- 
man animal  learning  the  elements  of 
speech  by  semi-instinctive  utterances,  ut- 
terances at  first  subjective,  as  in  the  lower 
animals,  but  gradually  becoming  capable 
of  symbolizing  objects;  behold  thought 
ranging  from  thing  to  thing,  rudely  classi- 
fying things  by  the  personal  relations  af- 
fecting them,  and  extending  its  method 
of  designating  these  personal  relations 
over  the  whole  external  world;  these  per- 
sonal relations  adapting  themselves,  even 


94        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

in  the  pregrammatical  ejaculation,  to  the 
moods  of  wish,  question,  answer  and  com- 
mand, and  the  unit  of  significance  em- 
bodying itself  in  the  holophase  or 
polysyllabic  unit  of  utterance."11 

In  considering  the  specimens  of  the  holo- 
phase exhibited  by  Payne,  the  observation  of 
Thorndike  may  be  recalled  that  the  farthest 
reach  of  animal  mentality  is  the  formation  of 
an  association  series.12  The  holophase  may  be 
described  as  the  phonetic  symbol  of  such  an 
association  series.  It  seems  to  be  the  linguistic 
bridge  by  which  man  advanced  to  conceptual 
thought.  Even  when  abstract  terms  begin  to 
appear  the  holophase  lingers.  Thus  the  old 
Huron-Iroquois  contained  such  distinct  terms 
as  escoirhon  (I-have-been-to-the- water),  set- 
sanha  (go-to- the- water),  ondequoha  ( there- 
is- water-in-the-bucket)  ,  daustantewacharet 
(there-is-no-water-in-the-pot),  along  with  the 
word  awen,  meaning  simply  water.13 

11  History  of  the  New  World,  called  America,  preface  to  Vol. 
II.,  p.  xiv. 

a  See  ante,  Sec.  21,  p.  57. 
"Opus  cited,  Vol.  II.,  p.  198. 


LINGUISTIC  DATA  95 

Mr.  Payne  gives  a  detailed  account  of  the 
stages  by  which  the  holophase  was  dissolved 
and  the  parts  of  speech  were  formed.  Terms 
for  particular  personal  relationship  multiplied 
before  the  formation  of  general  categories,  and 
some  low  forms  of  language  are  characterized 
by  a  remarkable  affluence  in  this  respect.  Mr. 
Payne  illustrates  this  characteristic  by  in- 
stances from  both  Old  World  and  New  World 
languages.  "Javanese  has  twenty  pronouns 
of  the  first  person  and  twelve  of  the  second. 
Malay  has  sixteen  of  the  first  person  and  ten 
of  the  second.  Fuegian  has  more  than  twenty 
words,  some  containing  four  syllables,  all  of 
which  may  mean  either  'he'  or  'she'."14 

An  idiom  traceable  through  many  lan- 
guages, East  and  West,  provides  two  distinct 
forms  of  the  first  person  plural;  one  collective, 
the  other  selective.  "The  collective  'we'  in- 
cludes all  persons  present;  the  less  compre- 
hensive one  refers  to  some  smaller  'selected' 
groups  to  which  the  speaker  belongs,  the  rest 
of  the  audience  being  excluded  from  what  is 

"  Ibid.,  p.  199. 


96        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

being  expressed  by  him."15  Allied  to  this  mul- 
tiplicity of  person  is  a  profusion  of  terms  of 
number.  Terms  for  both  dual  and  plural  num- 
ber are  found  in  American  languages,  and 
terms  for  trinal  number  are  found  in  some 
Melanesian  languages.16  The  facts  collected 
by  Mr.  Payne  exhibit  an  almost  bewildering 
variety  of  linguistic  forms  in  low  languages. 
They  are  all,  however,  traceable  to  original 
collectivity  diminished  in  various  degrees  by 
selection. 

§  33.  The  Organ  of  Group  Personality 

Considering  the  linguistic  systems  of  the 
American  aborigines  and  collating  the  facts 
with  additional  data  obtained  from  tribal  lan- 
guages in  other  parts  of  the  world,  Mr.  Payne 
reaches  the  conclusion  that  the  nature  of  lan- 
guage characterizes  it  as  the  organ  of  group 
personality.  Animals  express  emotional  states 
by  sounds  and  have  at  command  a  great  va- 
riety of  sounds  for  that  purpose.  The  com- 
bination of  sounds  so  as  to  express  ideas,  thus 

"Ibid.,  p.  202. 
M  Ibid,  p.  204. 


LINGUISTIC  DATA  97 

adapting  vocal  communication  to  the  expres- 
sion of  thought,  Mr.  Payne  explains  as  a  pro- 
cess initiated  by  the  needs  and  interests  of 
the  community. 

"In  other  words,  the  fundamental  per- 
sonal conception  is  an  'our'  or  'we'  in 
which  'my'  and  'I'  are  involved  but  not 
distinguished.  It  is  collective;  it  regards 
certain  human  beings  as  forming  a  group, 
and  this  group  as  including  the  members. 
.  .  .  Language,  we  cannot  doubt,  arose 
in  the  group.  Its  first  efforts,  then,  would 
probably  express  the  relation  of  thing  and 
thought  common  to  all  members  of  the 
group  at  the  same  time;  and  these  would 
be  conceived  by  each  member  as  affecting 
not  merely  himself  but  all  his  co-members. 
.  .  .  Differential  relations  must  in  time 
supervene,  resulting  in  the  discrimination 
of  personalities ;  but  in  general  the  person- 
ality of  language  may  be  regarded  as  orig- 
inally collective,  and  its  original  expres- 
sion as  a  collective  'we'  or  'our'."17 

11  Ibid.,  p.  201. 


98        NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

It  is  an  implication  of  such  opinions  as  to 
the  origin  of  language  that  there  must  have 
been  a  time  when  the  consciousness  of  personal 
individuality  did  not  exist  in  the  unit  life  of 
the  community,  any  more  than  in  the  members 
of  any  other  animal  pack.  Self -consciousness 
has  been  evolved  by  life  in  community  and  is 
a  social  product.  Sufficient  remains  of  primi- 
tive language  exist  to  show  that  the  concept 
of  personal  individuality  is  of  comparatively 
recent  origin.  An  eminent  American  author- 
ity, the  late  Daniel  G.  Brinton,  in  his  Essays 
of  an  Americanist,  remarked: 

"You  might  suppose  that  this  distinc- 
tion— I  mean  that  between  self  and  other, 
between  I,  thou  and  he — is  fundamental; 
that  speech  could  not  proceed  without  it. 
You  would  be  mistaken.  American  lan- 
guages furnish  conclusive  evidence  that 
for  unnumbered  generations  mankind  got 
along  well  enough  without  any  such  dis- 
crimination." 

Anthropological  research  has  found  that  the 
concept  of  self  among  primitive  peoples  is  still 


LINGUISTIC  DATA  99 

that  of  the  group  rather  than  of  individual. 
The  Rev.  Mr.  Fison,  a  missionary  with  abund- 
ant opportunity  for  intimate  knowledge  of  the 
Australian  aborigines,  says:  "It  is  the  group 
alone  that  is  regarded;  the  individual  is  ig- 
nored; he  is  not  looked  upon  as  a  perfect  en- 
tity. He  has  no  existence  except  as  part  of  a 
group,  which  in  its  entirety  is  the  perfect 
entity."18 

Observations  to  the  same  purport  have  been 
made  among  savages  in  many  parts  of  the 
world.  Reclus,  in  his  Primitive  Folk,  sums  up 
the  evidence  by  saying:  "In  opposition  to  the 
idea  that  the  individual  is  the  father  of  so- 
ciety, we  suppose  that  society  has  been  the 
mother  of  the  individual.  .  .  .  Everything 
leads  us  to  believe  that  at  the  outset  collectiv- 
ism was  at  its  maximum  and  individualism  at 
its  minimum."19 

Ancient  law  gives  similar  testimony.  Sir 
Henry  Sumner  Maine,  in  his  standard  treatise 
on  the  subject,  says  that  "law  is  at  its  basis 
a  rule  of  conduct  inculcated  for  the  welfare  of 

18  Cited  by  Stuckenberg,  Sociology,  Vol.  II.,  p.  45. 
"Opus  cited,  pp.  56,  57. 


100      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

the  primitive  group,"  and  he  remarks  that 
"ancient  law  knows  next  to  nothing  of  indi- 
viduals." It  is  concerned  with  groups.5 


20 


§  34.  Individual  Right  a  Late  Concept 

The  discrimination  of  individual  rights  and 
relations  is  among  the  latest  refinements  of 
speech  and  of  jurisprudence,  and  is  still  im- 
perfect among  many  peoples,  perhaps  most 
peoples.  The  idea  of  group  personality,  even 
in  the  present  age,  has  probably  greater  domi- 
nation than  the  idea  of  individual  personality. 
It  is  still  strongly  marked  in  a  people  of  such 
ancient  culture  as  the  Chinese.  The  idea  of 
group  personality  pervades  their  administra- 
tion of  justice  and  controls  their  habits  of 
thought.  Arthur  H.  Smith,  who  lived  and 
worked  among  them  many  years,  says: 

"Chinese  social  solidarity  is  often  fatal 
to  what  we  mean  by  accuracy.  A  man 
who  wished  advice  in  a  law  suit  told  the 
writer  that  he  himself  lived  in  a  particular 
village,  though  it  was  obvious  from  his 
narrative  that  his  abode  was  in  the  suburbs 

"  Ancient  Law,  Pollock's  edition,  p.  250. 


LINGUISTIC  DATA  101 

of  a  city.  Upon  inquiry  he  admitted  that 
he  did  not  now  live  in  the  village,  and  fur- 
ther investigation  revealed  the  fact  that 
the  removal  took  place  nineteen  genera- 
tions ago.  'But  do  you  not  almost  con- 
sider yourself  a  resident  of  the  city  now?' 
he  was  asked.  'Yes,'  he  replied  simply, 
'we  do  live  there  now,  but  the  old  root  is 
in  that  village.'  .  .  .  Another  individual 
called  the  writer's  attention  to  an  ancient 
temple  in  his  own  native  village  and  re- 
marked proudly,  'I  built  that  temple.' 
Upon  pursuing  the  subject  it  appeared 
that  the  edifice  dated  from  a  reign  in  the 
Ming  dynasty,  more  than  300  years  ago, 
when  'I'  only  existed  in  the  potential 
mood."21 

Percival  Lowell,  in  his  essay  on  The  Soul  of 
the  Far  East  holds  that  deficiency  in  conscious- 
ness of  personal  individuality  is  typical  of  the 
East.  "The  peoples  .  .  .  grow  more  personal 
as  we  go  West.  .  .  .  The  sense  of  self  grows 
more  intense."  He  finds  the  gradation  so 

a  Chinese  Characteristics,  p.  55. 


102      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

marked  as  to  suggest  a  cosmical  cause,  but  it  is 
amply  explained  by  difference  in  character  of 
race  development.  Gulick  in  his  Evolution  of 
the  Japanese  gives  what  is  doubtless  the  cor- 
rect interpretation.  He  says: 

"The  asserted  'impersonality'  of  the 
Japanese  is  the  result  of  the  communal- 
istic  nature  of  the  social  order  which  has 
prevailed  down  to  the  most  recent  times; 
it  has  put  its  stamp  in  every  feature  of  the 
national  and  individual  life,  not  omitting 
the  language,  the  philosophy,  the  religion, 
or  even  the  most  inmost  thoughts  of  the 
people.  This  dominance  of  the  commun- 
alistic  type  of  the  social  order  has  doubt- 
less had  an  effect  on  the  physical  and 
psychic,  including  the  brain,  development 
of  the  people.  These  physical  and  psy- 
chical developments,  however,  are  not  the 
cause,  but  the  product  of  the  social 
order."22 

"Opus  cited,  p.  361. 


LINGUISTIC  DATA  103 

§  35.  Linguistic  Summary 

It  appears  from  the  foregoing  that  linguistic 
data  support  the  Social  Hypothesis  and  at  the 
same  time  disallow  the  Individual  Hypothesis. 
The  delimiting  value  of  the  faculty  of  speech  is 
admitted  by  all  authorities.  Sayce  remarks: 

"The  faculty  of  speech,  whether  exer- 
cised or  unexercised,  is  the  one  mark  of 
distinction  between  man  and  brute.  All 
other  supposed  marks  of  difference,  physi- 
ological, intellectual  and  moral,  have  suc- 
cessively disappeared  under  the  micro- 
scope of  modern  science.  But  the  prerog- 
ative of  language  still  remains,  and  with  it 
the  possession  of  conceptual  thought  and 
continuous  reasoning."23 

If  language  be  the  distinctive  character 
mark  of  the  human  species,  and  if  the  fact  be 
established  that  language  is  essentially  a  social 
product,  then  it  necessarily  follows  that  Man 
is  a  product  of  social  evolution.  This  infer- 
ence is  confirmed  by  the  facts  of  individual  de- 

*  Introduction  to  the  Science  of  Language,  Vol.  II.,  p.  305. 


104      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

velopment.    Anatomists  agree  that  there  is  no 
special  organ  of  speech.    Dr.  Hutchinson  says : 

"The  organs  that  make  the  human  voice 
were  never  built  for  that  purpose  in  the 
first  place.  Unlike  the  eye  and  the  ear, 
nature  built  no  special  organ  for  the  voice 
alone,  but  simply  utilized  the  wind-pipe 
and  lung-bellows,  the  swallowing  parts  of 
the  food  passage  (tongue,  lips  and  pal- 
ate) and  the  nose  for  that  purpose,  long 
after  they  had  taken  their  own  particular 
shapes  for  their  own  special  ends."24 

Speech  is  an  art  that  has  to  be  acquired  by 
the  individual  from  social  contact.  Every 
child  has  to  learn  how  to  speak.  The  function 
would  never  arise  in  the  course  of  individual 
development  apart  from  social  control.  The 
physical  basis  of  speech  thus  supplies  evidence 
that  it  originated  as  a  social  function. 

*  Handbook  of  Health,  p.  271.  For  a  detailed  account  of 
how  the  physical  endowment  was  utilized  for  speech,  see 
Payne's  work.  Vol.  II.,  p.  14-5  et  seq. 


CHAPTER  VI 

ANTHROPOLOGICAL  DATA 

§  36.  Vestigial  Structure  in  Savage  Society 

Darwin  was  confronted  by  a  mass  of  evi- 
dence collected  by  anthropological  research  in 
regard  to  domestic  institutions  among  savages. 
The  communal  system  of  sex  relationship  de- 
scribed by  such  observers  as  Morgan,  McLen- 
nan and  Lubbock  is  considered  by  him  and  he 
admits  that  there  is  strong  evidence  to  the  ef- 
fect that  it  is  a  primitive  characteristic.1  Mor- 
gan showed  that  the  system  is  ingrained  in  the 
archaic  texture  of  language,  indicating  that 
neither  monogamy  nor  polygamy  nor  indeed 
any  form  of  marriage  expressive  of  individual 
relations  existed  in  the  primitive  constitution 
of  society.  While  he  was  led  to  this  epochal 
discovery  by  examination  of  American  tribal 

1  The  Descent  of  Nan,  Chap.  XX.,  Sees.  971,  977. 
105 


106      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

languages,  it  was  corroborated  by  linguistic 
evidence  in  different  parts  of  the  world.  His 
conclusions,  published  in  1868,2  impressed 
Darwin,  who  remarked  that  "the  indirect  evi- 
dence in  favor  of  the  belief  of  the  former  pre- 
valence of  communal  marriage  is  strong,  and 
rests  chiefly  on  the  terms  of  relationship  which 
are  employed  between  members  of  the  same 
tribe,  implying  a  connection  with  the  tribe,  and 
not  with  either  parent."3  According  to  Mor- 
gan terms  of  relationship  fall  into  two  great 
divisions,  classificatory  and  descriptive.  The 
former  system  deals  with  groups  while  the 
latter,  which  is  that  in  use  among  civilized  na- 
tions, deals  with  individuals.  The  descriptive 
system  gives  such  distinct  terms  as  "mother," 
"aunt";  in  the  classificatory  system  the  same 
term  of  relationship  indicates  both.  Among 
the  Australian  aborigines,  for  instance,  the 
child  has  not  simply  a  mother  but  also  a 
mother  group  to  which  his  actual  mother  be- 
longs, all  the  women  of  the  group  being  desig- 

3  Systems  of  Consanguinity  and  Affinity  in  the  Human  Fam- 
ily. Smithsonian  Contributions  to  Knowledge,  Vol.  XVII. 
The  evidence  is  summarized  in  his  Ancient  Society. 

•  Descent  of  Man,  Sec.  972. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  DATA  107 

nated  by  the  same  term  of  relationship;  and 
likewise  he  has  mot  merely  a  father  but  a 
father  group.  Such  evidence,  as  Darwin  ob- 
serves, seems  to  indicate  that  originally  the 
notion  of  parentage  inhered  in  the  tribe  and 
not  in  individuals. 

The  incompatibility  of  such  data  with  the 
Individual  Hypothesis  was  noted  by  Darwin 
himself,  and  he  remarked  that  he  would  "not 
pretend  to  conjecture"  how  the  domestic  in- 
stitutions now  found  among  savages  could 
have  arisen.4  But  he  rejects  the  supposition 
that  the  communal  system  "prevailed  in  times 
past,  shortly  before  Man  attained  to  his  pres- 
ent rank  in  the  zoological  scale,"  as  it  would 
be  incompatible  with  "the  strength  of  the  feel- 
ing of  jealousy  all  through  the  animal  king- 
dom, as  well  as  from  the  analogy  of  the  lower 
animals,  more  particularly  those  which  come 
nearest  to  Man."5 


4  Descent  of  Man,  Sec.  977. 
•Opus  cited,  Sec.  975. 


108      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

§  37.  Origin  of  the  Family 

Westermarck  expounds  the  origin  of  do- 
mestic institutions  in  conformity  with  Dar- 
win.6 He  holds  that  pairing,  originally  casual, 
became  permanent  through  influences  mainly 
due  to  the  basis  of  subsistence.  "When  man- 
kind became  chiefly  carnivorous,  the  assistance 
of  an  adult  male  became  still  more  necessary 
for  the  subsistence  of  the  children,  as  the  chase 
everywhere  devolves  on  the  man."  The  fam- 
ily thus  made  its  origin  in  connection  with 
parental  duties,  and  "among  our  earliest  hu- 
man ancestors  the  family,  not  the  tribe, 
formed  the  nucleus  of  every  social  group,  and, 
in  many  cases,  was  itself  perhaps  the  only 
social  group."7 

The  evidence  in  favor  of  the  existence  of 
communal  marriage  as  a  primitive  arrange- 
ment is  considered  in  detail  by  Westermarck. 
He  finds  it  to  be  either  fallacious  or  of  so  ex- 
ceptional a  nature  that  it  cannot  "represent  a 

•  In  one  place  he  intimates  surprise  that  Darwin  could  have 
thought  it  probable  that  the  progenitors  of  man  were  social 
animals.  History  of  Human  Marriage,  p.  42. 

7  Opus  cited,  p.  538. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  DATA  109 

stage  of  human  development."  He  concludes 
that  "nothing  would  entitle  us  to  consider  this 
promiscuity  as  a  survival  of  the  primitive  life 
of  man,  or  even  as  a  mark  of  a  very  rude  state 
of  society."8 

Although  endeavoring  to  show  that  the  his- 
torical evidence  adduced  by  Morgan,  McLen- 
nan and  Lubbock  does  not  justify  their 
conclusions,  Westermarck  holds  that  "the 
strongest  argument  against  original  promis- 
cuity is,  however,  to  be  derived  from  the 
psychical  nature  of  man  and  other  mam- 
mals."9 The  powerful  feeling  of  jealousy 
would  suffice  to  preclude  the  communal  system 
in  primitive  humanity.  Westermarck  gives  an 
array  of  evidence  on  the  prevalence  of  jeal- 
ousy in  the  human  race  in  all  culture  stages, 
but  in  this  field  he  encounters  evidence  that 
sexual  hospitality  is  prevalent  among  peoples 
of  low  culture.  He  meets  this  by  pointing  out 
that  jealousy  "is  far  from  being  the  same  feel- 
ing in  the  mind  of  a  savage  as  in  that  of  a 
civilized  man.  A  wife  is  regarded  as  not  very 


•Opus  cited,  p.  60. 
*  Opus  cited,  p.  117. 


110      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

different  from  other  property."  Therefore 
"the  fact  that  a  man  lends  his  wife  to  a  visitor 
no  more  implies  the  absence  of  jealousy  than 
other  ways  of  showing  hospitality  imply  that 
he  is  without  the  proprietary  feeling."10 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  when  savage  jeal- 

i 

ousy  is  thus  identified  with  mere  resentment 
of  trespass  it  becomes  a  different  factor  from 
the  animal  jealousy  on  which  the  theory  relies. 
The  use  of  the  term  "jealousy"  to  describe 
male  contention  over  the  possession  of  females 
in  the  animal  kingdom  seems  to  carry  with  it 
misleading  associations.  Jealousy,  as  a  hu- 
man characteristic,  has  particular  objects 
apart  from  which  it  is  not  excited.  The  pug- 
nacity which  many  animal  species  display 
during  the  rutting  season  is  a  general  sex 
manifestation.  Moreover,  while  the  mating 
instinct  among  the  animals  is  generally  con- 
fined to  a  particular  season,  that  is  not  the 
case  with  Man.11  This  is  an  important  dis- 
tinction, as  it  points  to  the  existence  of  con- 

10  Opus  cited,  p.  130. 

"  A  collection  of  evidence  on  this  subject  is  given  in  History 
of  Human  Marriage,  Chap.  II. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  DATA  111 

ditions  in  the  human  species  facilitating 
mating  without  the  need  of  any  periodic  in- 
stinct to  bring  the  sexes  together. 

§  38.  Systems  of  Kinship 

The  opposition  to  what  has  been  designated 
as  the  primitive  horde  theory  has  been  very 
able  and  tenacious.  That  opposition  has  had 
to  reckon  with  convergent  evidence  along  sev- 
eral lines;  evidence  of  the  widespread  preval- 
ence, past  and  present,  of  kinship  through 
mothers  only;  evidence  drawn  from  terms  of 
relationship  in  various  languages,  indicating 
marital  classification  by  groups;  evidence 
drawn  from  the  actual  organization  of  savage 
society  indicating  that  group  marriage  con- 
tinues under  conditions  suggesting  that  it  is 
a  relic  of  primeval  habit.  All  these  lines  of 
evidence  have  been  met  by  arguments  atten- 
uating the  evidence  and  accounting  for  the 
residuum  on  the  hypothesis  of  retrograde  or 
degenerate  tendencies.  The  argument  could 
point  to  the  fact  that  such  tendencies  are 
known  to  have  operated  in  some  cases,  and 
hence  there  is  room  for  the  supposition  that 


112      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

degeneracy  has  occurred  even  when  it  is  im- 
possible to  trace  it.12  But  anthropological  re- 
search keeps  finding  evidence  incompatible 
with  the  theory  of  the  original  pairing  family 
and  at  present  the  mass  of  antagonistic  data 
seems  to  have  fairly  overwhelmed  it. 

The  progress  of  the  controversy  has  been 
marked  by  a  divergence  of  opinion  between 
field  anthropologists  and  chair  anthropol- 
ogists. The  classificatory  scheme  of  tribal  or- 
ganization on  the  basis  of  group  marriage  was 
discovered  by  the  American  anthropologist 
Lewis  H.  Morgan  from  clues  furnished  by 
actual  observation  and  experience  of  tribal 
life.  Much  additional  information  has  come 
from  other  anthropologists  engaged  in  the 

MThe  controversy  is  described  in  detail  by  Prof.  George  E. 
Howard,  in  his  History  of  Matrimonial  Institutions,  1904. 
The  work  is  mainly  judicial  but  it  gives  an  introductory  analy- 
sis of  the  literature  and  theories  of  primitive  marriage  and 
the  family.  The  conclusion  at  which  Prof.  Howard  arrives  is 
that  "early  monogamy  takes  its  rise  beyond  the  border  line 
separating  Man  from  the  lower  animals.  At  the  dawn  of 
human  history  individual  marriage  prevails,  though  the  unit 
is  not  always  lasting.  In  late  stages  of  advancement,  under 
the  influence  of  property,  social  organizations,  social  distinc- 
tions, and  the  motives  to  which  they  gave  rise,  various  forms 
of  polyandry  and  polygamy  make  their  appearance,  through 
monogamy  as  the  type  is  never  superseded."  P.  150. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  DATA  113 

study  of  conditions  under  actual  contact  with 
them.  Westermarck  and  others  who  have  en- 
deavored to  show  that  the  field  anthropologists 
did  not  correctly  interpret  the  evidence  they 
collected  have  dealt  with  the  subject  as  a  schol- 
astic study.  Fortunately  a  closer  connection 
between  the  two  classes  of  students  has  been 
brought  about  through  the  efforts  of  English 
anthropologists,  and  the  combination  has  re- 
sulted in  the  production  of  works  that  may  be 
regarded  as  introducing  a  new  era  in  anthrop- 
ological research.  A  monumental  work  of  this 
order  was  published  in  1899  by  Baldwin  Spen- 
cer, some  time  fellow  of  Lincoln  College,  Ox- 
ford, and  later  professor  of  biology  in  the 
University  of  Melbourne,  Australia,  and  F.  J. 
Gillen,  special  magistrate  and  protector  of  the 
aborigines,  Alice  Springs,  South  Australia. 
Mr.  Gillen  had  spent  nearly  twenty  years 
among  the  aborigines  and  both  Professor 
Baldwin  and  himself  had  been  admitted  to 
membership  in  the  Arunta  tribe.  In  their  re- 
searches they  had  the  advice  and  help  of  Dr. 
E.  B.  Tylor  and  Professor  J.  G.  Frazer  of 
England.  The  result  was  a  precise  and  sys- 


114      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

tematic  account  of  the  languages  and  customs 
of  the  Central  Australian  aborigines,  afford- 
ing conclusive  evidence  of  the  existence  of 
group  marriage.  The  work  was  carried  on 
with  Westermarck's  criticisms  in  mind,  and 
with  the  purpose  of  getting  at  the  actual  facts. 
There  are  tribes  in  which  individual  marriage 
has  superseded  group  marriage,  but  the  prior 
existence  of  the  latter  has  left  distinct  vestiges 
in  language  and  customs.  In  some  tribes 
group  marriage  still  continues.  The  authors 
remark : 

"Westermarck  has  referred  in  his  work 
to  what  he  calls  the  pretended  group  mar- 
riage of  the  Australians?  In  the  case  of 
the  Urabunna  there  is  no  pretence  of  any 
kind,  and  exactly  the  same  remark  holds 
true  of  the  neighboring  Dieri  tribe."13 

Proof  of  the  actual  existence  of  group  mar- 
riage does  not  of  itself  exclude  the  hypothesis 
that  it  is  an  outcome  of  moral  degeneracy,  but 
group  marriage  is  found  imbedded  in  a  lin- 
guistic system  that  classifies  relationship  by 

a  The  Native  Tribes  of  Central  Australia,  p.  109. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  DATA  115 

groups  and  not  by  individuals.  It  is  hard  to 
imagine  how  alteration  of  behavior  could  have 
brought  about  such  an  elaborate  reconstruc- 
tion of  thought  and  language  as  to  extinguish 
all  trace  of  a  prior  system  of  individual  rela- 
tionship. And  the  difficulty  increases  when  it 
appears  that  languages  quite  distinct  in  their 
vocabularies  show  the  same  classificatory  sys- 
tem. Spencer  and  Gillen  give  lists  of  terms 
in  various  tribes,  differing  in  their  character 
but  all  expressive  of  the  same  system.  They 
conclude  that  no  hypothesis  will  meet  the  facts 
save  that  group  marriage  is  a  system  that 
underlies  the  language  and  social  institutions 
of  the  various  tribes. 

§  39.  The  Undivided  Commune 

Another  point  brought  out  distinctly  is  that 
in  this  matter  there  is  no  evidence  of  moral 
degeneracy.  On  the  contrary  marital  regula- 
tions are  strictly  enforced,  and  breach  of  them 
severely  punished,  but  the  prohibitions  relate 
to  groups,  and  to  individuals  only  as  members 
of  groups.  To  designate  such  intercourse  as 
promiscuous  falsifies  the  situation.  Neither 


116      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

polygamy  nor  polyandry  is  so  characterized, 
and  group  marriage  is  the  fusion  of  both  those 
systems,  in  conformity  with  moral  obligations 
distinctly  recognized  as  such.  Transition  to 
individual  marriage  is  going  on,  but  it  appears 
as  a  differentiation  of  group  marriage  and  is 
associated  with  some  recognition  of  the  insti- 
tution. The  evidence  points  to  a  primitive 
condition,  not  of  anarchy  as  the  term  "horde" 
might  suggest,  but  of  a  condition  which  the 
veteran  field  anthropologist  A.  W.  Howitt 
has  termed  The  Undivided  Commune. 

Howitt  has  been  engaged  in  the  study  of 
the  Australian  aborigines  of  South  East  Aus- 
tralia for  about  forty  years.  As  long  ago  as 
1873  he  joined  with  Dr.  Lorimer  Fison  in  in- 
vestigating the  classificatory  system  of  rela- 
tionship. At  intervals  after  1882  Howitt 
made  known  the  results  of  his  investigations, 
and  in  1904  he  published  a  work  in  which  he 
collected  the  evidence  and  set  forth  his  con- 
clusions. They  agree  with  those  reached  by 
Spencer  and  Gillen  upon  evidence  obtained 
among  the  tribes  of  Central  Australia.  How- 
itt gives  vocabularies  and  tables  of  relation- 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  DATA  117 

ship  in  various  tribes  showing  the  existence  of 
the  classificatory  system,  and  he  gives  in- 
stances showing  the  strictness  of  tribal  law  in 
enforcing  prohibitions  connected  with  that 
system.  For  instance,  among  the  Dieri,  where 
group  marriage  exists,  the  most  insulting  ex- 
pression that  can  be  used  is  one  implying  im- 
proper sexual  relations.  "This  expression  is 
never  used  by  one  person  to  another  unless 
they  have  been  worked  up  to  a  state  of  anger 
approaching  frenzy."14 

Howitt  says  that  the  classificatory  system 
is  unintelligible  unless  it  is  borne  in  mind  that 
"the  social  unit  is  not  the  individual  but  the 
group;  and  the  former  simply  takes  the  rela- 
tionships of  his  group,  which  are  of  group  to 
group."  The  system  is  not  a  crude  but  an 
elaborate  one,  making  some  distinctions  which 
are  lost  in  the  descriptive  system  of  civilized 
peoples.  For  instance  our  term  "uncle"  in- 
cludes father's  brother  and  mother's  brother, 
but  in  the  classificatory  system  they  are  dis- 
tinguished. Mr.  Howitt  holds  that  the  study 
of  Australian  relationship  terms  leads  to  "the 

14  The  Native  Tribes  of  Southeast  Australia,  p.  186. 


118      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

conclusion  that  the  state  of  society  among  the 
early  Australians  was  that  of  an  'Undivided 
Commune'."15  Existing  tribal  organization 
is  the  result  of  communal  division.  "This  fun- 
damental law  of  communal  division  underlies 
and  runs  through  all  the  more  developed  sys- 
tems of  four  or  eight  sub-classes,  and  even 
shows  traces  of  its  former  existence  in  tribes  in 
which  the  class  system  has  become  decadent 
and  the  local  organization  has  taken  place  and 
assumed  control  of  marriage."16  That  is  to 
say,  group  marriage  and  the  classificatory  sys- 
tem of  relationship  are  results  of  the  segmen- 
tation of  primitive  community. 

This  hypothesis  throws  the  existence  of  life 
in  community  far  back  in  geologic  time.  The 
organization  of  society  both  in  America  and 
Australia  exhibited  the  classificatory  system, 
in  both  of  which  continents  the  original  entry 
of  Man  was  made  by  land  connections  that 
have  since  disappeared.17  Moreover  there  is 

"Opus  cited,  p.  173. 

14  Ibid.,  p.  174. 

"There  are  theories  of  oversea  migration,  but  they  do  not 
seem  to  be  well  founded.  Payne's  History  of  the  New  World 
Called  America  gives  an  account  of  the  course  of  speculation 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  DATA  119 

another  class  of  anthropological  data  that  di- 
rectly connects  the  Undivided  Commune  with 
the  animal  pack,  prior  to  any  recognition  of 
human  consanguinity  and  affiliation. 

§  40.  The  Origin  of  Totemism 

A  difficult  problem  of  anthropology  has 
been  to  account  for  the  origin  of  Totemism. 
The  regulations  of  savage  society  founded 
upon  Totemism  have  a  coercive  force  surpass- 
ing that  of  law  among  civilized  peoples.  Tot- 
em injunctions  and  prohibitions  seem  to  grasp 
savage  nature  by  the  roots  of  being,  producing 
scrupulous  observance  of  customs,  many  of 
which  to  civilized  man  appear  to  be  extremely 
absurd  and  irrational.  When  the  Totemic  or- 
ganization of  society  is  found  to  be  an  aborigi- 
nal characteristic  in  such  widely  separated 
parts  of  the  world  as  the  continents  of  America 
and  Australia,  the  inference  is  unavoidable 
that  it  must  have  arisen  from  the  operation  of 
some  general  cause  founded  in  the  psychical 
constitution  of  human  nature.  Vestiges  of 

as  regards  American  origins;  Hewitt's  Native  Tribes  of  South- 
east Australia  does  likewise  as  regards  Australian  origins. 


120      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

Totemism  have  been  detected  among  peoples 
in  advanced  stages  of  social  organization, 
Semites,  Egyptians,  Greeks  and  Romans. 
But  Totemism  is  a  scheme  of  relationship  not 
between  human  beings  but  between  the  group 
and  its  environment.  It  assumes  kinship  with 
plants  and  animals  involving  obligations  of 
comity  and  relations  of  mutual  service.  Totem 
groups  take  their  names  from  their  respective 
Totems  and  identify  themselves  with  the 
Totem  with  such  intuitive  conviction  as  to  in- 
dicate that  to  the  savage  mind  it  appears  to 
be  a  most  simple  and  obvious  matter. 

Some  facts  discovered  by  Spencer  and  Gil- 
len  threw  light  upon  this  mystery.  They 
found  Australian  tribes  that  have  not  arrived 
at  an  understanding  of  the  facts  of  human 
reproduction.  Pregnancy  is  accounted  for  as 
being  the  work  of  the  Totem  within  whose 
sphere  of  influence  it  is  experienced.  Spencer 
and  Gillen  give  some  curious  accounts  of  the 
precautions  taken  by  the  women  to  keep  the 
Totem  spirit  from  affecting  them.18  Subse- 
quent investigation  has  abundantly  confirmed 

"  The  Native  Tribes  of  Central  Australia,  pp.  124,  202,  265. 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  DATA 

the  prevalence  of  such  strange  notions.  Pro- 
fessor Spencer  has  collected  much  additional 
evidence.  In  a  recent  work  he  says  that  this 
belief  "has  now  been  shown  to  be  prevalent 
over  the  whole  of  the  central  and  northern 
part  of  the  continent — that  is,  over  an  area 
four  and  a  half  times  the  size  of  Great  Britain, 
—among  the  Queensland  tribes  and  in  a  large 
part  of  West  Australia."19 

Such  facts  indicate  that  Totemism  origi- 
nated as  a  savage  theory  of  parentage.  This 
interpretation  is  accepted  by  Professor  H.  G. 
Frazer,  who  designates  it  as  "the  conceptional 
theory,"  according  to  which  Totemism  origi- 
nated "as  an  early  theory  of  conception,  which 
presented  itself  to  savage  man  at  a  time  when 
he  was  still  ignorant  of  the  true  cause  of  the 
propagation  of  species.  ...  It  accounts  for 
all  the  facts  in  a  simple  and  natural  manner."20 
This  theory,  which  is  confirmed  by  a  great 
mass  of  evidence  whose  cogency  must  impress 

a  Native  Tribes  of  the  Northern  Territory  of  Australia,  p. 
263. 

30  Totemism  and  Exogamy,  Vol.  IV.,  pp.  59,  60.  This  work 
in  four  massive  volumes  is  a  digest  of  the  literature  of 
Totemism. 


NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

anyone  who  consults  Frazer's  monumental 
treatise,  fills  in  the  gap  between  human  so- 
ciety and  the  animal  pack.  It  points  to  the 
existence  of  the  Undivided  Commune  at  a 
period  anterior  to  any  family  organization  or 
indeed  to  any  recognition  of  human  consan- 
guinity. It  is  a  type  of  community  directly 
connected  with  and  merging  into  the  animal 
state. 

§  41.  Anthropological  Summary 

It  has  been  noted  that  Darwin  himself  ad- 
mitted that  social  structure  among  savages 
told  against  the  Individual  Hypothesis.  There 
are  cases  in  which  difficulties  observed  by  him 
have  been  removed  by  fuller  knowledge,  but 
this  case  is  not  one  of  them.  The  incompati- 
bility between  the  facts  and  that  hypothesis 
has  gone  on  increasing,  and  for  the  interpreta- 
tion of  the  data  it  has  been  found  necessary  to 
make  statements  and  give  explanations  which 
adopt  the  Social  Hypothesis.  There  is  not  as 
yet  any  such  agreement  of  scientific  opinion  in 
this  field  as  is  found  in  linguistics  and  in  psy- 
chology. The  conclusions  at  which  field  an- 


ANTHROPOLOGICAL  DATA  123 

thropologists  long  since  arrived,  as  to  the 
collectivism  of  primitive  society,  are  still  re- 
sisted in  some  quarters.  But  ever  since  the 
publication  of  Professor  Frazer's  great  corpus 
of  evidence  the  weight  of  scientific  authority 
is  on  the  side  of  the  Social  Hypothesis. 


CHAPTER  VII 

SURVEY  OF  GENETIC  DATA 

§  42.  The  Huxleyan  Position 

From  the  foregoing  it  appears  that  the 
evidence  in  all  four  of  the  classes  examined 
yields  support  to  the  Social  Hypothesis.  In 
the  department  of  biology  the  Individual 
Hypothesis  still  seems  to  hold  the  field  not  be- 
cause of  evidence  but  rather,  it  seems,  because 
the  prevailing  attitude  is  Huxleyan  instead  of 
Darwinian.  Huxley's  Mans  Place  in  Nature 
was  published  in  1863,  four  years  after  the 
publication  of  The  Origin  of  Species  and  eight 
years  before  The  Descent  of  Man  in  which 
Darwin  stated  his  own  views  of  the  genesis  of 
the  human  species.  Thus  the  Huxleyan  posi- 
tion was  established  in  advance  of  the  Social 
Hypothesis  which  seems  never  to  have  re- 
ceived due  consideration.  Among  the  numer- 

124 


SURVEY  OF  GENETIC  DATA          125 

ous  authorities  consulted  in  the  preparation 
of  this  treatise,  Darwin's  own  work  is  the 
only  one  in  which  this  particular  phase  of 
evolutionary  process  is  distinctly  indicated. 
Huxley's  work,  both  in  its  mode  of  treatment 
and  by  its  illustrations,  tends  strongly  to  im- 
press the  opinion  that  Man  is  a  modification 
of  the  ape  type  of  animal.  He  argues  that 
"the  structural  differences  between  Man  and 
the  highest  ape  are  of  less  value  than  those 
between  the  highest  and  the  lower  apes"  and 
he  enlarges  upon  "the  impossibility  of  erecting 
any  cerebral  barrier  between  Man  and  the 
apes."  He  insists  that  there  is  "an  almost 
complete  series  of  gradations  from  brains 
little  higher  than  a  rodent  to  brains  little  lower 
than  that  of  Man."  "The  difference  between 
the  brains  of  the  chimpanzee  and  of  Man  is 
almost  insignificant,  when  compared  with  that 
between  the  chimpanzee  brain  and  that  of  the 
lemur."1 

Such  language  is  calculated  to  set  up  the 
Individual  Hypothesis  as  the  guide  to  re- 
search. Huxley  admits  that  "in  the  present 

'The  quotations  are  all  from  Chap.  II.  of  the  work  cited. 


126      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

creation,  at  any  rate,  no  intermediate  link 
bridges  over  the  gap  between  Homo  and 
Troglodytes"  But  this  implies  that  eventu- 
ally that  missing  link  may  be  found.  Huxley 
raises  this  hope  when  he  remarks:  "It  seems 
to  follow  that  if  any  process  of  physical  causa- 
tion can  be  discovered  by  which  the  genera 
and  families  of  ordinary  animals  have  been 
produced,  that  process  of  causation  is  amply 
sufficient  to  account  for  the  origin  of  Man." 
But  Darwin  pointed  out  that  a  great  differ- 
ence in  the  process  of  causation  was  possible, 
namely,  that  the  stress  of  natural  selection 
might  in  some  cases  operate  upon  the  com- 
munity and  mould  individual  structure 
through  the  life  of  the  community.  Certainly 
in  the  case  of  the  social  insects  not  "any  pro- 
cess of  physical  causation"  would  suffice,  but 
only  that  particular  process  which  has  been 
designated  social  evolution.  This  Darwinian 
suggestion  seems  still  to  await  trial  in  biologi- 
cal research. 


SURVEY  OF  GENETIC  DATA          127 

§  43.  Sociality  an  Essential 

Even  those  who  adopt  the  Individual  Hy- 
pothesis generally  admit  social  conditions  as 
a  proximate  phase  in  the  genesis  of  Man.  But 
if  the  argument  employed  to  account  for  the 
transition  from  unsocial  Ape  to  social  Man  is 
examined  it  is  found  to  be  logically  defective. 
Reduced  to  its  simplest  form  it  comes  to  this, 
that  as  Man  becomes  Man  he  is  Man.  The 
formation  of  society  is  attributed  to  percep- 
tion of  its  advantages  through  increased  men- 
tal development.  As  one  writer  of  this  school 
puts  the  case,  it  dates  from  "the  dawn  of  in- 
tellectuality." What  caused  this  dawn?  The 
affirmation  imputes  to  the  antecedent  animal 
species  a  specific  characteristic  of  the  human 
species  and  is  a  case  of  reasoning  in  a  circle. 
When  it  is  stated  that  Man  was  not  originally 
a  social  animal,  but  that  later  on  Man  engaged 
in  social  intercourse  and  developed  speech,  a 
primitive  condition  is  imputed  to  Man  in  which 
he  could  not  have  become  Man,  but  the  logical 
hiatus  is  veiled  by  applying  the  term  "Man" 
to  an  animal  of  specifically  different  character. 


128      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

It  is  like  talking  of  a  bird  that  did  not  origi- 
nally breathe  air  but  acquired  the  habit 
through  flight.  Homo  alalus,  or  speechless 
Man  is  a  pseudo-concept.  Even  Haeckel,  who 
invented  the  term  to  indicate  a  hypothetical 
phase  in  human  genesis,  says:  "Man  origi- 
nated from  the  preceding  stage  in  consequence 
of  the  gradual  improvement  of  inarticulate 
animal  sounds  into  true  articulate  human 
speech."2  That  is  to  say,  Man  did  not  precede 
speech,  but  speech  preceded  Man,  and  as 
speech  is  unquestionably  a  social  product,  the 
formation  of  community  was  a  condition  pre- 
cedent to  the  formation  of  the  human  species. 

§  44.  Specific  Importance  of  Difference 

The  Huxleyan  notion  that  Darwinism  im- 
plies gradation  between  Man  and  the  other 
animals  seems  to  pass  without  question,  but 
its  morphological  basis  is  not  so  secure  as  has 
been  assumed.  The  social  and  solitary  insects 
have  a  fundamental  structural  type  in  com- 
mon, but  the  phenomena  of  polymorphism  and 
the  peculiar  structure  resulting  from  that 

1  The  Evolution  of  Man,  Vol.  II.,  p.  182. 


SURVEY  OF  GENETIC  DATA          129 

process  are  peculiar  to  the  social  insects. 
Naturalists  do  not  attempt  to  grade  them  as 
phases  of  the  same  process  of  physical  causa- 
tion that  produced  the  solitary  species.  They 
explain  polymorphism  as  structural  variation 
due  to  the  intervention  of  a  particular  process 
of  physical  causation,  namely,  social  evolution. 
The  original  stock  in  which  insect  community 
was  formed  may  have  been  the  same  stock 
from  which  solitary  insects  of  the  same  order 
are  derived,  but  since  divergence  in  evolution- 
ary process  took  place  they  have  been  dispar- 
ate in  their  development  and  the  existing  gap 
between  the  organs  of  social  insects  is  not  filled 
in  by  intermediate  forms.  Polymorphism  ap- 
pears among  the  social  insects,  while  in  bodily 
structure  solitary  insects  have  only  the  di- 
morphism of  sex. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  no  analogous  struc- 
tural variation  has  taken  place  between  Man 
and  other  Primates.  The  objection  fails  to 
allow  sufficient  weight  to  Darwin's  observation 
that  when  the  stress  of  evolution  was  laid  upon 
brain  development  corporeal  structure  would 
be  little  affected  by  natural  selection.  Specific 


130      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

characteristics  due  to  social  evolution  are 
formed  intensively  in  Man,  and  not  extensive- 
ly as  with  the  social  insects.  If  variation  regis- 
tered in  the  cells  of  the  brain  and  nervous 
system  were  as  apprehensible  as  external  dif- 
ferences the  resemblance  between  Man  and 
Ape  might  then  appear  superficial  and  in- 
significant as  compared  with  the  great  struc- 
tural differences  that  would  then  appear. 

If,  as  Darwin  says,  corporeal  structure  is 
but  little  affected  by  natural  selection  after  its 
stress  is  laid  upon  brain  development,  then  it 
follows  that  as  between  Man  and  Ape  differ- 
ence is  of  more  specific  importance  than  re- 
semblance. This  corollary  is  peculiar  to  Man 
among  the  Mammalia  since  in  that  order  it  is 
only  in  the  case  of  his  particular  species  that 
this  shift  of  evolutionary  stress  took  place.  It 
is  in  accord  with  this  principle  that  he  retains 
what  in  its  general  pattern  is  a  primitive  mam- 
malian form,  but  nevertheless  difference  be- 
tween Man  and  Ape  pervades  every  part  of 
their  structure.  Even  Huxley,  although  in- 
sisting upon  their  close  affinity  as  animal 
species,  remarks  that  "every  bone  of  a  gorilla 


SURVEY  OF  GENETIC  DATA          131 

bears  marks  by  which  it  might  be  distinguished 
from  a  man,"  and  it  might  be  added  that  the 
difference  in  other  organs  is  even  greater. 
Huxley  admits  that  the  structural  differences 
throughout  "are  great  and  significant."  Upon 
the  Darwinian  principle  that  has  been  cited 
the  difference  in  detail  implies  a  divergence 
in  evolutionary  process  which,  if  it  had  regis- 
tered its  effects  upon  general  structure,  might 
have  produced  a  creature  as  unlike  the  ape  as 
an  elephant  or  a  giraffe. 

§  45.  The  Evidence  of  Behavior 

The  misleading  influence  of  externals  is  seen 
in  a  disposition  to  regard  some  varieties  of 
Man  as  approximating  apes  in  character.  The 
Australian  aborigines,  the  now  extinct  Tas- 
manians,  various  jungle  tribes  of  Java  and  the 
Malay  Peninsula,  and  also  the  African  pygmy 
tribes,  have  been  referred  to  as  animal  groups 
so  similar  in  their  ways  of  life  to  the  anthro- 
poid apes  as  to  suggest  derivation  from  the 
same  stock.  The  facts  when  duly  considered 
point  just  the  other  way.  According  to  the 
Darwinian  theory  adaptation  to  the  basis  of 


132      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

subsistence  is  of  causal  importance  in  the  for- 
mation of  species.  The  different  lines  of  adap- 
tation pursued  by  organisms  result  in  different 
species.  Keeping  in  mind  these  principles,  it 
is  to  be  considered  that  although  there  are 
savage  tribes  living  under  the  same  natural 
conditions  as  apes,  and  quite  as  dependent  as 
apes  upon  jungle  produce,  no  tribe  has  ever 
been  discovered  that  is  arboreal  in  habit  like 
apes.  Some,  like  the  Samangs  of  the  Malay 
Peninsula,  build  shelters  in  trees  as  a  refuge 
against  enemies,  but  they  are  distinctly  a 
species  of  animals  adapted  to  terrestrial  life. 
The  pygmy  tribes  of  Oceania  and  Africa  are 
regarded  by  anthropologists  as  remnants  of 
aboriginal  peoples  once  widespread  but  now 
only  preserved  in  jungle  recesses,3  but  they  are 
also  distinctly  terrestrial.  If  they  were  origi- 
nally an  arboreal  species,  how  could  they  have 
experienced  such  complete  change  of  habit 
while  remaining  on  the  same  plane  of  subsis- 
tence and  under  the  same  natural  conditions  as 
apes?  It  is  more  reasonable  to  suppose  that 
they  do  not  come  of  an  arboreal  stock.  Upon 

*  Keane,  The  World's  Peoples,  pp.  64,  149. 


SURVEY  OF  GENETIC  DATA          133 

anatomical  grounds  Professor  Keith  has  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  Man  never  was  arboreal 
but  was  evolved  from  an  animal  species  of  ter- 
restrial habit.4 

Even  when  as  completely  dependent  as  apes 
on  a  natural  basis  of  subsistence,  savages  are 
worlds  away  in  their  social  organization.  This 
is  a  point  that  is  not  always  apparent.  To 
superficial  view  there  are  savage  tribes  whose 
members  appear  to  be  as  gross  in  mode  of  life 
as  the  lowest  brutes,  and  quite  as  remote  from 
any  sense  of  moral  obligation,  but  intimate 
knowledge  always  shows  that  their  lives  are 
enmeshed  in  a  web  of  obligation.  Their  mo- 
rality is  quite  different  from  that  of  civilized 
life,  but  it  is  if  anything  more  stringent.  An 
Australian  aboriginal  may  go  naked,  have  no 
property  or  settled  abode,  live  like  a  wild  ani- 
mal on  what  he  can  pick  up  or  capture,  but  it 
would  be  a  great  error  to  suppose  him  subject 
only  to  animal  appetites  and  passions.  If  he 
brings  down  game  he  cannot  eat  it  himself  or 
keep  it  for  his  mate  and  her  children,  but  it 
must  be  distributed  according  to  tribal  law. 

'Man,  pp.  77,  251. 


134      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

In  some  cases  the  hunter  himself  does  not  di- 
rectly participate.  In  the  Kurian  tribe  if  a 
man  kills  an  animal  the  distribution  of  the 
meat  is  made  by  his  wife's  father  and  the 
hunter  shares  in  the  feast  only  through  the 
portion  allotted  to  his  wife.5  Here  is  a  great 
chasm  between  human  behavior  and  animal  be- 
havior, although  here  man  has  remained  on 
the  same  basis  of  subsistence  as  other  animals. 

§  46.  The  Psychological  Chasm 

Although  Huxley  insisted  that  there  was 
"no  cerebral  barrier  between  Man  and  the 
apes"  yet  eventually  he  appears  to  have  found 
a  radical  difference  in  their  nature.  In  a  lec- 
ture delivered  in  1893,  he  held  that  in  the  case 
of  Man  a  principle  of  progress  intervenes  quite 
distinct  from  that  which  applies  to  animal  evo- 
lution. He  observed: 

"Social  progress  means  a  checking  of 
the  cosmic  process  at  every  step  and  the 
substitution  for  it  of  another,  which  may 
be  called  the  ethical  process;  the  end  of 
which  is  not  the  survival  of  those  who  may 

•Hewitt's  Native  Tribes  of  Southeast  Australia,  p.  758. 


SURVEY  OF  GENETIC  DATA          135 

happen  to  be  the  fittest,  in  respect  of  the 
whole  of  the  conditions  which  exist,  but  of 
those  who  are  ethically  the  best.  ...  In 
places  of  ruthless  self-assertion  it  demands 
self-restraint;  in  place  of  thrusting  aside, 
or  treading  down,  all  competitors,  it  re- 
quires that  the  individual  shall  not  merely 
respect,   but   shall  help   his   fellows;   its 
influence  is  directed,  not  so  much  to  the 
survival  of  the  fittest,  as  to  the  fitting  of 
as  many  as  possible  to  survive."6 
The  logic  of  this  position  is  difficult  to  un- 
derstand and  the  difficulty  is  not  lessened  by 
the  note  that  Huxley  appends  affirming  that 
"social  life  and  the  ethical  process  .  .  .  are 
part  and  parcel  of  the  general  process  of  evo- 
lution."    So  then  we  have  particular  cosmic 
process  checking  general  cosmic  process,  which 
leaves  the  matter  darker  than  before. 

If  the  Social  Hypothesis  be  adopted  the  ap- 
parent conflict  disappears.  That  hypothesis 
does  not  dispute  that  Man  belongs  to  the  same 
order  as  apes  but  it  discards  derivation  from 
any  of  their  species  and  it  finds  no  pattern  of 

"Evolution  and  Ethics,  p.  33. 


136      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

human  origins  in  their  characteristics.  The 
human  species  have  a  mammalian  root  in  com- 
mon with  apes,  but,  as  Darwin  remarked,  "we 
must  not  fall  into  the  error  of  supposing  that 
the  early  progenitor  of  the  whole  simian  stock, 
including  Man,  was  identical  with,  or  even 
closely  resembled  any  existing  ape  or  monkey." 
It  is  not  assuming  anything  abnormal  to  ad- 
mit the  possibility  that  in  the  Mammalia  as  in 
other  animal  orders  evolutionary  process  early 
assumed  a  social  phase.  The  occurrence  of 
that  phase  in  the  formation  of  the  human 
species  implies  no  break  in  natural  history  but 
it  does  imply  a  psychological  chasm  between 
Man  and  his  animal  cognates  that  has  gone  on 
widening  it  may  be  for  millions  of  years. 

Thus  the  Social  Hypothesis  accounts  for 
qualitative  as  well  as  quantitative  difference 
between  human  and  animal  intelligence.  As 
Professor  Thorndike  remarks:  "Some  sort  of 
difference  in  processes  in  the  brain  must  be  at 
the  basis  of  the  mental  differences  between 
man  and  the  lower  animals,  we  should  all  ad- 
mit."7 Such  difference  is  just  what  on  this 

7  Animal  Intelligence,  p.  287. 


SURVEY  OF  GENETIC  DATA          137 

hypothesis  is  to  be  expected.  There  is  a  psy- 
chological chasm  between  Man  and  all  other 
mammals  because  Man  did  not  come  by  their 
way  but  by  quite  another  way.  Other  mam- 
mals are  either  wholly  products  of  individual 
evolution  or,  if  not  entirely  so,  their  social 
habits  were  not  such  as  to  shift  the  stress  of 
evolution  to  the  community,  which  was  ac- 
complished in  the  case  of  Man,  thus  introduc- 
ing social  evolution.  Man  does  not  merely 
stand  on  a  higher  terrace;  his  position  is  the 
result  of  an  uplift  distinct  in  nature  and  effect 
from  that  which  took  place  among  other  Mam- 
malia, placing  him  on  quite  another  plane  of 
being.  The  oceanographer,  Sir  John  Murray, 
in  giving  an  account  of  the  geospheres  remarks 
that  "within  the  biosphere  a  sphere  of  reason 
and  intelligence  has  been  evolved"  which  "may 
be  called  the  psychosphere."8  Man  is  cer- 
tainly the  only  animal  of  his  order  inhabiting 
the  psychosphere.  However  close  Man's  ani- 
mal origins  were  to  those  of  the  apes,  as  Man 
he  became  a  denizen  of  a  different  world.  If 
any  other  animals  can  have  had  a  process  of 

'The  Ocean,  p.  228. 


138      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

development  reaching  toward  the  psycho- 
sphere  they  might  be  the  bees  and  ants,  the 
resemblance  of  whose  social  organization  to 
human  polity  is  often  remarked.  But  their 
case  appears  to  illustrate  a  rich  development 
of  instinct  from  social  evolution  rather  than 
of  intelligence.9  The  biological  position  of 
Man  appears  to  be  quite  unique  and  only  upon 
a  purely  morphological  system  of  classification 
can  Man  be  grouped  with  any  other  species. 
The  traditional  scheme  is  inaccurate  even  from 
the  morphological  standpoint.  The  Primates 
are  a  lowly  set  of  mammalian  forms  whose 
proper  place  in  the  morphological  scale  is  near 
the  bottom.  But  because  the  animal  stock 
from  which  Man  was  evolved  belonged  to  this 
group  it  has  been  placed  at  the  top,  with  a 
name  corresponding  to  that  false  position.10 

Inattention  to  the  radical  difference,  the  im- 
mense separateness  between  Man  and  other 
animals,  accounts  for  the  practical  tendency  of 
Darwinian  speculation  to  bring  darkness 
rather  than  light  of  which  humanists  complain. 

•  Bergson  has  some  interesting  remarks  on  this  point.     See 
Creative  Evolution,  Mitchell's  translation,  p.  167. 
wCf.  ante,  p.  38. 


SURVEY  OF  GENETIC  DATA          139 

Extracts  have  already  been  given  from  an  en- 
ergetic deliverance  on  this  point  by  Professor 
Judd  in  his  presidential  address  on  Evolution 
and  Consciousness.  As  regards  Darwin's  own 
part  in  the  imbroglio  Professor  Judd  said: 
"Darwin  was  undoubtedly  in  line  with  all  our 
modern  thinking  when  he  felt  the  necessity  of 
a  special  formula  for  human  evolution,  but  he 
hardly  satisfied  the  demand  which  he  felt.  The 
breach  between  animal  life  and  human  life  is 
much  too  great  to  be  spanned  by  any  single 
form  of  selection.  The  fact  is  that  the  method 
and  end  and  character  of  human  life  are  all 
different  from  those  described  in  any  formula 
of  organic  selection." 

It  may  be  questioned  whether  Darwin's 
theory  of  the  Descent  of  Man  would  have  been 
exposed  to  such  animadversion  had  he  not  been 
entangled  by  his  hypothesis  of  sexual  selection, 
now  almost  discarded  by  his  followers.  His 
Social  Hypothesis  if  attentively  considered 
will  be  found  to  provide  a  special  formula  for 
human  evolution  that  recognizes  the  funda- 
mental difference  and  the  great  existing  breach 
between  animal  life  and  human  life. 


140      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

§  47.  Altruism  and  the  Aesthetic  Sense 

It  may  be  observed  that  other  psychological 
problems  such  as  altruism  and  the  aesthetic 
sense,  which  resist  explanation  from  the  stand- 
point of  individual  evolution,  become  soluble 
when  the  hypothesis  of  social  evolution  is  ap- 
plied. As  Darwin  pointed  out,  the  spirit  of 
self-sacrifice  cannot  be  accounted  for  on  the 
principle  of  individual  advantage.  But  when 
the  development  of  the  individual  is  viewed  as 
a  by-product  of  the  life  of  the  community  it 
is  possible  to  see  that  altruistic  springs  of  ac- 
tion may  be  coiled  in  human  nature  even  as 
they  are  in  bee  nature.  Whether  or  not  the 
aesthetic  faculty  is  possessed  by  animals  other 
than  Man  is  a  disputed  point,  but  in  the  meas- 
ure possessed  by  Man  its  evolution  is  inex- 
plicable from  the  standpoint  of  individual 
advantage  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  Ca- 
pacity for  satisfaction  from  beauty,  art  and 
music  is  even  now  considered  rather  disad- 
vantageous to  individual  success.  But  if  the 
human  brain  be  regarded  as  primarily  a  sort 
of  wireless  telegraphy  installation  for  social 


SURVEY  OF  GENETIC  DATA          141 

service,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  supposing  that 
the  human  individual  is  a  gainer  thereby  to 
an  extent  that  puts  him  on  an  emotional  plane 
altogether  different  from  that  of  other  animals. 

§  48.  Combined  Weight  of  the  Evidence 

The  biological  data  have  been  reviewed  at 
some  length  because  it  is  only  in  this  field  that 
the  Social  Hypothesis  is  yet  to  be  established. 
When  data  of  this  class  are  collated  with  psy- 
chological and  linguistic  data  the  evidence 
seems  to  combine  irresistibly  in  favor  of  the 
Social  Hypothesis.  No  conflict  of  opinion  as 
to  the  primordial  situation  is  found  among 
psychologists  or  linguists.  They  agree  in 
predicating  life  in  community  as  a  condition 
precedent  to  the  development  of  speech  and 
reason,  specific  characteristics  of  Man.  The 
Social  Hypothesis  meets  all  the  facts  so  com- 
pletely as  to  warrant  acceptance  of  it  as  an 
inference  from  all  available  genetic  data. 

This  conclusion  is  corroborated  in  a  very 
striking  manner  by  the  direct  evidence  sup- 
plied by  anthropology.  The  now  widely 
accepted  explanation  of  Totemism  carries  his- 


NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

topical  knowledge  of  human  origins  quite  up 
to  the  animal  state.  In  a  community  so  ignor- 
ant of  the  facts  of  human  reproduction  as  to 
impute  the  birth  of  children  to  the  intervention 
of  plants  and  animals,  one  is  confronted  with 
social  structure  of  the  most  primitive  type  con- 
ceivable among  human  beings.  By  its  terms 
it  is  antecedent  to  any  conscious  organization 
of  family  relations  or  any  recognition  of  direct 
kinship.  The  relationship  between  parents  and 
children  is  not  direct  but  is  circuitous,  the  To- 
tem of  the  group  being  the  nexus.  In  the 
Totem  group  the  family  is  involved  but  not  yet 
distinguished.  Totemism  points  to  a  state  in 
which  there  was  intellectuality  enough  to  ex- 
perience curiosity  and  to  desire  an  explanation 
as  to  the  arrival  of  children  but  not  enough  in- 
tellectuality to  discern  actual  cause  and  effect. 
Such  a  state  surely  must  be  referred  to  the 
very  dawn  of  intellectuality.  Totemism  there- 
fore seems  to  have  been  the  outcome  of  the 
earliest  activity  of  nascent  reason,  and  the 
Totemic  organization  of  the  community  was 
the  first  stage  in  the  development  of  social 
structure.  From  beliefs,  customs  and  cere- 


SURVEY  OF  GENETIC  DATA          143 

monies  originally  initiated  by  Totemism  mas- 
sive growths  of  myth,  art  and  ritual  have 
taken  place  with  coordinate  social  organiza- 
tion, such  as  are  exhibited  historically  by  va- 
rious ancient  peoples  who  laid  the  cultural 
foundations  of  modern  civilization.11 

But  the  facts  of  Totemism  point  not  only  to 
an  incipient  stage  of  rationality  but  also  to  a 
primordial  type  of  community  which  Howitt 
has  termed  the  Undivided  Commune,  segmen- 
tation of  which  produced  the  classificatory 
system  of  relationship.12  This  conclusion 
reached  by  actual  study  and  observation  of  To- 
temic  institutions  coalesces  with  the  views  of 
Payne  as  to  the  aboriginal  group  in  which  lan- 
guage is  originated.13  Facts  evidence  by  such 
a  convergence  of  well  authenticated  data  tend 
not  only  to  establish  the  Social  Hypothesis,  but 

"This  clue  is  being  employed  with  striking  results  in  the 
interpretation  of  the  origins  of  Greek  arts  and  cults,  particu- 
larly in  such  works  as  Miss  J.  E.  Harrison's  Themis  and  her 
Ancient  Art  and  Ritual.  An  attempt  to  indicate  the  far- 
reaching  significance  of  Totemism  was  made  by  the  present 
writer  in  an  essay  published  in  The  Annals  of  the  American 
Academy  for  May,  1904. 

"Ante,  Sec.  38. 

"Ante,  Sec.  31. 


144      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

also  to  indicate  the  point  of  junction  between 
biology  and  political  science.  The  Undivided 
Commune  appears  to  be  the  primordial  form 
of  the  State.  It  was  then  not  merely  a  state- 
ment of  the  logical  order  but  was  a  precise 
statement  of  the  actual  historical  order  that 
was  made  by  Aristotle  when  he  said : 

"It  is  evident  that  the  State  is  a  crea- 
tion of  nature,  and  that  Man  is  by  nature 
a  political  animal.  .  .  .  The  State  is  by 
nature  clearly  prior  to  the  family  and  the 
individual,  since  the  whole  is  of  necessity 
prior  to  the  part."14 

In  view  of  the  Social  Hypothesis  the  Dar- 
winian theory  relieves  this  generalization  from 
the  inconsistent  attachments  to  it  made  by 
Aristotle  in  his  speculations  about  the  primitive 
household,  and  establishes  it  as  the  fundamen- 
tal proposition  of  political  science. 

§  49.  Conclusions 

This  survey  of  genetic  data  has  led  to  the 
following  conclusions: 

"Politics,  Book  I.,  Chap.  II.     Jowett's  translations. 


SURVEY  OF  GENETIC  DATA         145 

1.  Although     biology     indicates     different- 
modes  of  evolutionary  process  it  is  at  present 
inconclusive  as  to  the  mode  pursued  in  the  case 
of  Man. 

2.  Psychology,  linguistics  and  anthropology 
indicate  that  the  mode  pursued  in  the  case  of 
Man  must  have  been  the  process  distinguished 
as  social  evolution  and  not  the  process  dis- 
tinguished as  individual  evolution. 

3.  When  appeal  is  made  to  evolutionary 
doctrine  for  social  and  political  criteria,  the 
only  hypothesis  that  can  be  regarded  as  having 
solid  claims  to  consideration  is  that  of  social 
evolution. 

Although  the  available  data  supply  strong 
evidence  in  favor  of  the  Social  Hypothesis,  no 
doctrine  may  be  regarded  as  established  until 
it  has  in  its  support  a  scientific  consensus.  But 
pending  the  results  of  the  advance  of  knowl- 
edge bearing  upon  this  issue  the  Social  Hy- 
pothesis may  at  least  be  regarded  as  being 
sufficiently  probable  to  warrant  consideration 
of  its  implications. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  STATE 

§  50.  Significance  of  the  Term 

In  designating  the  entity  in  which  human 
nature  was  evolved  as  the  State,  the  term  is 
employed  in  a  sense  recorded  in  standard  dic- 
tionaries. For  instance:  Webster,  "the  whole 
body  of  people  who  are  united  under  one  gov- 
ernment whatever  may  be  the  form  of  that 
government";  Stormonth,  "the  whole  body  of 
people  included  under  one  form  of  govern- 
ment; the  community;  the  body  politic." 

Attempts  have  been  made  to  confine  the 
use  of  the  term  to  a  particular  type  of  com- 
munity, distinguished  from  other  types  such 
as  the  tribe  or  the  clan.  The  weighty  author- 
ity of  Lewis  H.  Morgan  is  on  the  side  of  such 
restricted  use.  He  remarks  that  "there  was 
neither  a  political  society,  nor  a  citizen,  nor  a 

146 


THE  STATE  147 

State,  nor  any  civilization  in  America  when  it 
was  discovered.1  Morgan  makes  "Society" 
the  general  term,  the  State  being  political  so- 
ciety, or  organization  on  the  basis  of  citizen- 
ship, as  distinguished  from  gentile  society,  or 
organization  on  the  basis  of  kinship.  This  ter- 
minology has  been  generally  adopted  by 
sociologists,  to  whom  it  commends  itself  by  its 
accord  with  their  fundamental  concept  of  so- 
ciety as  a  synthesis  of  individuality.2  The 
tribe,  the  gens,  the  clan,  the  State  are  regarded 
as  forms  of  association  among  individuals  so 
that,  from  this  point  of  view,  the  only  unified 
concept  is  that  of  Society.  Premising  that  the 
subject  matter  of  sociology  is  "the  genesis  of 
Society  from  individuals,"  Stuckenberg  re- 
marks that  Society  is  the  genus  and  "of  this 
genus  all  existing  societies  are  species  or  dif- 
ferentiations. Thus  under  the  genus  Society 
we  have  such  species  as  the  family,  the  Church, 
the  State,  each  of  which  contains  a  large  num- 
ber of  specific  or  concrete  societies."3 

1  Ancient  Society,  p.  66. 

2  For  a  detailed  criticism  of  the  methodology  of  Sociology 
see  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  XV.,  No.  2,  1909;  and  No.  5, 
1910. 

'Sociology — The  Science  of  Human  Society.    Vol.  I.,  p.  9. 


148      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

This  terminology  impresses  meanings  upon 
the  terms  "State"  and  "Society"  that  are  re- 
sisted both  by  etymology  and  by  usage. 
"State"  is  primarily  a  term  for  condition  in 
general.  Some  state  or  condition  underlies 
every  kind  of  association.  Structural  varia- 
tions produce  specific  forms,  the  clan,  the 
tribe,  a  theocracy,  a  kingdom,  a  republic,  an 
empire,  but  the  State  is  the  universal  of  which 
they  are  the  particulars.  In  common  usage 
any  body  politic,  whatever  may  be  the  prin- 
ciple of  its  organization,  is  recognized  as  a 
State  if  important  enough  to  attract  observa- 
tion. The  Statesman's  Year  Book  classifies 
among  States  such  countries  as  Abyssinia, 
Bhutan,  Nepal  and  Oman,  although  their 
organization  is  tribal  rather  than  civic  in  char- 
acter. Despite  Morgan's  objection  to  apply- 
ing the  term  "State"  to  any  form  of  polity 
found  among  the  American  aborigines,  such 
terms  as  the  Aztec  State  in  Mexico  and  the 
Inca  State  in  Peru  are  in  common  use  among 
historians,  nor  would  it  be  possible  to  substi- 
tute the  term  "Society"  without  altering  the 
sense.  Society  as  an  abstract  term  designates 


THE  STATE  149 

simply  relation,  with  a  suggestion  of  inten- 
tional relation, — companionship  (socius,  a 
companion).  Relation  implies  antecedent  con- 
dition. Etymologically  "state"  is  an  abstract 
term  for  condition  in  general,  and  its  use  to 
denote  a  body  politic  appears  to  have  been 
originally  suggested  by  the  phrase  of  Ro- 
man law  status  ret  publicae,  imperfectly 
apprehended  by  the  barbarians  from  whose 
settlements  modern  Europe  issued.4  Its  ap- 
propriateness as  a  generic  term  accords  with 
the  convenience  established  by  a  usage  that  has 
withstood  all  attempts  to  restrict  it  to  a  par- 
ticular type  of  body  politic. 

§  51.  The  Testimony  of  History 

There  is  need  for  a  better  classification  of 
the  forms  of  the  State,  distinguishing  the 
Civilized  State  from  the  Tribal  State  or  the 
Gentile  State.  But  the  differences  are  not 
really  so  deep  as  they  appear  to  be.  Even  the 
most  highly  developed  form  of  the  State  has 
elements  in  common  with  lower  forms  and 
upon  a  historical  survey  no  place  can  be  found 

*  Jenks,  Law  and  Politics  in  the  Middle  Ages,  pp.  71,  80. 


150      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

where  it  can  be  said  that  up  to  this  point  there 
is  one  entity  and  beyond  it  a  different  entity. 
Tribal  organization  was  very  marked  in  the 
ancient  City-State,  in  which  the  tribesman  was 
first  converted  into  the  citizen.  Tribal  organi- 
zation was  very  marked  in  the  early  forms  of 
the  modern  European  State,  in  the  course  of 
whose  development  the  concept  of  territorial 
jurisdiction  was  substituted  for  that  of  kin- 
ship as  the  principle  of  government.  It  is 
historically  evident  that  the  transformation 
has  been  a  process  of  State  life;  not  a  substi- 
tution of  the  State  for  a  society.  It  will 
hardly  be  contended  that  England  was  not  a 
State  prior  to  the  reign  of  John  who  first  as- 
sumed the  title  King  of  England;  or  that 
France  was  not  a  State  prior  to  the  reign  of 
Henry  IV,  who  first  assumed  the  title  of 
King  of  France.5  But  their  precedessors  who 
ruled  respectively  as  Kings  of  the  English  or 
Kings  of  the  Franks  were  national  chieftains 
rather  than  territorial  sovereigns.  The  prin- 
ciple of  territorial  jurisdiction  and  sovereignty 
was  not  explicitly  recognized  until  the  Peace 

*  Bryce,  Holy  Roman  Empire,  p.  24. 


THE  STATE  151 

of  Westphalia,  1648.6  The  subject  is  acutely 
discussed  by  Seeley,  and  he  summarizes  his 
conclusions  as  follows: 

"In  short,  compare  the  most  advanced 
State  with  the  most  primitive  tribe,  and 
you  will  see  the  same  features  though  the 
proportions  are  different.  In  the  State 
there  is  more  of  mind,  in  the  tribe  more 
of  nature.  Free  will  and  intelligent  con- 
trivance have  more  play  in  the  former; 
blood  and  kinship  rule  in  the  latter.  Still 
the  State  has  not  ceased  to  be  a  tribe; 
kinship  still  counts  for  much  in  it,  as  the 
nationality  movement  of  the  present  cen- 
tury has  strikingly  proved.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Tribe,  whenever  we  can  get  in- 
formation about  it,  is  found  to  be  also  in 
some  degree  a  State.  The  rigid  family 
organization  always  shows  itself  insuffi- 
cient, needing  to  be  supplemented  by 
more  artificial  institutions.  Thus,  apart 
from  kinship,  there  is  a  common  charac- 
teristic which  brings  together  the  most 
primitive  and  the  most  advanced  of  these 

'  Walker,  International  Law,  p.  158. 


152      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

associations — I  mean  the  principle  of  gov- 
ernment. Here  again  the  proportion 
may  be  different — this  is  what  gives  rise 
to  varieties — but  the  common  character- 
istic is  there  on  which  depends  unity  of 
kind."7 

§  52.  The  Testimony  of  Anthropology 

It  is  remarkable  how  deep  down  the  origin 
of  political  office  may  be  traced.  Howitt  gives 
particulars  showing  the  energy  and  prestige 
of  the  senatorial  order  among  the  Australian 
aborigines.  The  group  of  ruling  elders  are 
"the  great  ones."  The  following  incident  is 
related: 

"When  in  the  Yaurorka  country  I 
camped  for  the  night  near  an  encamp- 
ment of  one  of  the  small  groups  of  that 
tribe.  Some  of  the  old  men,  the  Pinnarus 
of  the  place,  came  to  visit  me,  and  asked 
me  to  go  with  them  to  see  the  Pinna- 
pinnaru  (the  "Great-great-one"),  who 
could  not  come  out  to  see  me.  I  went 
with  them  and  found,  sitting  in  one  of 

''Introduction  to  Political  Science,  p.  36. 


THE  STATE  153 

the  huts,  the  oldest  Blackfellow  I  had 
ever  seen.  The  other  Pinnarus  were 
mostly  grayheaded  and  bald,  but  he  was 
so  old  as  to  be  almost  childish,  and  was 
covered  with  a  grizzly  fell  of  hair  from 
head  to  foot.  The  respect  with  which  he 
was  treated  by  the  other  old  men  was  as 
marked  as  the  respect  which  they  received 
from  the  younger  men.  They  told  me 
that  he  was  so  old  that  he  could  not  walk 
and  that  when  they  travelled  some  of  the 
younger  men  carried  him."* 

The  differentiation  in  nature  of  authority, 
distinguished  as  status  and  contract,  of  which 
some  use  has  been  made  to  demarcate  the 
Tribe  from  the  State,  was  found  even  among 
the  Australian  aborigines.  Mr.  Howitt  says 
of  the  Theddora  tribe:  "The  oldest  man  of 
the  tribe  was  recognized  as  a  kind  of  chief, 
but  whenever  an  attack  on  some  enemy  was 
planned  the  ablest  warrior  was,  as  a  rule, 
chosen  to  lead,  and  his  advice  then  received 
the  endorsement  of  the  old  men."9 

*  Xative   Tribes  of  Southeast  AtMtralia,  p.  300. 
•Opus  cited,  p.  302. 


154      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

Here  we  have  the  homologue  of  the  sachem 
and  chief  in  the  American  Indian  tribes. 
Morgan  says  that  "the  office  of  sachem  was 
hereditary  in  the  gens."  "Moreover,  the 
duties  of  a  sachem  were  confined  to  the  affairs 
of  peace.  He  could  not  go  out  to  war  as  a 
sachem.  On  the  other  hand,  the  chiefs  who 
were  raised  to  office  for  personal  bravery,  for 
wisdom  in  affairs  or  for  eloquence  in  council 
were  usually  the  superior  class  in  ability, 
though  not  in  authority  over  the  gens."1 

The  case  illustrates  the  powerful  structure- 
forming  influence  of  military  necessity,  a  fact 
so  conspicuous  in  advanced  forms  of  the  State 
as  to  cause  some  writers  to  regard  the  State 
itself  as  fundamentally  a  military  product. 
This  concept  is  adopted  by  Oppenheimer,11 

M  Ancient  Society,  p.  71.  It  might  be  worth  inquiry  whether 
the  duplication  of  executive  power  recorded  in  ancient  his- 
tory may  not  have  had  a  like  origin,  such  as  the  two  Kings  of 
Sparta,  the  two  Consuls  of  Rome,  the  two  Suffetes  of  Carthage. 

11  The  State,  by  Franz  Oppenheimer.  This  work  was  pub- 
lished in  Germany  in  1908.  The  American  translation  by  John 
M.  Gitterman  was  published  in  1914.  Translations  have  also 
been  made  into  French,  Hungarian,  Italian  and  Rumanian. 
The  interest  it  has  attracted  may  be  perhaps  attributed  to  the 
fact  that  it  accords  with  certain  sociological  theories  to  the 
effect  that  the  State  is  a  transitory  phase  of  power,  eventually 


THE  STATE  155 

who  dismisses  communities  like  those  of  the 
Australian  aborigines  and  other  primitive 
peoples  of  low  polity  as  "huntsmen  and  grub- 
bers," "peoples  without  a  State."  But  never- 
theless his  definition  lands  him  in  difficulties 
when  he  comes  to  consider  States  like  the  Com- 
monwealth of  Australia,  the  Dominion  of 
Canada,  the  United  States  of  America.  In 
their  case  it  is  historically  evident  that  the 
structural  principle  was  economic  and  not 
military.  Then,  according  to  the  proposed 
definition,  they  are  not  entitled  to  rank  as 
States.  Oppenheimer  perceives  the  logical 
consequence,  and  he  complains  that  "They  will 
continue  to  be  called  States  in  spite  of  all  pro- 
tests, especially  because  of  the  pleasure  of 
using  confusing  concepts."  Just  so;  it  is  im- 
possible to  upset  the  firmly  established  usage 
according  to  which  they  rank  as  States.  If 
instead  of  trying  to  conform  facts  to  theory 
it  is  sought  to  conform  theory  to  facts  it  will 
appear  that  the  most  primitive  type  of  com- 
munity available  for  observation  is  a  body 

to  be  superseded  by  voluntary  association  designated  by  the 
author  as  Free  Citizenship. 


156      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

politic  with  office  and  government,  and  when 
speaking  with  scientific  precision  it  must  be 
classed  as  a  State.  The  term  "Tribe,"  as  its 
etymology  indicates  ( tribus,  one  of  three  parts 
into  which  the  Roman  people  were  anciently 
divided),  is  an  appellation  which  simply  notes 
difference.  Although  a  convenient  term  in 
general  literature  and  in  common  speech  to 
designate  a  low  form  of  the  State,  it  has  no 
more  scientific  value  than  the  term  "weed"  as 
a  classification  of  plant  species. 

§  53.  Terminology  of  Political  Science 

It  is  not  uncommon  for  a  term  to  acquire 
a  popular  use  that  differs  from  the  scientific 
use.  As  a  term  of  common  use  "animals"  or- 
dinarily designates  a  class  which  a  zoologist 
distinguishes  as  Mammalia.  Birds,  fishes  and 
insects  are  not  usually  referred  to  as  animals, 
but  they  are  all  so  classed  when  speaking  with 
scientific  precision.  The  popular  use  differs 
from  the  scientific  use  without  impairing  it. 
Scientists  themselves  find  it  convenient  to 
adopt  the  popular  use  in  ordinary  conversa- 
tion. A  similar  differentiation  in  usage  exists 


THE  STATE  157 

as  regards  the  term  "State,"  but  it  need  occa- 
sion no  practical  difficulty.  In  statistical  man- 
uals, in  news  dispatches  and  in  international 
law  the  term  designates  only  bodies  politic  of 
such  salient  importance  as  to  be  regarded  as 
participants  in  world  politics.  But  as  a  term  of 
political  science  "State"  includes  every  form 
of  body  politic,  savage,  barbarous  or  civilized. 
With  that  concept  defined  other  generic 
terms  fall  readily  into  place.  Government  is 
not  the  State  but  is  particular  structure  and 
function  in  the  State.  A  good  definition  is 
supplied  by  Spencer,  who  says  that  Govern- 
ment is  "that  part  of  the  social  organization 
which  consciously  carries  on  directive  and  re- 
straining functions  for  public  ends."12  The 
use  of  the  term  "State"  as  a  synonym  for 
"Government"  is  a  common  practice  to  which 
there  need  be  no  objection,  if  it  be  understood, 
as  it  should  be,  that  although  the  whole  is  men- 
tioned the  part  is  meant.  It  is  an  instance  of 
what  rhetoricians  call  synecdoche. 

"Principles  of  Biology,  Vol.  II.:  Part  V.,  of  "Political  In- 
stitutions," Chap.  II.,  p.  247.  Spencer's  refutation  of  Hob- 
bes's  "State  of  Xature"  in  "Justice,"  Part  IV.,  of  The  Princi- 
ples of  Ethics,  Chap.  XXV.,  may  be  consulted  also. 


158      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

Since  the  State  is  the  whole  body,  it  follows 
that  the  State  includes  Society ;  but  Society  is 
not  a  part  of  the  whole  but  is  coextensive  with 
it.  The  State  and  Society  may  be  regarded 
as  the  same  entity,  in  the  one  case  considered 
in  its  collective  aspect,  in  the  other  in  its  dis- 
tributive aspect.  Thus  Spencer  describes  the 
State  as  "Society  in  its  corporate  capacity."1 

To  sum  up:  The  term  "the  State"  desig- 
nates the  whole;  the  term  "Society"  designates 
the  parts  which  together  form  the  whole;  the 
term  "Government"  designates  a  part  of  the 
whole  which  has  such  salient  importance  that  it 
is  apt  to  be  identified  with  the  whole  in  ordi- 
nary experience. 

§  54.  The  State  an  Organism 

It  is  a  corollary  of  the  Social  Hypothesis 
that  the  State  is  an  organism.  This  is  a  point 
that  is  deeply  involved  in  controversy.  The 
literature  of  the  subject  is  so  voluminous  that 
an  account  thereof  itself  makes  a  corpulent 
volume.14  The  weight  of  authority  is  now  ap- 

18  Data  of  Ethics,  Part  V.,  "Justice,"  pp.  186,  221. 
14  The  Organismic  Theory,  by  F.  W.  Coker.    There  is  a  brief 
but  comprehensive  account  of  the  conflict  of  scientific  opinion 


THE  STATE  159 

parently  against  the  proposition.  But  if  the 
conclusions  reached  in  favor  of  the  Social  Hy- 
pothesis are  well  founded,  it  follows  as  a 
simple  statement  of  biological  fact  that  the 
State  is  an  organism,  just  as  the  ant  or  the 
bee  community  is  an  organism.  It  may  be 
asked  whether  such  a  discrete  entity  as  a  com- 
munity of  social  insects  can  be  designated  as 
an  organism  without  doing  violence  to  lan- 
guage. To  this  it  may  be  replied  that  it  is 
an  use  required  by  scientific  precision  and  it  is 
adopted  by  specialists  as  a  matter  of  correct 
terminology  without  having  in  mind  any  bear- 
ing of  the  matter  upon  political  theory.  A 
community  of  social  insects  must  be  regarded 
as  an  organism,  inasmuch  as  its  unit  life  has 
been  differentiated  by  evolutionary  process 
operating  through  the  community,  as  Wheeler 
has  described  in  the  case  of  ants.15  J.  S.  Hux- 
ley in  a  purely  biological  treatise  expressly 
recognizes  insect  communities  as  organisms. 
He  refers  to  "such  organisms  as  the  ant  col- 
ony, which  is  not  a  solid  whole,  single  and  de- 

on  this  subject  in  Introduction  to  Political  Science  by  J.  W. 
Garner,  pp.  56-65. 
"  Ante,  Sec.  23. 


160      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

fined  in  space."     Discussing  compound  indi- 
viduality, he  remarks  that  "the  communities 
of  ants  and  bees  are  undoubted  individuals."1 
The  State  is  in  the  same  biological  category. 

It  should  be  carefully  observed,  however, 
that  when  the  term  "organism"  is  applied  to 
the  State  nothing  more  is  signified  than  the 
plain  dictionary  meaning  of  "an  organized  be- 
ing" (Webster)  or  "a  body  possessing  organic 
structure"  (Stormonth),  or  "a  body  exhibiting 
organization  and  organic  life"  (Century). 
Some  frequently  urged  objections  to  the  term 
are  beside  the  mark,  such  as  that  the  State 
lacks  concreteness,  or  that  it  exists  for  the  sake 
of  its  units,  or  that  the  units  differ  altogether 
from  the  units  of  any  biological  organism,  etc. 
It  is  the  existence  of  organs,  not  their  condi- 
tion, purpose  or  composition,  that  connotes 
the  organism.  Much  of  the  discredit  that  has 
settled  upon  the  term  is  due  to  misplaced  en- 
deavors to  trace  physiological  parallels.  The 
State  is  an  organism  of  a  type  so  distinct  from 
animal  or  vegetal  organism,  that  no  details 
of  structural  resemblance  may  be  assumed. 

l§  The  Individual  in  the  Animal  Kingdom,  pp.  50,  142. 


THE  STATE  161 

Every  order  of  organic  life  develops  its  forms 
in  its  own  way,  not  inferable  from  the  charac- 
teristics of  a  different  order.  The  facts  of 
animal  life  would  never  enable  one  to  form  a 
concept  of  such  an  organism  as  a  tree,  and 
likewise  the  facts  of  vegetal  life  would  never 
supply  material  for  the  concept  of  a  mammal. 
The  State  comes  within  the  category  of  organ- 
ism not  through  any  analogies  of  form  or  func- 
tion with  other  organisms  but  solely  because  of 
the  nature  of  its  own  being,  as  a  product  of 
social  evolution. 


CHAPTER  IX 

METHODOLOGY 

§  55.  Utility  of  the  Naturalistic  Concept 

The  Social  Hypothesis  implies  that  the 
State  is  an  organism.  Acceptance  of  this 
proposition  suggests  inquiry  as  to  how  far  and 
in  what  way  the  concept  is  applicable  in  scien- 
tific method.  The  case  may  be  considered  in 
several  aspects,  interpretation,  classification 
and  valuation. 

As  a  principle  of  interpretation  its  utility 
has  already  been  strikingly  illustrated.  It  has 
been  employed  with  marked  success  by  anthro- 
pologists in  elucidating  the  beginnings  of  re- 
ligious, economic  and  governmental  structure 
by  exhibiting  them  as  adaptations  of  the  or- 
ganism to  the  environment.  A  brilliant  ex- 
ample of  this  method  is  Payne's  account  of 
institutional  beginnings  among  the  American 

162 


METHODOLOGY  163 

aborigines.1  The  genetic  process  he  describes 
has  been  universally  operative  although  results 
have  varied  in  correspondence  with  difference 
in  environment. 

Evidence  indicating  that  the  formation  of 
social  structure  is  initiated  by  the  instinct  of 
self-preservation  in  the  community  has  been 
made  the  basis  of  a  doctrine  that  has  become 
famous  as  Economic  Determinism.  It  was 
originated  by  Marx  and  it  holds  a  prominent 
place  in  the  voluminous  literature  of  Socialism. 
According  to  it  all  social  factors  are  scientifi- 
cally reducible  to  economic  factors.2  The  dis- 
cussion started  by  the  enunciation  of  this 
doctrine  is  still  going  on  without  producing 
scientific  consensus.  Here  as  elsewhere  the 
naturalistic  concept  has  had  an  unsettling 
rather  than  a  constructive  effect.  It  is  now 
generally  admitted  that  economic  factors  are 
involved  in  transformations  of  human  society 

1  History  of  America,  Vol.  I.,  pp.  303-507.    This  is  a  masterly 
discussion  of  the  subject. 

2  For   a  systematic   account  of  this   doctrine  see   Professor 
Seligman's    Economic    Interpretation    of    History.      Louis    B. 
Boudin's    Theoretical   System    of   Karl  Marx   criticizes    Selig- 
man's  exposition   and   gives   an   account   from   the   standpoint 
of  Socialism. 


164      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

and  that  search  for  them  is  usually  illumina- 
tive of  process,  but  it  is  historically  evident 
that  other  factors  are  operative.  As  Profes- 
sor Seligman  remarks:  "There  is  not  only  an 
economic  interpretation  of  history  but  an 
ethical,  an  aesthetic,  a  political,  a  jural,  a  lin- 
guistic, a  religious  and  a  scientific  interpreta- 
tion of  history."3  But  according  to  the  Marx- 
ians all  these  factors  are  reducible  to  economic 
factors. 

This  raises  a  problem  such  as  occurs  both  in 
biology  and  in  psychology,  namely,  whether 
succeeding  phases  of  development  can  be 
causally  explained  in  terms  of  preceding  ones ; 
that  is  to  say,  whether  biologic  process  can  be 
explained  in  terms  of  physics  and  chemistry, 
or  consciousness  in  terms  of  organic  structure 
and  function.  Labor  upon  such  problems  has 
so  far  extended  knowledge  of  the  concomit- 
ants of  process  without  attaining  such  knowl- 
edge of  the  process  itself  as  would  supply  a 
unified  concept.  At  present  philosophy  seems 
disposed  to  find  the  unified  concept  in  the  field 
of  psychology  rather  than  in  that  of  biology, 

•Opus  cited,  p.  153. 


METHODOLOGY  165 

and  to  make  all  knowledge  an  incident  of 
psychic  activity.  According  to  this  view  the 
most  unified  concept  is  that  of  the  mind  es- 
tablishing its  own  standards  of  reality,  fram- 
ing its  own  modes  of  thought,  creating  for  its 
own  service  notions  of  space,  time  and  caus- 
ality, so  that  in  the  final  analysis  knowledge 
is  but  a  form  of  Man's  adaptation  to  his  en- 
vironment.4 Such  a  change  in  Man's  consti- 
tution as  would  provide  a  different  range  of 
percipience  in  his  sense  organs  might  estab- 
lish contours  and  vistas  very  different  from 
those  which  now  determine  notions  of  matter, 
form  and  energy.5 

§  56.  The  Forms  of  the  State 

The  variety  of  the  factors  that  supervene 
when  personality  emerges  from  the  biologic 
process  and  their  irreducible  character  suffi- 
ciently explain  the  futility  of  all  attempts  to 
establish  a  methodology  of  political  science  on 
the  concept  of  the  State  as  an  organism.6  The 

*This  appears  to  be  the  thesis  of  Bergson's  Creative  Evolu- 
tion. 

8  See  ante,  p.  64. 
•  Cf.  ante,  Sec.  2. 


166      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

traditional  Aristotelian  classification  of  State 
forms,  so  often  criticized  as  inadequate,  still 
holds  the  field  with  modifications  insufficient 
to  change  its  general  character.  The  practical 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  placing  State  forms 
upon  an  objective  basis  like  that  of  the  forms 
with  which  the  naturalist  deals  seem  to  be  in- 
surmountable. The  State  is  not  apprehensible 
at  all  save  as  it  is  objectified  in  institutions. 
In  a  way  the  same  is  true  of  the  organisms 
formed  by  insect  communities.  Their  differ- 
entiation is  definable  only  by  characteristic 
structure,  the  shape  and  arrangement  of  cells, 
the  physique  and  functions  of  the  inhabitants. 
A  similar  method  with  State  species  would  in- 
troduce racial  groupings,  but  State  species 
while  affected  by  racial  influence  are  not  con- 
fined by  racial  lines.  There  is  no  fixed  relation 
between  the  type  of  the  community  and  the 
physical  structure  of  its  units  as  in  the  case 
of  ants  and  bees.  In  the  insect  community 
the  process  of  polymorphism  has  established 
community  function  in  the  bodily  structure  of 
the  members  of  the  community.  In  the  State 
the  unity  is  a  psychical  adjustment,  and  the 


METHODOLOGY  167 

order  is  infinitely  modifiable.  Although  the 
State  originates  as  a  biological  product  it 
emerges  from  that  category  in  attaining  the 
psychosphere.  Psychological  factors  then 
dominate  biological  factors,  and  attempts  to 
describe  social  activities  in  terms  of  biological 
process  become  inadequate.  The  fact  that  the 
psychical  has  evolved  from  the  biological  no 
more  makes  it  similar  than  electricity  is  like 
steam. 

Another  source  of  difficulty  is  the  fact  that 
the  State  is  an  organism  that  we  cannot  view 
objectively  as  we  do  other  organisms,  since  we 
ourselves  are  part  of  its  unit  life.  The  student 
of  State  species  is  somewhat  in  the  position  of 
a  philosophic  bee  who  surveys  the  hive  from  the 
inside,  and  hence  construes  its  activities  in 
terms  derived  from  thought  and  experience  as 
a  member  of  its  society.  Thus  valuations  tend 
to  become  subjective.  Moreover,  the  philo- 
sophic bee  has  to  do  with  fixed  structure.  The 
observer  of  human  society  has  to  do  with  plas- 
tic structure  and  mutable  conditions,  and  he 
has  to  reckon  with  psychological  factors  that 
are  not  constants  but  variables. 


168      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

§  57.  The  Scope  of  Classification 

Thus  the  notion  that  State  species  can  ever 
be  exhibited  in  the  same  manner  as  biological 
species  must  be  dismissed  as  impracticable.  A 
more  feasible  task  is  to  deal  with  governmental 
structure,  and  exhibit  its  principal  types.  As 
Sidgwick  has  remarked,  "Political  science  aims 
like  other  sciences  at  ascertaining  the  relations 
of  resemblance  among  the  objects  that  it 
studies;  it  seeks  to  arrange  them  in  classes,  or 
to  exhibit  them  as  examples  of  types."  But 
he  points  out  that  such  methodizing  is  now 
limited  by  the  very  fragmentary  character  of 
our  knowledge.  Therefore  for  the  present  he 
prefers  to  limit  consideration  to  "the  principal 
forms  of  political  society  which  the  history  of 
European  civilization  manifests"  and  which 
therefore  possess  "what  may  be  called  a  mor- 
phological unity."7  Sidgwick  does  not  deny 
that  the  method  is  susceptible  of  larger  appli- 
cation, but  "if  we  try  to  begin  at  the  begin- 
ning, as  seems  natural,  we  have  to  begin  in 
almost  utter  darkness."8 

7  Development  of  European  Polity,  pp.  3,  4. 
*  Opus  cited,  p.  27. 


METHODOLOGY  169 

This  darkness  is  being  dispelled  to  such  an 
extent  that  extension  and  improvement  of  the 
method  of  political  science  may  be  reasonably 
expected.  The  present  state  of  knowledge  is 
at  least  sufficient  to  discredit  the  traditional 
notion  that  the  civilized  State  is  the  only  true 
form  of  the  State,  other  varieties  possessing 
significance  only  as  they  can  be  classed  in  serial 
order  antecedent  to  the  development  of  the 
civilized  State.  There  is  historical  evidence  of 
the  past  and  present  existence,  in  the  East,  of 
States  of  high  cultural  attainment,  which  can- 
not possibly  be  ranged  with  the  civilized  State 
of  the  West  in  any  serial  order,  but  the  situa- 
tion becomes  comprehensible  when  we  apply  to 
the  State  the  idea  of  the  variation  of  species, 
and  conceive  of  political  development  as  pro- 
ceeding on  divergent  lines  with  successions  of 
supremacy  as  regards  particular  types.  If  in 
the  present  state  of  knowledge  a  comprehen- 
sive scheme  of  classification  is  impracticable, 
at  least  the  fragmentary  and  provisional  char- 
acter of  the  present  system  can  be  recognized 
and  classification  should  aim  at  genetic  order 
so  far  as  it  is  traceable. 


170      NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

There  is  still  another  aspect  in  which  the 
naturalistic  concept  may  be  regarded,  that  of 
serving  as  a  determinant  of  the  validity  of 
social  and  political  theories.  This  branch  of 
the  inquiry  calls  for  some  examination  of  the 
corollaries  of  the  Social  Hypothesis. 


CHAPTER  X 

FIRST  PRINCIPLES  IN  POLITICS 

§  58.  Appearance  and  Reality 

Use  of  the  naturalistic  concept  as  a  prin- 
ciple of  valuation  does  not  escape  the  pressure 
of  subjectivism  that  has  been  found  to  clog 
its  practical  application  in  methodology,  but 
here  at  least  logical  defense  against  illusion  is 
readily  available.  Corrective  influence  from 
this  source  may  be  made  so  familiar  as  to  cause 
the  reality  to  be  substituted  for  the  appear- 
ance as  a  habit  of  thought.  Although  one 
may  seem  to  see  the  sun  rise  any  clear  morn- 
ing, every  educated  person  is  unhesitatingly 
aware  that  what  really  happens  is  quite  dif- 
ferent from  the  appearance.  Some  analogous 
education  of  ability  to  distinguish  between  re- 
ality and  appearance  is  a  prerequisite  to  suc- 
cessful use  of  the  naturalistic  concept  as  a 
determinant.  One  must  be  prepared  for  the 

171 


172       NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

contingency  of  conflict  with  instinctive  pre- 
possessions or  traditional  notions. 

The  matter  may  be  illustrated  by  the  case  of 
insects  which  all  biologists  admit  are  products 
of  social  evolution.  If  a  bee  or  ant  be  con- 
ceived to  possess  self-consciousness  its  sense  of 
autonomous  individuality  might  be  complete 
despite  the  fact  that  in  the  social  insects  in- 
dividuality is  socially  created  and  maintained. 
To  ordinary  view,  what  might  be  called  com- 
mon sense,  an  isolated  social  bee  or  ant  is  a 
complete  individual.  Only  patient,  trained 
observation  has  disclosed  the  fact  that  ap- 
parently complete  individuals  are  so  depend- 
ent upon  the  arrangements  of  the  community 
that  apart  from  it  some  of  the  adult  forms  can 
no  more  feed  themselves  than  a  newborn  hu- 
man child.  The  hive  bee  or  the  colony  ant 
cannot,  as  a  matter  of  physiological  fact,  be 
made  a  Stateless  creature  by  separating  it 
from  the  community.  Apparently  a  monad, 
it  is  still  in  reality  a  community-particle  in 
its  nature  and  in  its  needs.  Extracted  from 
the  social  order,  its  true  individuality,  far  from 
being  released  and  enlarged,  is  crushed  and 


FIRST  PRINCIPLES  IN  POLITICS      173 

injured.  Now  if  Man  be  a  social  product,  it 
follows  that  also  in  his  case  individual  free- 
dom cannot  be  identified  with  individual 
autonomy.  Robinson  Crusoe  on  his  desert  is- 
land is  no  more  a  Stateless  creature  than  an 
isolated  bee.  Instead  of  attaining  free  indi- 
viduality he  has  become  the  victim  of  defect 
that  tends  to  extinguish  his  human  indi- 
viduality. 

Acceptance  of  the  naturalistic  concept  as  a 
principle  of  valuation  should  therefore  be 
rigorously  conditioned  upon  logical  order.  If 
that  is  contradicted  by  appearances  then  the 
reality  differs  from  the  appearances,  which  is 
an  incident  of  scientific  knowledge  that  often 
happens.  Everything  depends  upon  the 
validity  of  the  basic  proposition.  The  defini- 
tions now  to  be  offered  are  therefore  to  be 
taken  as  wholly  contingent  upon  the  truth  of 
the  Social  Hypothesis. 

§  59.  Definitions 

The  foregoing  consideration  of  the  biologi- 
cal antecedents  of  the  human  species  suggests 
the  following  generalization: 


174       NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

PROPOSITION  :  Man  is  the  product  of  Social 
Evolution. 

Corollaries  of  this  proposition  affect  the 
whole  group  of  sciences  pertaining  to  anthro- 
pology in  the  large  sense  of  the  word.  They 
may  be  exhibited  in  several  aspects  as  follows : 

BIOLOGICAL 

The  State  is  the  permanent  and  universal 
frame  of  human  existence.  Man  can  no  more 
get  out  of  the  State  than  a  bird  can  fly  out  of 
the  air. 

The  State  is  an  organism.  It  may  be  de- 
fined as  an  organic  entity  composed  of  human 
beings  whose  nature,  relations  and  activities 
are  conditioned  by  its  own  nature,  relations 
and  activities.  It  is  derived  from  the  forma- 
tion of  community  in  the  animal  species  an- 
cestral to  Man.  As  in  other  organisms,  the 
individual  lives  are  subordinate  to  the  general 
life  in  proportion  as  that  is  high. 

The  Undivided  Commune  is  the  primordial 
form  of  the  State,  and  it  antedates  the  dif- 
ferentiation of  Man  from  the  antecedent  ani- 
mal stock. 


FIRST  PRINCIPLES  IN  POLITICS      175 

The  Institution  is  particular  structure 
formed  in  the  State  by  processes  of  adaptive 
change  in  effecting  adjustment  to  the  environ- 
ment. Such  processes  have  been  attended  by 
variation  of  State  species. 

Government  is  institutional  structure  with 
coercive  means  for  the  discharge  of  directive 
and  regulative  functions.  It  is  a  primary  or- 
gan of  the  State  and  its  beginnings  antedate 
the  transition  from  animal  nature  to  human 
nature. 

The  Individual  is  a  distinct  entity  in  the 
unit  life  of  the  State.  The  Individual  is  not 
an  original  but  is  a  derivative. 

POLITICAL 

Man  did  not  make  the  State ;  the  State  made 
Man.  Man  is  born  a  political  being.  His 
nature  was  formed  by  government,  requires 
government  and  seeks  government. 

The  State  is  the  unit  of  which  all  forms  of 
Government  and  Society  are  the  differentia- 
tion. Society  in  general  is  the  State  viewed  in 
its  distributive  aspect. 

The  State  is  absolute  and  unconditioned  in 


176       NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

its  relation  to  its  unit  life.  Government  is 
conditioned  by  dependence  of  its  functions 
upon  structure  and  hence  it  is  subject  to  in- 
herent limitations.  There  is  no  absolute  norm 
of  Government  but  every  species  of  the  State 
tends  to  produce  a  type  proper  to  its  charac- 
teristics in  its  particular  environment.  Pro- 
found changes  of  environment  produce  pro- 
found changes  of  Government.  State  species 
unable  to  effect  readjustments  of  structure  to 
meet  new  conditions  tend  to  disappear,  so  that 
from  age  to  age  there  is  a  succession  in  State 
species  analogous  to  that  which  takes  place  in 
biological  species. 

Government  derives  its  authority  from  the 
State.  The  scope  of  its  functions  varies  with 
the  circumstances  of  State  life  and  responds 
to  the  needs  of  State  life. 

Sovereignty  is  the  supremacy  of  the  State 
over  all  its  parts.  It  has  degrees,  proportioned 
to  the  development  of  governmental  structure, 
being  greatest  in  advanced  forms  of  the  State. 

ETHICAL 

Rights  are  not  innate  but  are  derivative. 
They  exist  in  the  State  but  not  apart  from 


FIRST  PRINCIPLES  IN  POLITICS      177 

the  State.  Hence  rights  are  correlated  with 
duties. 

Liberty  implies  not  absence  of  restraint  but 
presence  of  order.  It  may  be  defined  as  an 
order  agreeable  to  the  prevailing  sense  of  right 
whatever  that  may  be.  Therefore  notions  of 
Liberty  differ  in  accordance  with  existing  dif- 
ferences in  the  sense  of  right  and  they  vary 
with  changes  in  the  sense  of  right. 

The  object  of  the  State  is  the  perfecting  of 
Man,  but  the  attainment  of  that  object  de- 
pends upon  the  perfecting  of  the  State.  The 
test  of  value  in  any  institution  is  primarily  not 
the  advantage  of  the  individual  but  the  ad- 
vantage of  Society.  Individual  life  enlarges 
by  participation  in  a  larger  life;  ascends  by 
incorporation  in  a  higher  life.1 

With  the  development  of  the  above  corol- 
laries this  inquiry  into  the  natural  history  of 

1  The  biological  basis  of  this  inference  is  admirably  pre- 
sented in  the  chapter  on  "Genetics  and  Ethics"  in  Professor 
Conklin's  Heredity  and  Environment.  Professor  Conn's  Social 
Heredity  and  Social  Evolution  is  an  able  presentation  of  the 
ethical  aspect  of  human  evolution,  but  he  assumes  the  ex- 
istence of  a  difference  between  human  and  animal  evolution 
which  he  does  not  explain. 


178       NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  STATE 

the  State  is  concluded.  If  the  conclusions 
reached  are  well  founded  they  establish  the 
value  of  the  naturalistic  concept  as  a  principle 
of  valuation.  It  is  evident  that  the  corollaries 
have  a  direct  bearing  upon  theory  and  practice 
as  to  the  constitution  of  Society,  the  sphere  of 
Government,  the  organization  of  the  State,  the 
nature  and  extent  of  public  duty  and  of  pri- 
vate right.  Scientific  determination  of  the 
nature  of  evolutionary  process  in  the  case  of 
Man  is  therefore  a  matter  of  immense  practi- 
cal importance. 


LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES 

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BAGEHOT,  W.:  Physics  and  Politics.  1873. 
BALDWIN,  J.  M.:  Darwin  and  the  Humanities.  1910. 

BEDDARD,  F.  E.:     Mammalia,  Cambridge  Natural  History 

series.     1903. 
BERGSON,   H.:     Creative   Evolution,   Mitchell's    translation. 

1911. 

BOUDIN,  L.  B.:   The  Theoretical  System  of  Karl  Marx.    1907. 
BRINTON,  D.  G.:     Essays  of  an  Americanist.     1870. 
BRYCE,  J.:     The  Holy  Roman  Empire.     1873. 
BUTTEL-REEPEN,    H.    v.:      Man    and    His    Forerunners 

Thacker's  translation.     1913. 

CLIFFORD,  W.  K.:    Lectures  and  Essays.    1886. 
COKER,  F.  W.:    The  Organismic  Theory.    1910. 
CONKLIN,  E.  G.:     Heredity  and  Development.     1915. 
CONN,  H.  W.:    Social  Heredity  and  Social  Evolution.    1914. 

DICKINSON,  G.  L.:     A  Modern  Symposium.     1905. 
DARWIN,  C.:    Origin  of  Species.    1859. 

Descent  of  Man.     1871. 
DUCKWORTH,  W.  L.  H.:     Prehistoric  Man.     1912. 

FRAZER,  J.  G.:     Totemism  and  Exogamy.     1910. 

GARNER,  J.  W.:     Introduction  to  Political  Science.     1910. 
GEDDESS,  P.,  and  THOMSON,  J.  A.:  Evolution,  Home  Uni- 
versity Library,  1911. 
GULICK,  S.  L.:    Evolution  of  the  Japanese.     1903. 

179 


180  LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES 

HAECKEL,  E.:    Evolution  of  Man.     1874. 

The  Wonders  of  Life.     1904. 
HARRISON,  J.  E.:    Ancient  Art  and  Ritual.     1913. 

Themis.     1912. 

HARTMANN,  R.    Anthropoid  Apes.     1885. 
HOBHOUSE,  L.  T.:    Mind  in  Evolution.     1901. 

Morals  in  Evolution.     1906. 
HOPF,  L.:    The  Human  Species.    1909. 

HOWARD,  G.  E.:    History  of  Matrimonial  Institutions.    1904. 
HOWITT,  A.  W.:    The  Native  Tribes  of  South  East  Australia. 

1904. 

HUTCHINSON,  W.:    A  Handbook  of  Health.    1911. 
HUXLEY,  J.  S.:     The  Individual  in  the  Animal  Kingdom. 

1912. 

HUXLEY,  T.  H.:    Man's  Place  in  Nature.     1863. 
Evolution  and  Ethics.     1893. 

JENKS,  E.:    Law  and  Politics  in  the  Middle  Ages.     1898. 
JUDD,  C.  H.:    Evolution  and  Consciousness;  in  Psychological 
Review,  March,  1910. 

KEANE,  A.  H.:     The  World's  Peoples.     1908. 

KEITH,  A.:     Man,  a  History  of  the  Human  Body.     Home 

University  Library. 
KELLOGG,  V.  L.:    Darwinism  To-Day.     1907. 

Beyond  War.     1912. 
KROPOTKIN,  P.:    Mutual  Aid,  a  Factor  in  Evolution.    1902. 

LOWELL,  P.:    The  Soul  of  the  Far  East.    1888. 
LUBBOCK,  SIR  J.:     The  Senses,  Instincts  and  Intelligence 
of  Animals.    1888. 

MAINE,  SIR  H.  S.:     Ancient  Law.     1861. 
MARX,  K.:    A  Contribution  to  the  Critique  of  Political  Econ- 
omy.    1859. 
Capital.     1867-1894. 

METCHINIKOFF,  E.:    The  Nature  of  Man,  Mitchell's  trans- 
lation.    1903. 


LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES  181 

MORGAN,  C.  L.:    Animal  Life  and  Intelligence.     1891. 

Introduction    to    Comparative    Psychology. 

1894. 
Mental    Factors    in    Evolution;    article    in 

Darwin  and  Modern  Science.     1909. 
MORGAN,  L.  H.:    Ancient  Society.     1878. 
MURRAY,  SIR  J.:     The  Ocean.     Home  University  Library. 

OSBORN,   H.   F.:     Bulletin,   American   Museum  of  Natural 

History,  vol.  xiii,  1900. 
OPPENHEIMER,    F.:      The   State,   Gitterman's    translation. 

1908. 

PAYNE,  E.  J.:    History  of  the  New  World  called  America. 
1892. 

RECLUS,  E.    Primitive  Folk.     1889. 

ROMANES,  G.  J.:    Mental  Evolution  in  Animals.     1885. 
Mental  Evolution  in  Man.     1888. 

SAYCE,   A.  H.:     Introduction   to   the  Science  of  Language. 
1880. 

SEELEY,  SIR  J.  R.:    Introduction  to  Political  Science.    1896. 

SELIGMAN,  E.  R.  A.:    The  Economic  Interpretation  of  His- 
tory.    1902. 

SIDGWICK,  H.:    The  Development  of  European  Polity.   1903. 

SMITH,  A.  H.:    Chinese  Characteristics.     1894. 

SPENCER,  B.  and  GILLEN,  F.  J.:     The  Native  Tribes  of 
Central  Australia.     1899. 

SPENCER,  B.:    Native  Tribes  of  the  Northern  Territory  of 
Australia.     1914. 

SPENCER,  H.:    Descriptive  Sociology.     1867-1881. 
Justice,  Part  IV.  of  Ethics.     1891. 
Principles    of    Sociology,    vol.    II.,    part    V., 
Political   Institutions.     1882. 

STUCKENBERG,  J.  H.  W.:     Sociology,  the  Science  of  Hu- 
man Society.    1903. 


182  LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES 

SCHWALBE,  G.:    The  Descent  of  Man;  in  Darwin  and  Mod- 
ern Science.     1909. 

THORNDIKE,  E.  L.:    Animal  Intelligence.     1911. 

WALKER,  T.  A.:    International  Law.     1895. 

WALLACE,  A.  R.:    Natural  Selection  and  Tropical  Nature. 

1891. 

Studies,  Scientific  and  Social.     1900. 
WASHBURN,  M.  F.:     The  Animal  Mind.     1908. 
WATSON,  J.  B.:    Animal  Education,  1903. 

Behavior.     1914. 

WESTERMARCK,  E.:    History  of  Human  Marriage.    1901. 
WHEELER,   W.   M.:     Ants:    Their   Structure,   Development 

and  Behavior.     1910. 
WHITNEY,    W.    D.:      Philology;    article    in    Encyclopedia 

Britannica. 
WUNDT,  W.:     Outlines  of  Psychology.     1897. 


(The  reference  is  to  page  num- 
bers) 

Accadian,  an  advanced  linguis- 
tic type,  88. 

Aesthetic  sense,  origin  of,  140. 

Altruism,  origin  of,  140. 

Ameghino,  F.,  on  fossil  remains 
of  monkeys,  49. 

American  aborigines,  came  from 
Asia,  45;  their  archaic  lan- 
guage forms,  92  et  seq.; 
sachem  and  chief,  154. 

Animal  intelligence,  in  compar- 
ison with  human,  51 ;  views 
of  psychologists,  56-62;  pe- 
culiar sense  organs,  64. 

Ants,  13,  16,  52,  65,  67,  75,  138, 
166. 

Apes,  mating  habits  of,  20;  re- 
lation to  Man,  23,  26,  30,  34, 
35,  37,  38,  125,  134;  behavior 
of,  41,  44;  geographical  dis- 
tribution of,  48;  the  Homun- 
culus,  49;  mentality  of,  51; 
brain  development,  76;  hypo- 
thetical ape-men,  84;  gap  be- 
tween Man,  126;  difference 
from  Man  more  important 
than  resemblance  to,  130;  not 
ancestral  to  Man,  136. 

Aristotle,  mentioned,  5;  on  the 
State,  144;  classification  of 
State  forms,  166. 

Aryan  language,  high  develop- 
ment of,  88. 

Australia,  archaic  character  of, 
46. 


INDEX 

r(U<run  7*? 

Australian  aborigines,  their  do- 
mestic institutions,  106  et  seq., 
system  of  group  marriage, 
112  et  seq.,  Totemic  organi- 
zation of,  119  et  seq.,  natural 
basis  of  subsistence  of,  131 ; 
strict  social  obligations  of, 
133. 

Avebury,  Lord,  see  Lubbock. 

Aztec  State,  148. 

Baboons,  15,  42. 

Bagehot,  W.,  applies  biology  to 
politics,  3. 

Baldwin,  J.  M.,  origin  of  per- 
sonality, 80. 

Beaver,  the,  43. 

Bees,  13,  16,  19,  47,  138,  140, 
166,  167. 

Bergson,  H.,  creative  evolution, 
138  n. 

Bisons,   15. 

Boudin,  L.  B.,  on  Marx's  doc- 
trine, 163  n. 

Brinton,  D.  G.,  on  American 
languages,  98. 

Buttel-Reepen,  H.  v.,  on  de- 
scent of  Man,  31,  et  seq.,  on 
embryo  resemblance,  34. 


Chimpanzee,  26,  27,  41,  48. 

Chinese,  the,  100. 

Church,  the,  biological  influence 

of,  21. 

Civilization,  effects  of,  21,  22. 
Classificatory     system,     savage 

scheme    of   relationship,    106, 

111,  115,  117. 


183 


>tf  U*v^ 


184 


INDEX 


Clifford,  W.  K.,  on  evolution  of 
Man,  78-80. 

Conn,  H.  W.,  on  special  factors 
in  evolution  of  Man,  73. 

Corals,  48. 

Cormopholy,  the  science  of  so- 
cial aggregates,  2. 

Crusoe,  Robinson,  173. 

Cuvier,  5. 

Darwinism,  political,  implica- 
tions of,  1 ;  stated  by  Haec- 
kel,  2;  effect  on  political 
science,  2-6;  on  political  spec- 
ulation, 6;  employed  by  So- 
cialism, 7;  inconsistent  theo- 
ries as  to  Man,  12,  23,  24; 
alleged  inadequacy  of,  68,  83; 
embarrassed  by  anthropologi- 
cal data,  107,  122;  difficulties 
removed  by  Social  Hypothe- 
sis, 122,  130,  135,  141,  145. 

Dickinson,  G.  L.,  6  n. 

Dogs,    15. 

Duckworth,  W.  L.  H.,  on  de- 
scent of  Man,  34. 

Economic  Determinism,  doc- 
trine propounded  by  Marx, 
163;  criticism  of,  164. 

Educated  animals,  59. 

Eocene  period,  49. 

Evolutionary  process,  different 
modes  noted  by  Darwin,  10; 
natural  selection  may  be  di- 
rect or  indirect,  11;  its  in- 
cidence in  case  of  Man,  12, 
25;  the  social  phase,  13-17, 
effect  of  civilization,  22;  al- 
18;  individual  phase,  20-22; 
effect  of  civilization,  22;  al- 
ternatives in  case  of  Man,  25 ; 
anticipation  of  generalized 
types,  28;  instances  of  social 
phase,  48;  testimony  of  psy- 


chological data,  81;  of  lin- 
guistic data,  103;  of  anthro- 
pological data,  122;  mode 
pursued  in  case  of  Man,  144 
et  seq. 

Fison,  L.,  on  Australian  abo- 
rigines, 99;  investigates  clas- 
sificatory  system,  116. 

Frazer,  J.  G.,  advises  on  Aus- 
tralian research,  113;  on  ori- 
gin of  Totemism,  121. 

Fuegian  language,  95. 

Galton,  F.,  mentioned,  8. 

Geddess,  P.,  on  evolution  of 
Man,  44. 

Gibbons,  ape  species  26,  27,  42, 
48. 

Gibraltar  apes,  42. 

Gillen,  F.  J.,  on  Australian  ab- 
origines, 113  et  seq.,  on  To- 
temic  belief,  120. 

Glacial  epoch,  45,  50. 

Gorillas,  23,  24,  26,  27,  41,  44, 
48,  84. 

Government,  definition  of,  157, 
175,  176. 

Grammar,  origin  of,  88. 

Greek  language,  88. 

Gregarious  animals,  15,  41,  42. 

Group  marriage,  in  savage  so- 
ciety, 105;  among  Australian 
aborigines,  106;  disputed  by 
Westermarck,  108;  confirmed 
by  observation,  113;  genesis 
of,  116-118. 

Gulick,  S.  L.,  on  impersonality 
of  Japanese,  102. 

Haeckel,  E.,  classes  the  State 
as  a  biological  product,  2;  on 
pedigree  of  Man,  27;  his 
graphic  representation  of, 
29;  on  antiquity  of  Man,  39; 


INDEX 


185 


on  mental  evolution,  54;  on 
causal  importance  of  speech, 
128. 

Hartmann,    R.,    on    anthropoid 
apes,  36,  41. 


advocated    by    Huxley,    124- 
126;  logical  defect  of,  127. 
Institution,  the,  defined,  175. 

Japan,  8,  102. 


Henry    IV.,    King    of    France,      Javanese,    numerous    pronouns 


150. 


in,   95. 


Hobhouse,  L.  T.,  cited,  8,  62,  71.      John,  King  of  England,  150. 
Holophase,    primitive    form    of      Judd,  C.  H.,  on  inadequacy  of 

evolution, 


speech,    86,   94. 

Hopf,  L.,  on  human  species, 
37  n. 

Howard,  G.  E.,  on  history  of 
marriage,  112  n. 

Howitt,  A.  W.,  on  Australian 
aborigines,  116  et  seq.,  on  po- 
litical office  among,  145  et 
seq. 

Hulock,  ape   species,  42. 

Hutchinson,  W.,  on  physical 
basis  of  speech,  104. 

Huxley,  J.  S.,  on  compound  in- 
dividuality, 160. 

Huxley,  T.  H.,  mentioned,  8;  on 
Man's  place  in  nature,  124  et 
seq.,  on  ethics  and  evolution, 
134  et  seq. 

Inca  State,  148. 

India,  8. 

Individual,  of  the  human  spe- 
cies a  social  product,  80;  a 
late  development,  98-101 ;  a 
creature  of  the  State,  144; 
not  a  monad,  172;  definition 
of,  175;  ethical  status  of,  177. 

Individual  Hypothesis,  indi- 
cated by  Darwin,  20,  23;  gen- 
erally held  by  biologists,  49; 
biological  evidence  of,  51 ;  in- 
adequate in  case  of  Man,  68; 
discredited  by  psychological 
data,  81;  and  by  linguistic 
data,  103;  irreconcilable  with 
anthropological  data,  122 ; 


organic  evolution,  68-70 ; 
cited,  71;  on  language,  "82 ;  on 
evolution  of  consciousness, 
139. 

Keith,  A.,  on  comparative  brain 
development,  76;  Man  never 
arboreal,  133. 

Kellogg,  V.  L.,  cited,  2  n,  50  n. 

Kidd,  B.,  mentioned,  8. 

Kinship,  systems  of,  106;  an- 
thropological research  into, 
111  et  seq. 

Klaatsch,  Prof.,  on  descent  of 
Man,  32. 

Kropotkin,  P.,  mentioned,  8;  on 
animal  sociality,  42;  on  the 
gorilla,  44. 

Language,   see   Speech. 

Lemurs,  26,  30,  42. 

Liberty,  nature  of  in  human 
species,  177. 

Linnaeus,  cited,  5,  24. 

Lowell,  P.,  on  Eastern  defi- 
ciency in  personality,  101. 

Lubbock,  Sir  John,  on  the 
senses,  64;  on  archaic  society, 
105,  109. 

McLennan,  J.  F.,  mentioned, 
105,  109. 

Maine,  Sir  H.  S.,  on  ancient 
law,  99. 

Malay,  linguistic  characterist- 
ics, 95. 


186 


Mammalian  beginnings,  small 
size  a  characteristic,  50. 

Man,  origin  of,  12;  views  of 
Darwin  on,  13-25;  mental  and 
moral  faculties,  14-17;  his 
brain,  14,  18,  71-74,  76;  races 
of,  19;  genealogy  of,  26;  new 
theories  as  to  origin,  30;  evi- 
dence of  embryology,  34-36; 
divergence  from  ape  type, 
37;  antiquity  of,  39;  every- 
where a  social  animal,  45-47 ; 
pre-historic  relics  of,  50;  evo- 
lution of  his  mentality,  52- 
54,  57,  58,  60,  69,  70;  evolved 
from  a  social  animal,  55; 
special  factors  in  his  evolu- 
tion, 68-73;  significance  of 
physical  characteristics,  72 ; 
difficulties  removed  by  Social 
Hypothesis,  72-77;  social  ori- 
gin of  faculties,  78-81;  social 
origin  of  language,  84-97, 
103;  late  development  of  his 
personality,  98-102;  his  prim- 
itive condition,  107-121 ;  Hux- 
ley's account  of,  124-126;  a 
social  product,  128,  137,  174; 
never  an  arboreal  animal, 
133;  alone  inhabits  the  psy- 
chosphere,  137;  physically  a 
low  type,  138;  dawn  of  rea- 
son, 142;  by  nature  a  politi- 
cal animal,  145,  175;  his 
knowledge  a  biologic  adjust- 
ment, 165;  Stateless  man  an 
impossibility,  174;  his  nature 
formed  by  government,  175; 
his  perfection  the  aim  of  the 
State. 

Marx,  K.,  cited,  7,  8,  163. 

Metchnikoff,  E.,  on  compara- 
tive embryology,  35. 

Miocene  Bridge,  between  Asia 
and  America,  45. 


Missing  Link,  the,  27. 
i  Mjonkeys,  26,  28. 

Morgan,  C.  L.,  on  animal  in- 
telligence, 61 ;  on  human  men- 
tality, 70. 

Morgan,  L.  H.,  on  ancient  so- 
ciety, 105;  discovers  classifi- 
catory  system,  112;  on  the 
State,  146;  on  tribal  organi- 
zation, 154. 

Murray,  Sir  J.,  on  the  geo- 
spheres,  137. 

Naturalistic  Concept,  intro- 
duced by  Darwin,  2;  adopted 
by  Bagehot,  3;  and  by  See- 
ley,  4;  discarded  by  political 
science,  6;  effect  on  political 
speculation,  7;  its  world- 
wide influence,  7;  discordant 
interpretations  of,  8,  25;  its 
significance  determined,  145 ; 
applied  to  the  State,  146-161 ; 
methodological  value  of,  162- 
178. 

Natural  Selection,  see  Evolu- 
tionary process. 

Nietzche,  F.,  mentioned,  8. 

Oppenheimer,  F.,  on  the  State, 

154. 

Orang,  ape  species,  26,  27,  48. 
Osborn,  H.  F.,  on  evidence  of 

paleontology,  29. 

Payne,  E.  J.,  on  origin  of  lan- 
guage, 92  et  seq.,  on  institu- 
tional beginnings,  162  et  seq. 

Pithecanthropus,  31. 

Political  Science,  affected  by 
Darwinism,  2-6;  its  method, 
168;  its  terminology,  156  et 
seq. 

Polysynthetic  language,  87,  90. 

Prarie  dog,  43. 


INDEX 


187 


Primitive  society,  domestic  in- 
stitutions of,  105;  systems  of 
Kinship,  108-117;  the  undi- 
vided Commune,  118;  signifi- 
cance of  Totemism,  119-121. 

Propitheconthropi,  hypothetical 
genus,  ancestral  to  Man,  33. 

Psychosphere,  a  region  peculiar 
to  Man,  137. 

Pygmies,  131,  132. 

Reclus,  E.,  on  primitive 
thought  99. 

Rights,  not  innate,  176;  cor- 
related with  duties,  177. 

Romanes,  J.  G.,  on  mental  evo- 
lution, 54  et  seq.,  on  origin  of 
language,  84  et  seq. 

Samangs,  live  in  trees,   132. 

Sayce,  A.  H.,  on  origin  of  lan- 
guage, 88  et  seq. 

Schwalbe,  G.,  on  descent  of 
Man,  30. 

Secondary  period,  38. 

Seeley,  Sir  J.  R.,  cited,  4. 

Seligman,  E.  R.  A.,  in  economic 
determinism,  163  n.,  164. 

Siamang,  ape  species,  42. 

Sidgwick,  H.,  on  method  of  po- 
litical science,  168. 

Smith,  A.  H.,  on  Chinese,  100. 

Social  insects,  evolution  of,  10; 
produced  by  social  evolution, 
11,  13,  14,  17,  56,  126;  al- 
truism of,  16;  intelligence  of 
65,  75;  polymorphism  of,  128. 
166;  highly  developed  in- 
stincts, 138;  their  communi- 
ties are  organisms,  67,  159 : 
and  are  biological  individuals, 
160;  classification  of  species, 
166. 

Social  Hypothesis,  indicated  by 
Darwin,  11,  13,  19,  23;  bio- 


logical data  inconclusive,  51 ; 
adopted  by  Romanes,  56,  85; 
its  implications,  71-74;  psy- 
chological evidence  of,  77-81; 
supported  by  linguistic  data, 
103;  and  by  anthropological 
data,  122;  accounts  for  dif- 
ference between  Man  and  ani- 
mals, 135-139;  also  for  altru- 
ism and  aesthetics,  140;  fa- 
vored by  combined  weight  of 
evidence,  141,  145;  in  agree- 
ment with  Aristotelian  doc- 
trine, 144;  corollaries  of,  174- 
177. 

Socialism,  exploits  Darwinism,  7. 

Society^  scope  of  term,  J47; 
distinguished  from  the  State, 
148,  158,  175,  178;  etymology 
of  term,  149. 

Sociology,  its  method,  147. 

Speech,  not  due  to  individual 
advantage,  83;  sociality  a 
prerequisite,  84;  genesis  of, 
86-96;  organ  of  group  per- 
sonality, 97;  a  social  product, 
103;  physical  basis  of,  104. 

Spencer,  H.,  biological  inter- 
pretation of  politics,  3;  men- 
tioned, 8. 

Spencer,  B.,  on  Australian  abo- 
rigines, 113  et  seq.;  origin  of 
Totemism,  119. 

Sponges,  48. 

Sovereignty,  denned,  176. 

State,  the,  Aristotle  on,  144; 
significance  of  term,  146  et 
seq.;  etymology  of,  149;  gen- 
eric value  of  term,  149  et 
seq.,  distinguished  from  gov- 
ernment, 157;  from  society, 
158;  is  an  organism,  158  et 
seq.;  classifications  of,  166  et 
seq.;  specific  variation  of, 
169;  definition  of,  174  et  seq. 


188 


INDEX 


Taine,  H.,  mentioned,  8. 

Tertiary  period,  Man's  origin 
in,  39,  40;  land  distribution 
in,  45;  hey-day  of  mammalian 
life,  48. 

Thomson,  J.  A.,  44. 

Thorndike,  E.  L.,  on  animal  in- 
telligence, 57-59;  mental  dif- 
ference between  Man  and 
animals,  136. 

Totemism,  world-wide  spread 
of,  119;  its  character,  120; 
its  origin,  120  et  seq.;  earliest 
activity  of  reason,  142;  origi- 
nated myth,  art  and  ritual, 
143. 

Tribe,  a  low  form  of  the  State, 
150  et  seq.;  etymology  of 
term,  156. 

Tylor,  E.  B.,  on  paleolithic 
man,  46  n.;  aids  Australian 
research,  113. 


Undivided  Commune,  primor- 
dial form  of  the  State,  116, 
118,  122,  143,  174. 

Vizacha,  gregarious  animals,  43. 

Wallace,  A.  R.,  on  mental  de- 
velopment, 18;  on  monkeys, 
37;  on  affinities  of  Man  and 
apes,  40;  special  factors  in 
human  evolution,  73. 

Washburn,  M.  F.,  on  animal  in- 
telligence, 61. 

Watson,  J.  B.,  on  animal  in- 
telligence, 56,  59,  60. 

Westermarck,  E.,  on  origin  of 
family,  108. 

Wheeler,  W.  M.,  on  ant  life,  66. 

Whitney,  W.  D.,  on  origin  of 
speech,  86. 

Wundt,  W.,  on  origin  of  speech, 
87,  90. 


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